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PRELIMINARY MEHORANDUM 
November 13 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 81-554 ADX 
EEOC 
v. 
~ from DWyo (Brimmer) 
Federal/Civil Timely d:. Wyoming,~ 
SUHHARY: The SG argues that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment by including 
state and local governments within its coverage. 
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: Wyoming permits the involuntary 
retirement of Game and Fish Department employees at age 55 and 
requires their retirement at 65. The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) forbids discrimination on the basis of age 
- 2 -
against employees between the ages of 40 and 70 by requiring them 
to retire involuntarily. In 1974, the ADEA was amended to 
include state and local government employers. 
After receiving a complaint from a Wyoming state employee 
who was forced to retire at 55 and after unsuccessfully seeking 
conciliation, the EEOC filed suit in DWyo. The DC found that 
Congress had relied only upon the Commerce Clause when it enacted 
the ADEA. Then, the court cited National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), and held that the 1974 ADEA 
amendments violated the Tenth Amendment. The court was 
particularly perturbed by the inconsistency of the federal 
government imposing mandatory retirement upon some of its workers 
and simultaneously forbidding the states to do the same thing. 
Because of this inconsistency and because of the importance of 
the state functions of law enforcement and recreation, the DC 
found that the federal interest in preventing discrimination 
against older state employees could not outweigh the state's 
interest in setting age limits for its these members of its work 
force. 
CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that Congress did indeed rely 
upon the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted the 1974 ADEA 
amendments, because the legislative history contains references 
to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the EEOC. Every 
other court that has faced the issue has decided that the 1974 
amendments are appropriate legislation to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment. ~, Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (CA4 
1977). See cases cited at J.S. 10. Because the 1974 amendments 
I 
- 3 -
are an exercise of congressional power under §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, they cannot be invalidated by the Tenth Amendment. 
See City of Rome v. United States, 446 u.s. 156 (1980). 
Even if Congress acted under only the Commerce Clause, the 
1974 amendments are valid. National League of Cities struck down 
a congressional attempt to regulate the wages of state employees. 
The instant prohibition upon arbitrary age-based discrimination, 
by contrast, does not involve a fundamental employment decision 
essential to the separate existence of the states. Wyoming 
remains free to retire older employees who are unable to perform 
their jobs, and Wyoming has not argued that the application of 
the 1974 amendments would have a serious adverse impact on its 
budget. In this case, the federal interest in abolishing 
arbitrary age discrimination thus outweighs the state's interest. 
DISCUSSION: The DC holding that Congress did not act under 
§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ~nflicts with the CA4 decision 
and the decisions of several DC's. In addition, this case 
obviously presents an important federal question, the 
constitutionality of the 1974 ADEA amendments. The Court should 
call for a response, but, in the end, the Court will almost 
certainly note. 
Call for a response, looking to note. 
Of course, there is no response. 
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WYOMING, et al. 
/ 
Motion of Parties to Dispense 
with Printing the Joint 
Appendix 
SUMMARY: The SG on behalf of the appellant (EEOC) moves to dis-
pense with printing an appendix. This case (jurisdiction noted Jan. 
11, 1982) addresses the question of whether enforcement of the Age 
1/ 
Discrimination in Employment Act . of 1967- against local and state 
government employers is violative of the Tenth Amendment. The SG 
states that the limited facts are adequately presented in the DC's 
opinion which is included . in the jurisdictional statement. The appel-
lee joins in the request. 
DISCUSSION: In view of the fact that the necessary factual 
basis is presented in readily accessible papers already on file, it 
seems appropriate to grant this motion. 




!/29 U.S.C. 621 et ~-
G\o.~' 
'" ....... 
Employment Act of 1967 (the ADEA) to include 
governments within its coverage? .... 
Background 
A. The Federal Statute. Because this case 
\ 
whether Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant commerce clause or 
to the fourteenth amendment, a brief exam' ation of the history of 
the Act is in order. 
Congress first considered acting legislation to prohibit age 
legislative process that culminated in the 
enactment of in 1964. While Congress did not include age 
discrimin tion in the prohibitions of title VII, the Civil Rights 
.. 
Act of 1964 directed the Secretary of Labor to make a study of age 
discrimination in employment and of the consequences of such 




Congress enacted the ADEA, prohibiting employers from discriminating 
on the basis of age against employees between the ages of forty and 
seventy years by, among other things, requiring them to retire 
involuntarily. Section 2 of the ADEA declares: "Congress .•. finds •.. 
that •.• the existence in industries ~fecting commerce, of arbitrary 
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and 
the free flow of goods in commerce." The~A adopted the 
enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 u.s.c. §626(b), a comme~e clause act, but ----
many of its prohibitions resemble those in title VII. 
Congress first considered extending the ADEA to state and local 
government employers in 1972 when it extended title VII to such --
employers. The amendments to title VII clearly had roots in section 
5 of the fourteenth amendment. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. 19 (1971). Shortly after Congress amended title VII, 
Senator Bentsen proposed amending a FLSA bill to extend the ADEA, 
specifically noting that "principles underlying the" title VII 
' 
provisions· are "directly applicable to the" ADEA. 118 Cong. Rec. 
15895 (1972). 
The FLSA bill was not passed, however, until 1974. The House ..... 
' report explicitly relied upon Congress' commerc wer, the 
introduction alone mentioning effects on "commerce" nine times. 
Although this statement apparently refers to the FLSA provisions, 
there is no additional purpose preceding the amendments relating to 
..) . 
the ADEA. The House report stated that the "amendment [of ADEA] is 
a logical extension of the committee's decision to extend FLSA 
coverage to Federal, State and local government employers" and 
interpreted Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 u.s. 183 (1968) (upholding 
Congress' use of the commerce power to extend coverage of the FLSA 
to state-operated schools and hospitals) (overruled in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976)), to mean that the 
FLSA's coverage is clearly within the power of Congress under the 
commerce clause. In addition, during floor debate in the House, 
Representative Dent specifically relied on Wirtz when asked whether 
it would be constitutional to bring government workers within ADEA. 
See 120 Cong. Rec. 7337 (1974). 
The House report also, however, deplored "'age-ism' ... as [being 
as] great an evil in our society as discrimination based on 
race ..•• " There are frequent comparisons in the legislative history 
of the Act between discrimination based on age and discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, and national origin. The 1972 House 
report on the title VII extension stated: "The Constitution has 
recognized that it is inimical to •.• democratic •.. government ••• to 
allow ... discrimination in [the] bureaucratic systems which most 
directly affect the ..• citizens. The clear intention of 
the ••. Fourteenth Amendment[] is to prohibit all forms of 
~ discrimination." 
~~1) Conclusion. As petr concedes, Congress clearly relied upon 
~e ~use to enact the 1974 amendments. The evidence 
~~~~dicating that Congress relied upon the fourteenth amendment is 




the 1974 amendments is there an explicitly stated intent to act 
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Analogy to title VII is also 
largely unavailing. This Court has previously examined the 
provisions of both title VII and the ADEA and found that, while 
there are "important similarities between the two statutes," there 
exist~ignificant differences" . as well. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
u.s. 575, 584 (1978). More important, the fact that Congress 
eschewed proposals on several occasions to incorporate the age 
discrimination proscription into title VII indicates, if anything, 
an intent not to base the ADEA amendments on section 5 rather than 
any oversigh~. On the other hand, there are enough ambiguous 
passages in the legislative history, and similarities with title 
VII, to permit a court to infer, as many lower courts have done, 
that Congress relied at least in part on its section 5 powers. See 
H. Rep. No. 95-527, pt. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977) (noting 
~- that National League of Cities did not apply to laws, such as the 
ADEA, preventing employment discrimination) • 
One thing is clear: Congress did not doubt that it had under 
Wirtz the power to enact the amendments, and if Congress had enacted 
them subsequent to National League of Cities, C0?9jjes~ m~ht well 
rjJftij~. 
have acted expressly pursuant to section 5. It-also seems clear 
lt. 
that many congressmen viewed age discrimination as a subject matter 
that could properly have been included in title VII. 
(2) Federal law enforcement employees. The amendments in 1974 
also extended ADEA coverage to the executive branch of the federal 
government. 29 u.s.c. §633(a). The same Congress, however, 
required law enforcement officers and firefighters at the federal 
'·· . 
::> • 
level, some 40,000 employees, to "be separated from service .•• [when 
they] become[] 55 years of age or complete[] 20 years of service if 
then over that age." 5 u.s.c. §8335 (b). The Senate Report 
indicated that Congress recognized "that these occupations should be 
composed .•• of young men and women physically capable of meeting the 
vigorous demands which are far more taxing physically than most in 
the Federal Service ..•. Older employees in these occupations should 
be encouraged to retire." S. Rep. No. 948, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 
reprinted in [1974] u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3699 (1974). See 
also 5 u.s.c. §8335(a) (air traffic controllers retire at age 56); 
id., §8335(c) (employees of Panama Canal Commission and Alaska 
Railroad retire at 62). 
•' ,•'' 
B. The State Statute. Resp state's game wardens are law 
enforcement officers, and are authorized to make arrests and enforce 
criminal violations of state. ga~e and fish laws. Resp state 
requires the retirement of full-time law enforcement officers of the 
': v-
game department at age 55. According to amici curiae, twenty-eight 
l
)states, and many cities, counties, and towns, mandate the retirement 
of law enforcement personnel prior to age seventy. 
J 
Discussion 
. I. Commerce Clause 
In National League of Cities, the Court held that the 1974 
amendments to the FLSA, which extended the minimum wage and maximum 
hour provisions to individuals employed by the states, were 
unconstitutional because they "directly supplant[ed] the .•• choices 
of the States' ... officials .•. as to how they wish to structure pay 
scales in state employment." 426 U.S., at 848. The Court observed 
~-~td-k ~t-'}td.~ ~ 
that the amendments sought "to regulate directly the activitie~ 
States as public employers," id. at 841, 'and "withdrew from the 
States the authority to make ..• fundamental employment decisions •.. ," 
id., at 851. Finding that "[o]ne undoubted attribute of state 
sovereignty is the States' power to determine the wages which shall 
be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their 
governmental functions [and] what hours those persons will work," 
id. at 845, the Court concluded that "the challenged amendments 
operate[d] to directly displace the States' 
integral operations in areas of traditional 
id. at 852. 
--- As explained in~el v. Vir inia Surface Minin & Reclamation 
Association, 452 u.s. 264, 287-288 (1981), there are ~e 
conditions for establishing that congressional commerce power 
r---
legislation is invalid under the tenth amendment: (1) "there must be 
a showing that the challenged statute regulates the 'States as 
States'": (2) "the federal regulation must address matters that are 
indisputably 'attribute[s] of s~ate sovereignty'"; and (3) "it must 
be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would 
directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in 
areas of tradiiional governmental functions.'" 
A. Regulation of States as States. It is clear, and petr 
~ concedes, that the ADEA regulates "the States~ States." 
B. Indisputable attributes of state sovereinty. The tenth 
amendment, according to petr, prohibits Congress from regulating 
only those fundamental employment decisions that are essential to 
the independent existence of the states, and the power of state 
government to discriminate arbitrarily in employment on the basis of 
age is not a legitimate attribute of sovereignty. The ADEA does not 
interfere with the states' power to prescribe reasonable 
qualifications for those individuals to be employed to carry out 
state functions or to discharge those individuals found unfit for 
state employment. 29 u.s.c. §623{f) {1) {providing bona fide 
occupational qualification exemption). 
Resps contend that National League of Cities stands at least 
for the proposition that the establishment of employment terms for 
state employees is indisputably an attribute of sovereignty. 
-Although there is no exhaustive list of what is included in the term 
"attributes of sovereignt~," the Court observed in United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, 102 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 
I 
n.ll {1982) {quoting Layfayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U.S. 389, 422 {1978) {Burger, C.J., concurring)): "The National 
League of Cities opinion focused its delineation of the 'attributes 
of sovereignty' •.• on a determination as' to whether the State's 
interest involved 'functions essential to separate and independent 
existence.'" Police forces and wildlife management are traditional 
state functions, see National League of Cities, 426 u.s., at 851 
{"employer-employee relationships in ..• police protection .•. and parks 
and recreation"), and the dl!ration o.t....tQ_e term of emplqyment is no ----------
less essential to "independent existence" and the structuring of the 
police service than is the compensation to be paid. 
Resps concede that the ability to discriminate arbitrarily is 
not an attribute of state sovereignty, maintaining that the 
Constitution, see Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
8. 
u.s. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam), without the ADEA, precludes that. 
Rather than being arbitrary, however, the setting of a reasonable 
term of employment based on age for state law enforcement officers 
is a rational classification that receives only minimal scrutiny 
under the equal protection clause. See id., at 315. Rationality is 
proved, in part, by the fact that resps' mandatory retirement 
requirement for law enforcement officers is very similar to the one 
for federal officers. 
Resps also take issue with petr's argument that the BFOQ 
exemption sufficiently protects state sovereignty prerogative. 
Reliance ~n the exemption turns the determination whether an 
attribut~ of state sovereignty is involved into a battle of experts 
that eliminates the possibilty of a coherent and consistent 
resolution of the issue. It would seem that the retirement of law 
enforcement officers at ages less than 70 should be either 
reasonable as a BFOQ or arbitrary as age discrimination, no matter 
where the case may be tried or which party is able to employ the 
most impressive experts. Thus, the issue here is not how this issue 
is decided, but who decides it. 
Determination of the length of employment for state law 
enforcement officers seems to be as much an "attribute of 
sovereignty" as does determination of wages for state employees. It 
seems difficult to conclude that ADEA does not represent an attempt 
by Congress to "regulate directly the activities of States as public 
employers," National League of Cities, 426 u.s., at 841; "directly 
supplant[] the considered policy choices of the States' elected 
officials •.• as to how they wish to structure" a retirement program 
~-
for their employees, id. at 848; and "directly penalize[] the States 
for choosing to hire governmental employees on terms different from 
those which Congress has sought to impose," id. at 849. 
c. Direct Impairment of Traditional Functions. Petr concedes 
that wildlife management is a traditional government function. 
It is unclear whether the actual effect of the congressional 
enactment determines whether the tenth amendment is a bar to the 
ADEA's application to the states. The Court in National League of 
Cities indicated that actual impact was not determinative: "We do 
not believe particularized assessments of actual impact are crucial 
to the resolution of the issue presented .... [T]he dispositive 
factor is that Congress has attempted to exercise its Commerce 
Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be 
paid by the States •••• " 426 u.s., at 851-852. In Hodel, the Court 
explained: "[T]he determinative factor in [National League of 
Cities] was the nature of the federal action, not the ultimate 
economic impact on the States." 452 u.s., at 292 n.33. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to discuss the "nature" of the federal 
action, and how it affects traditional state functions, without some 
discussion of actual effects. What the Court has probably meant is 
that the National League of Cities doctrine will preclude completely 
certain congressional action, i.e., the ADEA, that adversely impacts 
on certain state functions, i.e., law enforcement, regardless of its 
impact on other state activities. 
Petr argues that the budgetary considerations noted in National 
League of Cities, where federal minimum wage requirements could have 
forced the restructuring of entire state government departments and 
.LU. 
required the elimination of entire functions, see 426 U.S., at 846-
852, are absent in this case. Petr argues that merely requiring a 
state to consider the facts relevant to promulgating a mandatory 
retirement age does not impair the state's ability "to structure 
integral operations" in any sense comparable to the impairment the 
Court concluded would follow from the financial consequences of 
enforcing the FLSA provisions at issue in National League of Cities. 
The impact on employment conditions here, however, is certainly 
s~ar to that in National League of Cities. Petr claims back 
wages for the game warden, and under 29 u.s.c. §626(b}, these - ---..... 
damages are "deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime 
compensation" under the FLSA. Such damages, presumably, cannot be 
assessed against a state under National League of Cities. 
If there is any distinction between the "nature" of the federal 
action in this case and that in National League of Cities, it must 
be with actual impact. Some economic impact seems certain. In 
order to comply with the ADEA, the states must either (1} prove that 
age is a BFOQ or (2} forestall mandatory retirement of law 
enforcement personnel until age 70. From the states' perspective, 
each alternative requires unnecessary consumption of scarce 
resources. 
The availability of the BFOQ exemption is of little solace to 
state and local governments faced with the costs of attorneys' fees, 
expenses of expert consultants and witnesses, and other litigative 
expenses. Litigation of a BFOQ defense for all law enforcement _ _..;;; __ 
officers in a department, for each position, or for particular 
personnel actions also diverts valuable law enforcement personnel 
from their normal duties. Moreover, a BFOQ exemption is extremely 
difficult to win even when there are resources to litigate. 
Compliance also has costs: ~ 
(1} Salaries generally increase with years of service. There 
usually are increased costs of life insurance benefits with age. 
Studies have shown that increases in age correlate positively with 
increases in the frequency as well as the duration of health 
insurance claims. Law enforcement personnel are often subject to 
statutes defining certain occupational diseases which, if 
contraction results in death or disability, entitle the employee to 
benefits. To the extent that the likelihood of developing ailments 
increases with age, the state would be forced to fund a higher 
number of disability pensions, often paid at full salary. 
(2} State inability to structure retirement schemes could retard 
upward mobility in law enforcement positions, thereby reducing the 
states' ability to recruit talented men and women for those 
positions and thwarting to some degree affirmative action efforts. 
(3} Resps contend that the ADEA will lead to the restructuring 
of its retirement pension system for state law enforcement officers. 
The resp state presently requires accelerated retirement 
contributions in order to provide law officers the same benefits 
level as it provides for other employees, but at an earlier age. 
Although it may be actuarially possible to balance the fund 
periodically and still give law officers the opportunity to retire 
at 55, such a system would at least require some restructuring of 
the benefits program and would probably require the resp state to 
contribute on a periodic basis • 
. . 
LZ. 
(4) Because of the unpredictability of actual retirement dates, 
personnel administrators will no longer be able as easily to fill 
vacancies by scheduling of merit selection and training programs. 
d 
(5) Finally, there is a relationship between the natural 
~ 
degenerative process as a person ages and the person's ability to 
~ provide effective law enforcement services. To force state and 
local governments to comply with the ADEA may materially affect the 
quality and availability of protective services that are demanded by 
the public, and require the state to spend more for the same level 
of protective service. 
Despite these effects upon the states, the ADEA's actual impact 
on the overall state governments may be more limited than the effect 
of the FLSA provisions at issue in National League of Cities. On 
the other hand, the interference is more in de r e ~han in ~ind. 
Because salary and pension contributions are simply different parts 
of one employment benefit package, it is likely that an increase in 
one will decrease the othe~~ thus forcing the states to allocate its 
resources in a manner dictated by Congress. It would seem that the 
states' ability to structure its employment conditions is 
significantly altered by the "nature" of the federal action at issue 
here. 
D. Balancing. The Court has indicated that even the direct 
impairment of traditional state functions is sometimes permissible 
when the federal interest outweighs the state interest. See Hodel, 
452 u.s., at 288 n.29. Under this analysis, petr argues that 
Congress' extension of the ADEA to state governments is an 
appropriate exercise of its authority under the commerce clause 
I ' 
lJ. 
because the national interest in protecting individuals from age 
discrimination far outweighs any legitimate interest that the states 
may have in requiring the retirement of productive employees. In 
1965, a million man-years of productive time went unused because of 
unemployment of workers over 45, and the total cost to the national 
economy was somewhere in the area of four billion dollars (1951 
prices). The 1974 extension is properly viewed as reflecting 
congressional recognition that the private sector cannot carry the 
entire responsibility for providing older workers in the nation's 
economy with productive employment opportunities. Resps, on the 
other hand, argue that no overriding federal interest is presented, 
demonstrated by the existence of a virtually identical retirement 
system imposed for federal law enforcement officers and firefighters 
by the 1974 Congress. 
If there is any balancing between the national and state 
interests, it must necessarily be ad hoc, but the Court's discussion 
in National League of Cities would indicate that police protection 
and parks and recreation are state services that traditionally have 
been left to the states. The inconsistency of Congress on age 
discrimination also undercuts any overriding federal interest in 
preventing states from exercising their powers in similar fashion. 
~- Petr is essentially making extremely fine 
distinctions between this case and National League of Cities, and 
unless National League of Cities is to be limited to the minimum 
wage and hour provisions of the FLSA, and nothing in that case so 
indicates, National League of Cities should control this case. On 
the other hand, after Hodel, the National League of Cities test is 
14. 
so flexible that almost any result, while open to criticism, could 
be justified. If the Court is unwilling to hold the ADEA amendments 
unconsitutional, thought should be given to overruling National 
League of Cities. The case has generated a significant amount of 
this Court's business since 1976, and the Hodel reformulation leaves 
its application unpredictable and unprincipled. --------II. Fourteenth Amendment &/.M-~ --
Congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 
is not restricted by the tenth amendment, see Hodel, 452 u.s., at 
287 n.28, and as a general rule, "[t]he question of the ~~ 
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not de~·~~ 
recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise."7
Miller Co., 333 u.s. 138, 144 (1948). See Katzenbach v. Morgan,~ 
u.s. 641, 646-647 n.5, (1966). Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 
448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Congress is not expected 
to act as though it were duty bound to find facts and make 
conclusions of law."). 
The difficulty is that, in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 
451 u.s. 1 (1981), the Court stated its test for "determining when 
Congress intends to enforce [the] guarantees [of the fourteenth 
amendment]": "Because such legislation imposes congressional policy 
on a State involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on 
traditional state authority, we should not quickly attribut to 
-----------~------~--~ Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to nforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 16 (Rehnquist, J., joined by 
------...> 
Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Bl9ckmun, P9well ~Stevens, JJ.). The 
Court noted that, in cases going to Congress' power to secure 
J.:>. 
guarantees under the fourteenth amendment, such as Morgan, Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 u.s. 112 (1970}, and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 
445 (1976} , Congress "expressly articulated its intent to legislate 
pursuant to §5." 426 u.s., at 14. Justice White's dissent, joined 
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated: "[I]t should not be 
lightly assumed that Congress acted pursuant to its power under §5 
in passing the [Developmentally Disabled Assistance] Act. Here, 
there is no conclusive basis for determining that Congress acted 
/ 
pursuant to §5." -' 451 u.s., at 35-36 (emphasis added}. That 
"conclusive basis" must be ascertained, according to the three, by 
examination of the statutory language, the structure of the act in 
question and its relationship to other acts as evidenced by cross-
references stated in the act itself, and a combination of "all 
objective considerations" connected with the act. Id., at 36. The 
concurring Justices did not expressly disapprove of the majority's 
"clearly stated intent" test, but merely considered it along with 
other factors. 
Petr argues that the priniciple enunciated by the Court is 
certainly a guide to statutory construction, but is of doubtful 
application in a case, such as this one, where Congress clearly 
intended to impose its policy ·on the states. The Court in Pennhurst 
was resolving an issue of statutory construction, not, as here, a 
question of congressional authority to legislate. Moreover, in 
citing to Morgan and Oregon, the Court stated that these cases 
"involved statutes which simply prohibited certain kinds of state 
conduct." 451 u.s., at 16. Arguably, this case is one where the 
16. 
Court has suggested that closer scrutiny 'of congressional motive is 
unnecessary. 
Petr's interpretation of Pennhurst is appealing but doubtful. 
It is difficult to argue that Pennhurst did not address, "as here, a 
question of congressional authority to legislate." See id., at 15 
{"In discerning congressional intent, we necessarily turn to the 
possible sources of Congress' power to legislate.") {emphasis 
added). Moreover, congressional intent to impose its policy on the 
states is not an 
FLSA of 1974 struck down in National League of Cities. Finally, 
although "[t]he case for inferring intent is at its weakest," id., 
at 16, with statutes creating an affirmative obligation, nowhere in 
Pennhurst did the Court suggest that it is unnecessary to find 
explicit intent where a statute merely prohibits conduct. 
Assuming that the Court is bound by the Pennhurst 
"nonimplication" rule, petr alternatively argues that, although the 
legislative history of the ADEA is not extensive, what evidence 
there is supports the conclusion that Congress understood that the 
1974 extension was supported by both the commerce clause and section 
5. Even the less demanding "conclusive basis" test, however, is not 
easily met in the face of the ADEA's commerce-related definitions; 
Congress' declaration of age discrimination creating a burden on 
commerce; the interrelationship between the ADEA and the FLSA; 
Congress' rejection of the proposal to incorporate the 1974 ADEA 
amendments into title VII of the Civil Rights Act; and the absence 
of any congressional statement to the effect that its fourteenth 





Assuming that Congress did act pursuant to section 5, it "may 
only 'enforce' the provisions of the amendments and may do so only 
by 'appropriate legislation.'" Oregon, 400 u.s., at 128 (Black, 
J.). In Morgan, 384 u.s., at 651, the Court held that, under 
section 5, legislation is "appropriate legislation" to enforce the 
provisions of the fourteenth amendment if it is (1) a measure to 
enforce rights protected by the fourteenth amendment; (2) "plainly 
adapted to that end"; and (3) consistent with "the letter and the 
spirit of the constitution." 
(1) Substantive Rights. Petr argues that the ADEA enforces 
rights granted by the fourteenth amendment by protecting individuals 
against adverse employment decisions based upon an arbitrary 
classification. Like arbitrary classifications based on race, sex, 
or religion, classifications based on age impermissibly disadvantage 
individuals by substituting stereotyped class-based assumptions for 
determinations based on individual merit. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to equate age discrimination with race or sex 
discrimination. Race and sex discrimination results in employment 
~
because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his 
abilities to do a job. ~ however, is at some point inherently 
In-related to ability. 
~
In~urgia, the Court held that a state statute mandating 
retirement of a state police officer at 50 years rationally 
_:;;-
furthered the state's purpose of assuring the physical fitness of 
its state police officers and "clearly meets the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause." 427 u.s., at 314. The Court reviewed the 
statute under its rationality test. It is difficult to see why 
. ' 
.J..Vo 
resps' statutes would not similarly withstand challenge on equal 
protection grounds. See also Vance v. Bradley, 440 u.s. 93 (1979} 
(holding that a requirement of retirement of Foreign Service 
personnel at age 60 was not violative of fifth amendment equal 
protection}; Oregon, supra (finding that Congress did not have th!---
power to reduce the voting age for state elections from 21 to 18}. 
Indeed, petr does not argue that the equal protection clause 
prohibits resps' mandatory retirement age. Rather, petr contends 
that a mandatory retirement statute that does not rationally further 
any legitimate state purpose violates the equal protection clause 
even under the relaxed standard, see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
102 s.ct. 1148, 1162 (1982} (Powell, J., concurring in the 
judgment}, and the ADEA simply requires a closer fit between the 
state's goals and the means used to reach them. Such an argument, 
however, must implicitly assume that Congress can consider~ 
discrimination a proper subject for congressional action under 
section 5. That interpretation broadens considerably the powers of 
Congress, see Oregon, 400 u.s., at 126-127 (Black, J.} ("Nor was the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to permit 
Congress to prohibit every discrimination between groups of 
people.}, and makes any tenth amendment limitation on the commerce 
clause superfluous, id., at 128 ("Congress may not by legislation 
repeal other provisions of the Constitution [and] the power granted 
to Congress was not intended to strip the States of their power to 
govern themselves."}. 
(2} "Adapted to that end." It is thus clear that ADEA does not 
prohibit only those employer practices that would be found 
irrational in a constitutional sense. It is arguable that, to the 
extent that ADEA reaches conduct that may not be unconstitutional, 
it is nevertheless "appropriate" legislation because it was adopted 
to minimize the risk of unconstitutional discrimination by: (1) 
shifting to the public employer the burden of justifying its 
mandatory retirement rule and by requiring a higher standard of 
justification than would be necessary to sustain the rule under the 
fourteenth amendment; (2) eliminating some defenses that would be 
used as a subterfuge for stereotyped judgments regarding older 
workers; and (3) prohibiting mandatory retirement, thus reducing the 
risk that older workers would suffer arbitrary hiring discrimination 
when forced into the job market. 
Resps argue that, rather than reducing the risk of 
unconstitutional discrimination or remedying past discrimination, 
Congress has redefined the appropriate tests for equal protection 
analyses, and that the ADEA does not "plainly enforce" the 
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. It is difficult to conclude 
otherwise. See Morgan, 384 u.s., at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
On the other hand, if Congress can "enforce" the right here, it has 
probably "adapted means to that end." 
(3) "Consistent with the Spirit and Letter." Morgan stated 
that "§5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute 
these guarantees." 384 u.s., at 651 n.lO (Black, J.). The ADEA, by 
limiting the protected class to employees who are between the ages 
of 40 and 70 years, in effect permits the states to discriminate 
against employees who are younger than 40 or older than 70. Resps 
argue that the ADEA itself violates equal protection by creating a 
class based solely on age. 
Clearly, the ADEA classification itself does not violate the 
---~· 
Constitution. Nevertheless, petr's argument is unsettling in that -----it asks the Court to allow Congress to give "substance" to section 1 
rights and then to defer to Congress' arbitrary line-drawing. In 
any case, the fact that Congress created a class of protected 
individuals is an implicit recognition that, while arbitrary age 
discrimination may be evil, discrimination based upon age is not the 
' ~ ........... 
same as discrimination based upon race or sex. It is also difficult 
to contend that ADEA is remedying a critical national problem or 
that there is any supervening national interest justifying 
application of the federal regulation in place of states' laws when 
the federal government is unwilling to follow its own dictates. 
Summary 
1. This case and National League of Cities are too similar to 
distinguish in a principled manner. National League of Cities 
should either control or be overruled. I recommend overruling. ~ 
2. Pennhurst apparently requires some affirmative showing by 
Congress that it relied on its fourteenth amendment powers before 
this Court will infer that Congress acted pursuant to section 5. 
That basis is not present. In any case, it is not at all clear that -ation" pursuan to sect"on 5. I 
/ 
recommend avoiding the difficult fourteenth amendment issue if at 




81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
The SG's Basic Argument (Commerce Power): 
The SG's brief states: 
"The power of state government to 
dlscriminate arbitrarily in employment on the 
basis of age is not a legitimate attribute of 
sovereignty, comparable to the power of the 
state to make fundamental employment 
decisions concerning minimum wages and 
hours". 
Putting it differently, the SG says "arbitrary 
discrimination is not an attribute of state sovereiqnty" *** 
It does not interfere with the state's power to prescribe 
reasonable qual\fications • • • or to discharge individuals 
found unfit" (p. tO). 
Respondent's Answers: 
The Act does interfere with the same state 
sovereignty functions in the same way that the FELA Act did: 
it affects numerous decisions with respect to employment, 
and arguably may be an even greater intrusion on the state's 
authority. For example: 
1. Increased costs. Salaries generally increased 
with years of service. Fringe benefits also continue to 
increase (e.g., cost of group life, health and accident 
insurance). More persons would be retired because of 
disability, often at full salary. 
'· ~ ~.,. 
···~ ~· .. 
''· 
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2. Retirement plans. Structuring retirement 
plans will be more difficult as well as ' expensive. 
3. Handicaps recruiting of talented young people. 
Upward mobility to positions of leadership and higher 
~ salaries will be affected. 
4. Natural degenerative process. As persons age, 
there is some natural degeneration physically and sometimes 
mentally. Identifying this to the point of justifying 
termination of employment will be impossible in most 
situations. 
5. Bona fide occupational qualification. The SG 
says the Act wi.ll not interfere with the "state's power to 
proscribe reasonable qualifications" or "to discharge those 
individuals found unfit". The SG cites the provisjon that 
an employer (the state) need not comply "where age is a bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)". But this usually 
requires litigation. 
6. Litigation. Experience under Title VII 
demonstrates that resulting litigation has been a burden. 
The threat of it has to be considered with respect to every 
employment decision: hiring, promoting, and firing. 
Litigation is expensive, and also distracts key personnel 
from normal duties. 
* * * 
In sum, the states make a rather strong case for 
arguing that there is no distinction on principle between 
the effect on state sovereignty of the Age and 
----------··~·-··------------~---
,. 






Discrimination Act and FELA. I am inclined to agree (for 
Commerce Clause analysis) that National I,eague of Cities 
either must be followed here or overruled. It has been 
undercut to some extent by some by the language in Hodel, 
but this does not justify overruling it. 
The SG also argues that §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment empO'IIers Congress to i.mpose this burden on the 
states. But the legislative history lends no support to 
Congressional reliance on that Amendment. And in Pennhurst 
State School v. Ralaerman (WHR), the opinion suggests that 
we do not assume or imply Congreesional reliance on this 









TO: ,Ji.m Browning DATE: Sept. 22, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powe1l, Jr. 
81-554 EEOC v. Wvomi.ng 
'Thank you for your most helpful bench memo. 
In taking a second look at the briefs, I am 
i.mpresser1 bv the fact that the parties debate whether the 
Age Discrimination Act "directly impairs [the ability of 
states] to structur.e integral ooerations in areas of 
traditional. functions" (see qodel). 
In your memoranrlum you mention, perce9tively, that 
there is a substantial difference between the unfettered 
right to require mandatory retirement at age 65 (for 
example), and the necessitv to make individual judgments 
with respect to every employee over 65 whom the state wishes 
to retire. Apart from other neqati.ves, each of these 
decisions is made in the shadow o€ ~ossible litigation. In 
view of the threat of liti.gation, demonstrated to be a 
reality in thousands of cases since Title VIt was enacted, a 
state government in particular usually would choose to 
retain a marginally incompetent em~loyee rather than 
separate him or her before age 70. 
It would be interesting - if the information is 
readily avai.lable - to know how many suits have been brought 
agai.nst states under the Age Discrimination Act. Would 
Lexis provide this information? At best, it would reflect 
.I 
2. 
only cases of record that have gone to judgment - the tip of 
the iceberg. 
I do not suggest that the number of suits would be 
more than another interesting item of information. In this 
connection, it may be that th~ annual reoort of the 
Administrative Office (full of statistics} would show the 
total number of Title VII cases filed in federal court in a 
fiscal year. We have the 1981 fiscal year report in my 
Chambers (T think Mark may have it). 
r .. F • P • , .J r • 
ss 
! , 
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lfp/ss 09/22/82 
81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
The SG's Basic Argument (Commerce Power): 
The SG's brief states: 
"The power of state government to 
discriminate arbitrarily in employment on the 
basis of age is not a legitimate attribute of . .__ 
sovere1gnty, comparable to the power of the 
state to make fundamental employment 
decisions concerning minimum wages and 
hours". 
Putting it differently, the SG says "arbitrary \ ~~ _ 
discrimination is not an attribute of state sovereignty" ** *} ~~ 
It does not interfere with the state's power to prescribe 
AA. 'fA--•<. ..$ 
reasonable qualifications . . • or to discharge individuals~
found unfit" (p. 10). ~~S"'~ 
p,~ tA-~. "'~ j ( "' ~h-'•Cf 
Respondent's Answers: \ 
The Act does interfere with the same state 
sovereignty functions in the same way that the FELA Act did: 
it affects numerous decisio~ with respect to employment, 
~----------------
and arguably may be an even greater intrusion on the state's 
authority. For example: 
1. Increased costs. ~aries generally increased 
with years of service. Fringe benefits also continue to 
increase (e.g., cost of~oup life, ~ealth and accident 
insurance). More persons would be retired because of 
disability, often at full salary. 
, . .. 
· •. . · 
2. ~tirement plans. Structuring retirement 
plans will be more difficult as well as expensive. 
3. VHandicaps recruiting of talented young people. 
Upward mobility to positions of leadership and higher 
salaries will be affected. 
4. Natural ~egenerative process. As persons age, 
there is some natural degeneration physically and sometimes 
mentally. Identifying this to the point of justifying 
termination of employment will be impossible in most 
situations. 
5. Bona fide occupational qualification. The SG 
says the Act will not interfere with the "state's power to 
proscribe reasonable qualifications" or "to discharge those 
individuals found unfit". The SG cites the provision that 
an employer (the state) need not comply "where age is a bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)". But this usually 
requires litigation. 
6. Litigation. Experience under Title VII 
demonstrates that resulting litigation has been a burden. 
The threat of it has to be considered with respect to every 
employment decision: hiring, promoting, and firing. 
Litigation is expensive, and also distracts key personnel 
from normal duties. 
* * * 
In sum, the states make a rather strong case for 
arguing that there is no distinction on principle between 
the effect on state sovereignty of the Age and 
2. 
.. . ... 
Discrimination Act and FELA. I am inclined to agree (for 
Commerce Clause analysis) that National League of Cities 
either must be followed here or overruled. It has been 
undercut to some extent by some by the language in Hodel, 
but this does not justify overruling it. 
The SG also argues that §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment empowers Congress to impose this burden on the 
states. But the legislative history lends no support to 
Congressional reliance on that Amendment. And in Pennhurst 
State School v. Halderman (WHR), the opinion suggests that 
we do not assume or imply Congressional reliance on this 
~ 
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5)\ § 8335 
'14 .. % 1-.t:*s-<1 
~co~ v wrr::_ 
'EMPLOYE - Part 3 
separate the controller is not effective, without the consent of the 
controller, until the last day of the month in which the 60-day no-
tice expires. 
(b) A l~nt officer or a firefigh,ter who is otherwise 
eligible for Immediate retirement under section 8336(c) of this title 
shall be se:p_arated from the service on the last day of the month in 
w1iich he bec;2_me~ 55 years otAge or completes 20 years of service if 
then over that age. lJ'he head of the agency, when in his judgment 
the public interest so requires, may exempt such an employee from 
automatic separation under this subsection until that employee be-
comes 60 years of age. The employing office shall notify the em-
ployee in writing of the date of separation at least 60 days in ad-
vance thereof. Action to separate the employee is not effective, 
without the consent of the -employee, until the last day of the month 
in which the 60-day notice expires. 
(c) An employee of the Alaska Railroad in Alaska and an em-
ployee who is a citizen of the United States employed on the Isth-
mus of Panama by the Panama Canal Company or the Canal Zone 
Government, who becomes 62 years of age and completes 15 years of 
service in Alaska or on the Isthmus of Panama shall be automatical-
ly separated from the service. The separation is effective on the 
last day of the month in which the employee becomes age 62 or com-
pletes 15 years of service in Alaska or on the Isthmus of Panama if 
then over that age. The employing office shall notify the employee 
in writing of the date of separation at least 60 days in advance 
thereof. Action to separate the employee is not effective, without 
the consent of the employee, until the last day of the month in 
which the 60-day notice expires. 
(d) The President, by Executive order, may exempt an employee 
from automatic separation under this section when he determines 
the public interest so requires. 
Pub.L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 571; Pub.L. 92-297, § 4, May 
16, 1972, 86 Stat. 144; Pub.L. 93-350, § 4, July 12, 1974, 88 Stat. 
356; Pub.L. 95-256, § 5(c), Apr. 6,1978,92 Stat.191. 
Hbtorloal and Revlalon Notea 
Derivation: lJnlted State• Code 
1$ u.s.c. 22M 
Revlaed Statute• and Statute• at Larce 
July 31, 1906, ch. 804, 1 401 "Sec 1$", 70 
Stat. 748. 
l!'eb. 7, 1964, Pub.L. 88-267, 1 1 (Ieee (a)-
( c)), 78 Stat. 9. 
BxplaDatoey Note. 
Standard changee are made to conform 
with the definitions applicable and atyle 
of thle title as outunea ln the preface to 
the report. 
rectlng that "Panama Canal Commission" 
be eubstltuted for "Panama Canal Com-
pany or the Canal Zone Government" ln 
eubsec. (e) of thle section bas not been 
executed In vlew of the 1978 repeal of 
Codltlcatloa. Pub.L. 96--70, Tltle III, I eubsec. (e) of this section by Pub.L. 91$-
8302(e) (3), Sept. 27, 1979, 93 Stat. 498, dl- 2116. 
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job 09/29/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: EEOC v. Wyoming, No. 81-554 
A. You requested information on how many suits have been 
brought against states under the ADEA. In FY 80, the EEOC's Trial 
Division filed 47 ADEA suits and intervened in two others. There 
were 14,040 charges of age discrimination filed with the EEOC. Of 
those 14,040 charges filed, 1500 were filed against state/local _______. 
governments; 21 against state employment agencies; 241 against 
elementary/secondary public schools; and 282 against public 
colleges/universities. 
B. You also wanted to know how many ADEA cases against state 
governments have been decided, and the total number of title VII 
cases filed in federal court in a fiscal year. For this 
information, the librarians will have to contact services outside 
the Court. I will await further instructions on how far you would 
like to pursue this search given that the EEOC is a party. 
job 09/30/82 
To: Mr. Justice 
SUPPLEME~TA~ MEMORANDUM 
Powell ~JuX 1(50 
From: Jim 
Re: EEOC v. Wyoming, No. 81-554 
The SG has submitted a reply memorandum for the EEOC. He 
argues that, despite some language in Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 u.s. 1 (1981), Congress is not 
constitutionally required to generate legislative history to enact 
valid legislation. The legislative history of an enactment is not 
itself the subject of judicial review in the sense that courts seek 
to ascertain the adequacy of Congress' knowledge about 
constitutional law. The teaching of Pennhurst is that, when 
Congress exercises its spending power, it is crucial to ascertain 
whether Congress intended to impose an unconditional rule of conduct 
pursuant to its regulatory powers or whether it merely intended to 
require those who elect to participate in the federal program to 
conform their conduct to the conditions imposed upon recipients of 
federal funds. Pennhurst requires an explicit congressional 
statement of reliance on the fourteenth amendment only when it is 
asserted that a funding provision is also a regulatory provision. 
&A--" 
7 
Although this a possible means of distinguishing Pennhurst from 
1\ 
l 
the present case, I am not sure the broad language in Pennhurst 
gives much indication that the Court meant to limit its "explicit 
reliance" requirement. In any case, I agree fully with the SG's 
fundamental position that the purpose of, judicial review under our 
constitutional system is not to enable the courts to take issue with 
the constitutional theories specified by the political branches in 
exercising their powers, but to ascertain whether the coordinate 
branches of the government have acted within their constitutional 
powers. If the Court finds Congress' extension of the ADEA to state 
employees an unconstitutional use of its commerce powers, it should ~ 
decide whether Congress could enact the legislation under the 
fourteenth amendment. 
•,, 
J_ LZ-{Str\ ---~c.~~~~t/-o~ 
~~· 
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October 12, 1982 
RE: No. 81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming, et al. 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
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Re: 81-554 - EEOC v. Wyoming, et a1. 
MEMORANDUM TO: Justice Powell 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice O'Connor 



















December 20, 1982 
EEOC v. 
Dear Chief: 
I have written separately that I aqree. But two 
or three relatively minor points occurred to me in reading 
your memorandum. 
The short paragraph on page 5, written in terms of 
"turf", can be put in more lawyer-like terms. You might say 
1 
something along the following lines: ~· J 
"If Congress were free to regulate state sov-
ereignty in this area at all, at least it 
s hou.ld not demand more restrictive reqnlation 
of state employment policies than Congress 
itself imposes upon federal employment." 
AA you suggest (p. 7, 8), the SG's reliance on the 
B.F.O.Q. provision is \'lholly unpe-r.suasive. I would empha-
size, somewhat more than you have, the fact that B.~.O.Q. ~ 
claims often - if not usually - result in law suits. These 
are expensive and also divert . state officials from th~ir 
normal duties. 
,, 
On p. 11 (third line of first full paragraoh), 
your memorandum said you woul~ "have little doubt" as to the 
applicability of Bradley and Murqia. This is a rather weak 
statement. I would say that "the precedential force of 
these deciAions would require that we sustain the Wyoming 
Act". 
~he second paragraph commencing on paqe 11 talks 
about City of Rome and several other cases that seem to me 
to be essentially irrelevant. I do agree that Oregon v. 
' Mitchell is used to make a good point. 
I am qlad you will file a vigorous dissent. In my 
view, our colleagues' decision in this case leaves very 
little of the principle of federalism upon which our govern-
ment was founded. 
Chief Justi.ce 









v . Wyoming 
agree with the substance of your 
dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc : The Conference 










.. , . . . 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
Dear Bill, 
j;uttrttttt Qfllllrl c£ t~t ~Ut~ j;tatt.a-
Jl a.s'Irittgtlltt. !J. <q • 2ll.?Jt ~ 
December 20, 1982 
No. 81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
I will await the dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
. . .,. .. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:Su:p-uut.t <!}onrl of tqt ~nitt~ ~taftg 
1tn:s!pttghtu:. ~. <!}. 20,?~~ 
Re: No. 81-554 - EEOC v. Wyoming 
Dear Bill: 





cc: The Conference 







~u:pumt <qtturl ttf tlrt ~tb ~tattll' 
~fringhm. ~. <q. 20c?J!.~ 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
December 21, 1982~ 
Re: 81-554 - EEOC v. Wyoming 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me in your first draft with 
the addition you propose today. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
lfp/ss 02/01/83 
TO: Mike Sturley 
FROM: LFP,JR. 
SUBJECT: 81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
Thank you for affording me an opportunity to take a 
look at your preliminary draft. I may well have misled 
you by my emphasis on the Virginia-Kentucky Resolution and 
similar expressions. I did think that there was more 
contemporary evidence of the states concern with 
federalism at the time of ratification of the 
Constitution. 
I suppose the absence of this (if, in fact, you found 
nothing in the debates of the Constitutional Convention) 
is explained by the general understanding that a federal 
system was being created. No one doubted this. 
Therefore, there was no reason to state in the preamble of 
the Constitution that its "purpose" was to create a 
federal system or to reserve undelegated powers to the 
states. 
Thus, a sounder way to rebut Justice Stevens is to 
make this clear, and then to per sue fairly briefly two 




First, demonstrate the fallacy of JPS's view that the 
need for freedom of trade was "the central problem that 
gave rise to the Constitution itself", and that the 
commerce clause was enacted "to confer a power on the 
national government adequate to discharge its central 
mission". I have elaborated on what you wrote in a 
separate draft that I will give you. You can improve what 
=I--~h_a_v_e __ ~w-r~i~t~t~e~n~, --~a-n~d--~p~e~rhaps provide 
documentation. r~; pl~ oF eo~...,. ct... 
some limited 
Secondly, we should retain a separate Part dealing 
with federalism and its historic place in our system. It 
is far more central historically than the Commerce Clause 
ever was. You should be able to document this. f'~' •~" kJ.i·s~ 
Perhaps this Part could commence with a summary of 
what you have said very well in Part II of your 
preliminary draft, putting some of your material in notes. 
The quote from the Massachusetts Legislature, for 
example, can be omitted or summarized in a note. 
I prefer to emphasize primarily what this Co urt ha;> 
said about our federal system, and the Court's repeated 
recognition that the states are "sovereign" with respect 
to many functions. I do not want to debate League of 
Cities, but its opinion cites Maryland v. Wurz, 392 U.S. 
3. 
at 196 with a reference to a state's "sovereign 
political entity". There must be a number of other court 
decisions that also refer to federalism and the sovereign 
authority of the states. As recently as Justice 
Marshall's decision in Hodel - in which he accepted League 
of Cities - he acknowledged that federal regulation must 
be weighed in light of "indisputedly 'attributes of state 
sovereignity'". 452 u.s. 264, 287. 
John's opinion recognizes no 1 imi t whatever to the 
) 
power of Congress, under the c ommerce clause, to overr ~de/ 
state sovereigni t YJ- He neither mentions federalism nor 
state sovereignity-, -arld re ers to -e-iti. e s as 
"pure judicial fiat". We might refer to his in a 
J ootnote, and add that under his view it is not easy to 
think of any governmental function at the state or local 
level - other than the criminal laws - that could not be 
preempted. 
I have a couple of observations. If you have not 
taken a look at the federalist papers with the view ..to -
finding a good quote on federalism, I suggest that you do 
so. I am confident that the papers emphasiz3 d defens e, 
==< -
against fore ig n agrQ• sors - It was, I think, a more -
important concern of the founders than commerce. 
4 0 
I also want to make clear that I do not denigrate the 
importance of the commerce clause. Nor do I support, and 
never have, the early doctrines as to the right of states 
to interpose their wills or to secede. Yet, as you 
document, these were convictions strongly held during the 
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February 17, 1983 
No. 81-554 EEOC v. wyoming 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 




TO: Mike DATE: Feb. 23, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-554 EEOC v. wyoming 
The changes made by Justice Stevens prompt me to 
suggest that we make somewhat clearer the point that this 
case concerns a power of the states that until quite recent-
ly was viewed as "sovereign". This is implici.t in our opin-
ion, but I think :i.t should be made explicit - along the 
lines of footnote 13. 
We have not made clearly the distinction between 
commerce as it was perceived well into this century (freedom 
of trade among the states) and the clearly sovereign activi-
ties of the states. 
No power is more sovereign than the right of a 
state to select and determine the terms and conditions of 
employment of the people who constitute the state govern-
ment. Most of these people have nothing to do with trade 
among the states in the normal acceptance of these terms. 
Justice Stevens relies on Gibbons v. Ogden. The 
short answer is that Chief Justice Marshall was not address-
ing the sovereign power of states. Nor, indeed, did he say 
that the Commerce Clause was the central provision of the 
Constitution. He did construe it broadly, but as applied 





I am not suggesting any major revision of the 
structure of our opinion. I do want you to try some of your 
artful drafting to make, briefly and clearer than at 
present, the poi.nt that t.his case does not involve commerce 
in any traditional sense, and that the statements relied 
· upon by Justice Stevens - in the notes he has added - are 
., irrelevant for two reasons: (i) they do not support the 
view that the Commerce Clause was the centerpiece of the 
Constitution, and (ii) they do not address at all the point 
that until mid-20th Century no one - certainly not the 
Founders - would have suggested that "commerce" or "trade 
among the states" embraced the sovereign function of a 















TO: Mike DATE: Feb. 23, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
The changes made by Justice Stevens prompt me to 
suggest that we make somewhat clearer the point that this 
case concerns a power of the states that until quite recent-
ly was viewed as "sovereign". This is implicit in our opin-
ion, but I think it should be made explicit - along the 
lines of footnote 13. 
We have not made clearly the distinction between 
commerce as it was perceived well into this century (freedom 
of trade among the states) and the clearly sovereign activi-
ties of the states. 
No power is more sovereign than the right of a 
state to select and determine the terms and conditions of 
employment of the people who constitute the state govern-
ment. Most of these people have nothing to do with trade 
among the states in the normal acceptance of these terms. 
Justice Stevens relies on Gibbons v. Ogden. The 
short answer is that Chief Justice Marshall was not address-
ing the sovereign power of states. Nor, indeed, did he say 
that the Commerce Clause was the central provision of the 
Constitution. He did construe it broadly, but as applied 




I am not suggesting any major revision of the 
structure of our opinion. I do want you to try some of your 
artful drafting to make, briefly and clearer than at 
present, the point that this case does not involve commerce 
in any traditional sense, and that the statements relied 
upon by Justice Stevens - in the notes he has added - are 
irrelevant for two reasons: (i) they do not support the 
view that the Commerce Clause was the centerpiece of the 
Constitution, and (ii) they do not address at all the point 
that until mid-20th Century no one - certainly not the 
Founders - would have suggested that "commerce" or "trade 
among the states" embraced the sovereign function of a 











No. 81-554, EEOC v. Wyoming 
Attached is a draft of a proposed new footnote 5. I 
suggest deleting present footnote 13 on page 11 and a sentence 
from present footnote 7 on page 8 (since their substance is in-
corporated in the attached draft), and adding this new footnote 5 
on the middle of page 5 after "governments"--immediately before 
the beginning of part "A." I attach a copy of the opinion with 
these changes noted. 
In the new footnote, I have not further stressed the 
point about the Commerce Clause not being the centerpiece of the 
Constitution for several reasons: 
(i) Although JUSTICE STEVENS does not claim Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's direct support for this proposition, there are 
arguments that he could make if we pushed him to it. (He already 
cites Beveridge's Life of John Marshall.) Even in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, Marshall claimed that "[t]he power over commerce, includ-
ing navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the peo-
ple of America adopted their government." 22 u.s., at 190. This 
statement is, of course, consistent with our view. But in con-
text, Marshall seems to be giving more weight to that Clause than 
it really deserved. 
(ii) JUSTICE STEVENS does claim direct support from Gib-
bons v. Ogden. Justice Johnson, in a separate opinion, discussed 
the reasons for the calling of the convention, and he essentially 
page 2. 
advocated JUSTICE STEVENS's present view. 22 u.s., at 223-225. 
JUSTICE STEVENS cites a portion of this discussion in his opinion 
at 3 n.l. He also cites various other authorities at this point, 
including Gunther's Constitutional Law. It does not seem entire-
ly fair to accuse him of not having Marshall's support. In anv 
event, our strongest answer is that this all relates to the An-
napolis Convention, not the Philadelphia Convention. And we al-
ready make this point in footnote 2. 
{iii) Finally, I think this is already the strongest 
part of our opinion without the need for further response. Among 
the law clerks with whom I have discussed the two opinions {al-
most all of whom agree with JUSTICE STEVENS's "bottom line"), no 
one is willing to support his extreme view of the importance of 
the Commerce Clause. 
pretty convincingly. 
In my view, we have already won this point 
If we attack JUSTICE STEVENS any harder on 
it, we only run the risk that we will convince him. He may back 
off from his position slightly, tone down his claims, and cost us 
the straw man that we rebut. The material JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST gave us is not terribly helpful. It is a recognition of 
state sovereignty, but we could include literally hundreds of 
such recognitions. {Notice how many we include from last Term 
alone.) The context is not very good, however, since Chief Jus-
tice Marshall would deny that state sovereignty is a limitation 
on federal sovereignty. He apparently sees the two as operating 
in different spheres. The commerce powers are in the federal 
sphere. 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND TilE 
CONSTITUTION-A SU~11\1ARY VlEWt 
William P. MmjJ!ty* 
Under Article Il of the Articles of Confetleration each st;lt\: tetained 
its sovereignty and independence, and every power, jnriscliction, ancl 
right which was not expressly delegated to the United States. This pre-
dueled the existence of any implied powers. The poweb which were 
expres~ly delegated to Congress were limited, but even as to these, there 
was no power of enforcement. The central government, with rare excep-
tions, operated not on incliviclu<1ls hut through the states, ancl its author-
ity was effective only so far as, and no farther than, the states were will-
ing to accept it. The states remained free to ignore the central govern-
ment with impunity, which tltey die!, in spite of their pledgee! word in 
Article XIII that they would abide by the determination of Congress on 
all matters delegated to it. Under the Articles, there existed in Alllerica 
a compact of sovereign si.ates with a mutual agent. Ancl history records 
that it was a failure. -
Throughout the colonies there were men of prominence \\'ho wcrC' 
uetennined, for reasons su!Ttcient to themselves, to eradicate t.his system. 
Being individuals of surpassing political skill and ability, and aided by 
the course of events under the Articles, they brought about the calling 
of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and dominated its member-
ship. The funuamental purpose of the ConYention was to change the 
system. The Founding Fathers decicleLl at the outset that no mere fcdera· 
tion would suffice. Instead, they created a national goyernment which 
would operate directly on individuals, gave it vastly inoeasecl sweeping 
powers, and created a national executive and a n ational judiciary for 
their enforcement. Severe limitations were placecl on the powers of the 
states, and the supremacy of the central go\'etnm.ent oYer the states was 
clearly ancl expressly set forth. ·with cleliberate intent and great care, 
the Founders remedied the defects of the system under the Articles. Ancl 
because it was recognized that the Constitution was fatal to the sover-
eignty of the states, tl 11·y by-passed the state governments and went 
fl'his article com1uclcs a study which began with St nlc S01'i'>l'ib nty Prior to thr 
Constitution, 29 MISS. L.J. I 15 (1958); continued with Stnte Soverl'ignt}' nnd the 
Foundi11g Fathers, 30 1\lm. L.J. 135 (19.)9); 30 l\IJSS. L.J. 261 (1959); and 31 i\l1ss. 
L.J. 50 (El39); continued with State Sovaeignty and the Drafting of till' Constitu-
tion, 31 l\!ISS. L.J. 203 (I!JGO); 3~ l\l1 s~. L.J. I (I!JGO); !12 i\l!ss. L.J. 1:">.! (1%1); and 
3~ i\f1ss. L.J. 227 (IDGI); and rontinll<•l with Stale Sovcrtignty and the l!ntifiwtion 
of the Constitution, 33 MISS. L..J. 29 (1961); 33 MISS L.J. 161 (19G2); ami 33 l\fiS~. LJ. 
29·1 (l9G2). 
•Professor o[ Law, Uuivcrsity of l\lississippi. 
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directly to the people for ratification of the great transition. There was 
no misundersta11ding as to the eiTect that the Constitution would have 
upon sta te sovereignty, for in the campaign for ratification one of the 
principal b:~ses of opposition to the Constitution was that it would 
destroy the sovereignty of the states. 
Study o[ the contemporary sources reveals that among both the 
supporters and opponents of the Constitution, there was no doubt, dis-
agreement or misunderstanding on the Jollm1·ing particulars. Ratiftca-
tion of the Constitution was final and irreYocable, and no right of seces-
sion from the United States was contemplated. The power to determine 
constitutional meaning and applicability lay \\·ith the instrumentalities 
of the national government. In making such determinations there was 
no expectation that any strict construction in favor of state power would 
be followed. Although national powers 'rere enumerated, state power 
was not expected to be a constitutional limitation 011 the scope or extent 
of any enumerated national power. 
It is obvious, however, from even a cursory view of American con-
stitutional history since 1789, that the ratification of the Constitmion 
did not setlle these mattets permanently, or eYen for very long. As noted 
at the very beginning of this study, almost immediately after the adop-
tion of the Constitution the arg11ment was advanced that since the states 
were sovereign under the Articles they were still sovereign except to the 
extent that sovereignty had been expressly surrendered in the Cons titu-
tion, and therefore national powers should be strictly and narrowly con-
struecl. lt was argued then tll<tt the Tenth Amendment supported the 
strict construction approach, and the same argument is still being m:-tde 
today. 
Later a more vigorous position wa,, taken. The ac}mission made dur-
ing the ratification campaign that the Constitution was fatal to state sov-
ereignty was HOW conveniently forgotten, and the discovery was made 
that it was an iclle thing which hacl been done after all, that t.he ~ystem 
of government under the Constitution was still what it had been under 
the Articles of Confederation, namely, a compact of soyereign states. From 
this premise there flowed logically the doctrines of state interposition 
and nullification articulated by John C. Calhoun, the brilliant p!·cCivil 
'\Var high priest of state sovereignty. Finall y, thue came the lllos t radi -
cal assertion of all. Since the Union was merely a compact of sovereign 
states, it followed that there was no sucb thing as a permanent and indi-
visible nation. Therefore, by the same process through which it ratified 
the Constitution and entered the Union in the first place, i.e., an exer-
cise of popular sovereignty, a state could like\\·isc secede from the United 
States. 
It may be stated flatly that none of these doctrines-strict construc-
tion of the Constitution, interposition or nullification, ami secession-
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can fmd support from the contemporary sources 011 th e drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution. Beyond a few scauercd pa~sagcs ta l;en 
out of context, the evidence of 1787-1788 is overwhelming against each 
o( them. And yet it is undeniable that these doctrines have b:.Jd an enor-
mous impact upon American history. They have been buming issues 
over which men have argued, fought and died. lJow could it happen 
that doctrines so demonstrably unte11ablc could have attained such 
vitality? 
It is true that Elliot's D eba tes were not published until 18!36 and 
Madison's N olcs not until l8·J 0. From this it might be suggested that 
state soverignty doctrines were <~blc to thrive became their documentary 
refutation remained undisclosctl for ft[ty years after ratification. This 
explanation, however, is both superficial and erroneous. J t is erroneous 
for the reason that the philosophical and political advocates of the 
state sovereignty doctrines were participants in, or at least contempor-
aries of, the drafting and ratification of th e Constitution and were fully 
aware of the understanding at the time. One need go no further than 
Madison and J effcrson who, less than ten years after the Constitution 
became operative, authored the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions set-
ting forth a compact theory of the Constitution. In Madison's case, con-
sidering the extent of his nationalism in 1787, this is one of the most 
complete turnabouts in history. 
But any explanation is superficial which fails to take into account 
the fact that men of afTairs almost invariably espouse those philosophies, 
forms and policies of government which they feel will bes t protec t and 
advance their own economic and social interests. As we saw in the first 
part o( the study, this was true in the drafting of both th e Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution. The conservative nationalists who 
were defeated in 1776 did not accept the result as being irremediable. 
Similarly, the opponents of strong cc11tral government in 1787, whil e 
they acrcptccl ratification of the Constitution as final, did not accept 
as inevitable in practice the fulfillment of that national power of which 
the ConstitutiOii was the promise. \!\That th ey clid was completely nat-
ural. They engaged in political action to restrain ancl lim it the usc of 
national power and they advanced interpretations of the Constitution 
which would protect the power of the states against national aggrancli?c-
ment. 
In their political struggle the advocates of the state sovereignty doc-
trines found their principal sources of strength and support in the cir-
cumstance to which Madison and Hamilton had repea tedly called allen-
Lion. This was the political fact that the people as a general rule would 
feel closer to their state and local government s and more remote from 
the national government. Since members of Congress were to be elc'-ted 
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offices would carry witl1 them into national off1ce a tendency or predispo-
sition to favor state over national power. And sur\'ival in office would 
frequently clemaml giving precedence to parochial and provincial over 
na1 ional and general interests. 
Time has demonstrated the acuteness of l\Iaclison's and Hamilton's 
perception. Throughout our history, far more often than not, Congress 
has been very sensitive to the existence of state interests and to areas and 
subjects of state power. Such political considerations have frequently 
resulted in the non-use of national powers. This has been true even to 
the point of reducing some of these powers to a dormant state. Con-
gress's power to control the manner of election of Representatives and 
Senators has never been utilized to any great extent, and even the mod-
est exercise of this power being proposed today is bitterly opposed as an 
invasion of states' rights. To give another example, Congress's powers 
under the full faith and credit clause remain to this clay virtually 
untapped. 
J <1 their Constitutional struggle the defenders of state sovereignt) 
were immensely aided by the very characteristic of the Constitution 
against which they had vigorously protested in the ratification cam-
paign; namely, its generality and ambiguity. It was recognized by all 
hands in 1787-88 that the Constitution's generalities opened the way to 
indefinite augmentation of national power th wugh latitudinal con-
struction. Indeed, the main defense of the Constitution's generality was 
that it would permit whatever national action the future exigencies of 
an unknown future might demand. But, by clefmition, ambiguity means 
the capability of supporting more than oue meaning or interpretation. 
1f the Cons1 itution nmld support an interpret<~ti on which favored 
national power, it could also support a construct ion that favored state 
power. And so began th e perennial debate between "liberal" and 
"strict" construction through which contests bet"·een national ancl state 
power have been ·waged eYer since, with each side claiming th at its 
interpretation of the Constitution is the "true" one. 
The advocates of the state sovereignty doctrines soon found another 
ally in their struggle, and again it was through one of the features of 
the Constitution against which they had levied severe strictures. This 
ally was the federal judiciary, and especiaJJy the United States Supreme 
Court. The establishment of judicial 1 eview-the power to interpret 
the Constitution with finality and to invalidate acts contrary to that 
interpretat ion- provided the advocates of state sovereignty with the 
device through which their views could be given lega l efficacy. Although 
judicial review was established by a relatively nat ionalist minded Mar-
shall Court, it was put to far differen t uses in the century following 
Marshall's death. 
Jt is true that the Supreme Court never yielded to state sovereignty 
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doctrines in their advanced form~ --nullification, interposition, ,tnd seces-
sion. But the Court dicl, on many occasions a ncl as reccn t I y as El3G, 
accept the doctrine of strict construction of tl1e Constitution against 
national power and in favor of state power. \'Vh:tt came to be known 
as 'dual sovereignty' was, in essen ce, no more than <1 holding that the 
mer xistence of state power was in <~ncl of itself a limitation on the 
scope of national power. The doctrine th<~t national powers were ennm- } 
crated and those not enumerated were reserved to the states served as a 
snff1cient reason for giving a narrow interpretation to the enumerated 
powers. State autonomy was elevated to state sovereignty by judicial 
constrnction. And if there were also decisions which applied the con -
trary construction, it on ly served to underscore the power of the Court 
and the importance of having a majority on the side one preferred. 
The facility with which men could find in the amorphous language 
of the Constitution approval and sanctioll of their own political and 
economic philosophies prompted John Aclams, at an early date in our 
history, to declare that "1 have always called our Constitution a game at 
leap frog." 1 American constitutiqnal history from John Adams's day 
to mid-twentieth century America amply demonstrates the truth of his 
observation. The listing of great nationalist decisions by th e Snprernc 
Court could be paralleled by a similar catalogu<' of decisions favoring 
states' rights. 
And yet there is reason to believe that the last leap may have been 
taken, so far as constitutional law is concerned. The compact theory of 
the Constitution ancl the state sovereignty doctrines which flowed from 
it were abandoned after the CiYil \Var and may today be considered 
extinct, despite the recent abortive attempts to revive them in the vari-
ous int erposition resolutions adopted by Southern legislatures. And the 
strict construction approach to the Constitution may well have received 
the fmal and lethal blow in the Supreme Court's recognition in 19.11 
that the tenth amendment is merely a truism which is declaratory of a 
relationship and_hence is not a suhstantive limitation on national power. 
Modern society increasingly makes exercise of national power an 
imperative, and the <~ llegiance of the people to the national government 
increases commensurately with their expectations and demands. Strict 
construction thus loses the support of public opinion. Jt is inconceivable 
to imagine ever again Supreme Court decisions comparable to those of 
1935 and 1936. Even the polemics of Southern Senators in the field of 
civil rights lack real conviction that national power is inadequate to 
the purpose. In the future, the distribution of power between nation 
and state will continue to be a political ancl a legislative question, as it 
always has been. But it is doubtful if ever again it will be a constitu-
tional and a judicial question as it has been in the past. The future 
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debates over the respective roles and functions of nation ancl states will 
increasingly turn on questions of policy rather than p ower. 
This study has been an inquiry into the dialectics of original intent 
on the question of the relationship and the distribution of power between 
the national government and the states under the Constitution. The 
contemporary understanding of the men who drafted the Comtitution 
and the men who supported and opposed its ratification has been set 
forth in the preceding pans of the study. To the author the validity 
of the c.onclusions reached is clear beyond doubt. In one sense, of course, 
any· iuquiry into original intent is futile, for it is true that, in the fmal 
analysis, the actions of men, including their interpretations of the Con-
stitution, are determined more by the demands and desiderata of the 
present than by the understanding of the past. It is also true that the 
intent and understanding of 1787-88 was almost immediately challenged, 
and has subsequently been denied, confused, submerged and even lost 
at times throughout our history. And arguably this has been a good 
thing for the country. 
The fact that or_iginal intent lacks the power to control la ter action 
does not, however, render inquiries into original intent irrelc:v<tnt. 
Throughout our history, justification has always been sought for con-
flicting constitutioual interpretations in terms of original in tent. l\Ien 
prefer to defend their positions not only on grounds of the expediency 
of the moment but also in terms of historic legitimacy. So long a there 
is constitutioHal debate, it seems inevitable that original inten t \\·ill be 
a part of the rhetoric. Knowledge on the subject is therefore necessary 
for forensic purposes. 
The anthor feel~, ho\\'ever, that thetc is a larger and more funda-
mental value to be derivc<l from thi~ study. It is trite to observe that the 
national government today exercises greater aml mere pervasive powers 
than ever before in our history. Of course, there r.ever has been and never 
can be a permanently ftxed number of public functions or subj ects of 
power with clearly established and mutuall y exclusive lists of what is 
national and what is state or local. ln a complex and interdependent 
industrial society, it is a commonplace that \\'hat \\'as local yestercla y today 
has assumed dimensions aml effects which transcend state boundary lines. 
Much of the increased activity of the national government in this cen-
tury has resulted from the fact that modern society generates problems 
which arc beyond the capacity of individual states to control. The trend 
seems likely to accelerate rather than to abate. 
While most Americans accept the necessity of an increased centrali-
zation of authority in order to cope with the problems of today's world, 
there arc also feelings of misgiving and disquietude. Although events 
and circumstances make increased national activity imperative, many 
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design o{ the Constitution, that although the increased exercise of 
national power can !Je justifted on grounds of expediency, it nevenhcless 
lacks historic legitimacy. The author l1as frequently entct tained such 
feelings, and {or that reason this study has been not only an education 
but also a comfort ancl a consolation. 
Speaking in the Constitutional Convention, James Madison stated 
that "The great objection made against au abolition of the state govern-
ments was that the general government could not extend its care to all 
the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdi c-
tions. The objection as stated lay not against the probahlc abuse of the 
genc1.al power but against the imperfect usc that could be made of it 
throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a vari ety of 
objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it cou ltl not in this 
view be improper; as far as it could be impracticable, the convcniency of 
the general government itself would concur with that of the people in 
the maintenance of subordinate governments. \Vcre it practicable for 
the general government to extend its care to every req uisitc obj ect wi th-
out the cooperation of the- state governments the people 'would not be 
less free as members of one great republic than as members of thir teen 
small ones." 2 The states have never since 17S 7 been in any d anger of 
being abolished. The historic contest has been waged over ques tions of 
respective sovereignty and power of nation and state. After 170 years, 
we seem finally to have settled on the approach originally advanced by 
Madison. 
Remembering that the Constitution was grounded on the Vi rginia 
Plan of which James Madison was the author, the word~ of th e " father 
of the Constitution" in his letter to \Vashington on the eYe of the 
Convention have modern relevance. "Conceiving that an individual 
independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with their aggrC'gate 
sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into oue simple repub- ( 
lie would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for some 
middl~ound, which may at once support a due supremacy of the j 
natiO'iial authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherC'ver they / 
can be subordinately useful." 3 
There has been no departure from our ancient moorings. The Con-
stitution was "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequen tly, 
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."• The grand design 
has not been abandoned. It is continually being fulfilled. 
--------·---
21 FA:tRAND, TilE RECORD OF TilE FEDERAL CO:-.!VEI"T!ON 356 (rev. cd. 1937). 
S1 LF.lTIRS AND 0Tili'.R WRITINGS Ol' JAM ES MADISON 287 (18H cd.). 
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CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 4, 1983 
Re: No. 81-554 - Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Wyoming 
Dear Bill: 











.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§npunu <lfonrl o-f tlft ~ ~'fattg 
:.rurlp:tt:gUm. ~. Of. 2Ufi)l.~ 
January 5, 1983 
Re: 81-554 - EEOC v. Wyoming 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
.., 






JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.%iu.p-r.em.e ~curt cf tq.e ~nit.elt .;§tait.il' 
11frurfringtcn. ~· ~· 20bfJ!.~ 
January 10, 1983 
No. 81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
Dear Chief, 
I am in general accord with your memorandum 
in this case and will wait for your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 





January 18, 1983 
81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
Dear Chief: 
I have sent you, under separate cover, a note 
joining in your fine dissenting opinion. 
I am considering writing separately onlv to reply 
specifically to John Stevens. As I cannot qet to this dur-
ing this argument session, I will delay bringing down this 
case. 
I have some ideas I would like to try out. They 
will relate solely to John's dissent and i.n no wav cover the 
qround you have addressed so well. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
,January 18, 198 3 
81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
Dear Chief: 
PleaRP- add mv name to your oiss~ntinq opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The rhief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
\ 
~U:prtntt Qfc-urlllf tltt ~ri.bb ~taftg 
jil"ag!p:ttghm. ~. <!f. 20.?~~ 
January 19, 1983 
Re: No. 81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 01/19/83 WYOMING SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mike DATE: Jan. 19, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-554 EEOC v. Wyoming 
This refers to our conversation concerning a sepa-
rate dissenting opinion directed at John Stevens' view that 
the central purpose of the Constitution is evidenced by the 
Commerce Clause. 
Of course, therewere a combination of purposes. 
But all were to be attained within the framework of a feder-
al system. Justice Stevens largely - if not entirely - ig-
nores federalism. At least until the War Between the 
States, and de facto until well into this century, the Com-
merce Clause was overhadowed by the doctrine of federalism. 
If I recall Justice Stevens' opinion correctly (and I have 
not looked at it a second time}, it presents an exceptional-
ly inaccurate view of history - a view that should not go 
into the United States Reports without refutation. 
As you know better than most, I have had no time 
to refresh my recollection. You will have to examine the 
appropriate authorities. I do suggest the following: 
1. Scholarly histories and commentary on the 
founding of our country, commencing with the Articles of 
Confederation that in themselves evidenced the reluctance of 
the states to form a strong union. These sources will show 
that a number of states were unwilling to approve the Con-
stitution without the Bill of Rights, and that the Tenth 
Amendment was considered essential by several states. My 
recollection is that this included New York. 
2. 
2. The debates of the Constitutional Convention -
though voluminous - have relevant material. The secondary 
authorities on these debates may be an easier source. 
3. I mentioned the Federalism Papers. My recol-
lection of them is that, for the most part, they were advo-
cating the advantages of a strong central government -
though even as to this Hamilton and Madison did not share 
congruent views. Actually, and again I draw on my recollec-
tion, there was a primary concern about national security 
and the recognition that only by a united country could we 
remain strong enough to survive foreign aggression, and 
avoid internal tensions if not warfare. 
4. The Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions, protesting 
the Alien an Sedition Acts in the late 1790s, explicitly 
argued that each of the states had a right to interpose its 
will against any action of the federal government, legisla-
tive, executive or judicial. It was widely understood at 
the time that Jefferson was one of the authors. 
5. This Doctrine of Interposition was adovcated 
by Massachusetts in the late 1820s, as I recall. 
6. But the doctrine lost favor in most of the 
country except the South. The South's conviction that the 
Constitution had formed only a union of sovereign states was 
,.~. 
3 • 
a leading cause of secession. Calhoun of South Carolina was 
the most prominent spokesman. 
7. A primary source on the doctrine of federalism 
is, of course, found in decisions of this Court. I do not 
suggest any comprehensive review of our decisions or exten-
sive quotations. 
* * * 
My guess is that, apart from the usual problem of 
the preliminary research, the greatest difficulty in prepar-
ing an opinion is to keep it within reasonable bounds. I 
would like not to exceed the length of John Stevens' concur-
ring opinion, but with more documentation. 
I am not unaware of how pressed all law clerks are 
here at the Court. There will be less pressure during the 
four weeks of the February break than at any subsequent 
time. The cert memos command a finite part of your time. 
You have adjusted well to the "bobtail" type of bench memos, 
and these are entirely adequate now that I have confidence 
in you and your co-clerks. Indeed, in a real crunch a ver-
bal briefing will suffice in some cases. It is necessary, 
however, for each of you to be familiar with the cases as-
signed to you. 
Having said all of this, I do think responding to 
John Stevens is worth your scholarly effort and my time and 
attention. If I could have a draft in a couple of weeks, it 






P. S. 1. Take a look at Dumas Malone's six volume work on 
Jefferson, recently published. There may be some mention of 
the Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions and Jefferson's part. 
P.S. 2. Justice Stevens gets off a rather heated attack on 
League of Cities. I would ignore this and not even mention 
that case. I am interested only in the broader question 
addressed in this memorandum. 
-
lfp/ss 01/19/83 WYOMING SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mike DATE: Jan. 19, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-554 EEOC v. Wyomi.nq 
This refers to our conversation concerning a sepa-
rate dissenting opinion directed at John Stevens' view that 
the central purpose of the Constitution is evidenced by the 
Commerce Clause. 
Of course, therewere a combination of purposes. 
But all were to be attained within the framework of a feder-
al system. Justice Stevens largely - if not entirely - ig-
nores federalism. At least until the war Between the 
States, and rle facto until well into this century, the Com-
merce Clause was overhadowed by the doctrine of federaliAm. 
If I recall Justice Stevens' opinion correctly (and I have 
not looked at it a second time) , it presents an exceptional-
ly inaccurate view of history - a view that should not go 
into the United States Reports without refutation. 
As you know bett.er than most, I have had no tirne 
to refresh my recollection. You will have to examine the 
appropriate authori.ties. I do suggest the following: 
1. Scholarly histories and commentary on the 
founding of our country, commencing with the Arti.cles of 
Confederation that in themselves evidenced the reluctance of 
the states to form a strong union. These sources will show 
that a number of states were unwilling to approve the Con-
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stitution without the Bill of Rights, and that the Tenth 
Amendment was considered essential by several states. My 
recollection is that this included New York. 
2. 
2. The debates of the Constitutional Convention -
voluminous - have relevant material. The secondary 
authorities on these debates may be an easier source. 
3. I mentioned the Federalism Papers. My recol-
. ~ lection of them is that, for the most part, they were advo-
, eating the advantages of a strong central government -
though even as to this Hamilton and Madj.son did not share 
congruent views. Actually, and again I draw on my recollec-
tion, there was a primary concern about national security 
and the recognition that only by a united country could we 
remain strong enough to survive foreign aggression, and 
avoid internal tensions if not warfare. 
4. The Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions, protesting 
the Alien an Sedition Acts in the late 1790s, explicitly 
argued that each of the states had a right to interpose its 
will against any action of the federal government, legisla-
tive, executive or judicial. It was widely understood at 
the time that Jefferson was one of the authors. 
5. This Doctrine of Interposition was adovcated 
by Massachusetts in the late 1820s, as I recall. 
6. But the doctrine lost favor in most of the 
country except the South. The South's conviction that the 




a leading cause of secession. Calhoun of South Carolina was 
the most prominent spokesman. 
7. A primary source on the doctrine of federalism 
is, of course, found in decisions of this Court. I do not 
suggest any comprehensive review of our decisions or exten-
sive quotations. 
* * * 
My guess is that, apart from the usual problem of 
the preliminary research, the greatest difficulty in prepar-
ing an opinion is to keep it within reasonable bounds. I 
would like not to exceed the lenqth of John Stevens' concur-
ring opinion, but with more documentation. 
I am not unaware of how pressed all law clerks are 
here at the Court. There will be less pressure during the 
four weeks of the February break than at any subsequent 
time. The cert memos command a finite part of your time. 
You have adjusted well to the "bobtail" type of bench memos, 
and these are entirely adequate now that I have confidence 
in you and your co-clerks. Indeed, in a real crunch a ver-
bal briefing will suffice ln some cases. It is necessary, 
however, for each of you to be familiar with the cases as-
signed to you. 
Having said all of this, I do think responding to 
John Stevens is worth your scholarly effort and my time and 
attention. If I could have a draft in a couple of weeks, it 
would be most helpful. 










'P. s. 1. Take a look at Dumas Malone's six volume work on 
Jefferson, recently published. There may be some mention of 
the Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions and Jefferson's part • 
. · P.S. 2. Justice Stevens gets off a rather heated attack on 
l!i'. League of Cities. I would ignore this and not even menti.on 
' · that case. I am interested only in the broader quest ion 
addressed in th1.s memorandum. 
1 
·------~-----'-~-~--· __ , _____________ .... J 
January 24, 1983 
81-554 EEOC v. Wyominq 
Dear Bill: 
I find that I failed to send you a note advisin~ 
of my intention to add a few words in dissent in this case. 
Mv apologies for overlookinq this. 
,Just ice Brennan 
lfp/ss 












To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: EEOC v. Wyoming, No. 81-554 
1798-99 Kentucky and Viginia Resolutions 
drafted by Jefferson and Madison, repectively, 
to protest the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798; method chosen because courts, dominated 
by Federalists, were willing to enforce Acts; 
all Northern states disapproved Resolutions; 
Second Kentucky and Viginia Resolutions draft-
ed by Jefferson and Madison in response to 
disapproval of original Resolutions; stronger 
language, including "nullification" (Kentucky) 
and "interposition" (Virginia); Jefferson and 
Madison retreated from views of Resolutions 
when Acts were no longer an issue (after their 
party gained national power) 
1807-14 New England Opposition to Embargo Law etc. 
Massachusetts legislature denounced 1809 en-
forcement act as "unjust, oppressive, and un-
constitutional, and not legally binding on the 
citizens of this state"; Connecticut refused 
to furnish militia, using interposition lan-
guage; 1813 embargo law denounced by Mass. 
legislature using interposition language; Dan-
iel Webster(!) used interposition language in 
Congress re: 1813 conscription bill & bill for 
enlistment of minors; 1814 Hartford Convention 
1828-33 South Carolina Nullification 
nullification doctrine developed by John C. 
Calhoun--see "South Carolina Exposition" 
( 1828) setting out theory of interposition; 
state convention can nullify federal law with-
in state pending possible overruling by feder-
al constitutional amendment ( 3/4 vote neces-
sary to overrule state!); Webster-Hayne Debate 
(1830) re: Calhoun doctrine; Nullification 
Ordinance (1832) adopted by South Carolina in 
opposition to congressional tariff legisla-
tion; Pres. Jackson faced S. Car. challenge 
squarely and won 
2 0 
1850-60 Northern Opposition to Fugitive Slave Act 
best example found in Ableman v. Booth, 62 
U.S. 506 (1858). Booth arrested for violating 
Act and held in federal custody; Wisconsin 
state court granted habeas relief, finding Act 
unconstitutional; Wisconsin Supreme Court af-
firmed; Wisconsin legislature supported re-
sult; eventually this Court reversed 
mfs 01/27/83 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: EEOC v. Wyoming, No. 81-554 
1798-99 Kentucky and Viginia Resolutions 
drafted by Jefferson and Madison, repectively, 
to protest the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798; method chosen because courts, dominated 
by Federalists, were willing to enforce Acts; 
all Northern states disapproved Resolutions; 
Second Kentucky and Viginia Resolutions draft-
ed by Jefferson and Madison in response to 
disapproval of original Resolutions; stronger 
language, including "nullification" (Kentucky) 
and "interposition" (Virginia); Jefferson and 
Madison retreated from views of Resolutions 
when Acts were no longer an issue (after their 
party gained national power) Miller & Howell, 
Interposition, Nullification and the Delicate 
Division of Power in the Federal System, 5 J. 
Pub. L. 2, 13-14 (1956). 
1807-14 New England Opposition to Embargo Law etc. 
Massachusetts legislature denounced 1809 en-
forcement act as "unjust, oppressive, and un-
constitutional, and not legally binding on the 
citizens of this state" Miller & Howell, In-
terposition, Nullification and the Delicate 
Division of Power in the Federal System, 5 J. 
Pub. L. 2, 14 (1956); Connecticut refused to 
furnish militia, using interposition language 
Ibid.; 1813 embargo law denounced by Mass. 
legislature using interposition language Id., 
at 15; Daniel Webster(!) used interposition 
language in Congress re: 1813 conscription 
bill & bill for enlistment of minors Ibid.; 
1814 Hartford Convention Ibid. 
1828-33 South Carolina Nullification 
nullification doctrine developed by John c. 
Calhoun--see "South Carolina Exposition" 
( 18 28) setting out theory of interposition; 
state convention can nullify federal law with-
in state pending possible overruling by feder-
al constitutional amendment (3/4 vote neces-
sary to overrule state!); Webster-Hayne Debate 
2. 
(1830) re: Calhoun doctrine; Nullification 
Ordinance (1832) adopted by South Carolina in 
opposition to congressional tariff legisla-
tion; Pres. Jackson faced S. Car. challenge 
squarely and won Miller & Howell, Interposi-
tion, Nullification and the Delicate Division 
of Power in the Federal System, 5 J. Pub. L. 
2, 9-12 (1956) 
1850-60 Northern Opposition to Fugitive Slave Act 
best example found in Ableman v. Booth, 6 2 
U.S. 506 (1858). Booth arrested for violating 
Act and held in federal custody; Wisconsin 
state court granted habeas relief, finding Act 
unconstitutional; Wisconsin Supreme Court af-
firmed; Wisconsin legislature supported re-
sult; eventually this Court reversed Miller & 
Howell, Interposition, Nullification and the 
Delicate Division of Power in the Federal Sys-
tem, 5 J. Pub. L. 2, 16 (1956) 
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1-554 EEOC v. W 
SALLY-POW 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
~--- r join the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion, 
and write separately to record a personal dissent from 
Justice Stevens' revisionist view of the history of our 
country. He commences his separate concurring opinion 
with the startling observation that the Commerce Clause 
"was the Framers' response to the central problem that 
gave rise to the Constitution itself". Ante, at 1. 
(emphasis added) • Again, at a subsequent point in his 
opinion Justice Stevens observed that "this Court has 
construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the 
Framers • to confer a power on the national government 
adequate to discharge its central mission". Ante, at 3 
(emphasis added) . 1 Justice Stevens further states that 
1The authority primarily relied on by 
Justice Stevens are quotations from Justice Rutledge who 
did indeed write in 1947 that the "proximate cause of our 
national existence" was not to assure the great 
"democratic freedoms"; rather it was "to secure freedom of 
trade" within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A 
Declaration of Legal Faith, at 25-26, (1947), ante, at 
1,2. 
"National League of Cities not only was incorrectly 
decided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose 
of the Constitution itself •.. " Ante, at 5. (emphasis 
added) 
I 
Justice Stevens and I must have read different 
history books. No one would suggest that removing 
barriers to the free flow of trade was not one of the 
purposes of the Constitution. I do suggest that there 
were a number of other purposes of equal or greater 
importance in the contemplation of the statesmen who 
assembled in Philadelphia and as evidenced by the debates 
in the several states on the issue of ratification. No 
doubt there were differences of opinion as to the primacy 
of the various purposes. But one can be reasonably sure 
that few among the Founding Fathers thought that trade 
barriers were "the central problem", or that their 
elimination was the "central mission" of the 
Constitutional Convention. 
If Justice Stevens had written that the intent 
of the Founders, in adopting the Commerce Clause nearly 
two centuries ago,is irrelevant to the world in which we 
. .•. 
,, . 
. . . ,, 
.. 
live today, I would not have disagreed. But his 
concurring opinion purports to rely on their intent. The 
Commerce Clause properly has been construed, and its reach 
gradually extended, by this Court to accommodate 
unanticipated changes that have occurred over the decades 
primarily in transportation and communication. I would 
not have thought until today, however, that anyone would 
suppose that the time and circumstances of a game warden's 
retirement in Wyoming were of the slightest consequences 
to commerce and trade. Surely, such a suggestion, 
seriously made at the time that this was within the 
central purpose of the Constitution, would have foreclosed 
its ratification. 
I refer to the dissenting opinion of the Chief 
Justice for a response to the Court's opinion on the basis 
of constitutional doctrine. I write only -- and briefly 
in view of the scope of the subject -- to place the 
Commerce Clause properly in the perspective of history, 
and to suggest that even today federalism is not as 
utterly subservient to that Clause as Justice Stevens 




The central purpose of the Constitution was, as 
the name implies, to constitute a government. The central 
provisions, therefore, are those relating to the 
establishment of the government. The system of checks and 
balances, for example, was far more central to the larger 
perspective than any single power conferred on Congress. 
But apart from the framework of government itself, the 
motivating purposes of the Framers were stated in the 
preamble to the Constitution: 
" . . . to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty .• 
" 
Achievement of these purposes was not delegated 
solely to the Congress. But if one looks at the powers 
that were so delegated, the position of the Commerce 
Clause hardly suggests that it was "central" among the 
concerns of the patriots who formed our union. Section 8 
beg ins with the power to tax and to pay debts. Then, 
consistent with the preamble is the power to "provide for 
the common defense and general welfare". Among the 
following enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause is only 
one among nearly a score. So much for what the language 
and structure of the Constitution itself teachers about 
the intent of the Framers. 
III 
One would never know from my friend's and 
colleague's concurring opinion that the Constitution 
formed a federal system, composed of the central 
government and states that retained a significant measure 
of sovereign authority. This is clear from the the 
Constitution itself, the debates at the Convention and 
particularly from the discussions that attended the 
ratification debates in the colonies. It is impossible to 
believe that the Constitution would have been adopted, 
much less ratified, if it had been understood that the 
"central mission" of the national government was embodied 
in the Commerce Clause, a mission to be accomplished even 
at the expense of regulating the personnel practices of 
state and local government. 
' 
~-. 








From: Justice Stevens 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
1st DRAFT 
::;;r ~ ~ No. 81-054 Q~ -:?: 
_-. j _ L~ ~ jJ EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM~, ty -
1 
r r vv f"'/r~ SION, APPELLANT v. WYOMING, ET AL. ~ 
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING .• ' 
[January - , 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
While I join the Court's opinion, a complete explanation of 
my appraisar o1 ffie case requires these additional comments 
about the larger perspective in which I view the underlying 
issues. 
I 
In final analysis, we are construing the scope of the power 
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution. It is important to reme this clause was 
the Framers' response to t central roblem hat ave rle 
o e onstitution Itself. s ave pre wusly noted, Jus-
tice Rutledge described the origins and purpose of the Com-
merce Clause in these words: 
"If any liberties may be held more basic than others, 
they are the great and indispensable democratic free-
doms secured by the First Amendment. But it was not 
to assure them that the Constitution was framed and 
ado~ later were they added, by popular de-
mand. It was rather to secure freedom of trade, to 
~ 
(Jt; break down the ·baTrfers to Its free flow, that the Annap-
... ll olis Convention was called, only to adjourn with a view 
l-~ to Philadelphia. Thus the generating source of the Con-
LY{ - ~t1uj j-
1/Y a-- ~~ct-
'1~,~d/~~-
;,--0-- ~~ ~v 
2 
81-554-CONCUR 
EEOC v. WYOMING 
s e are_ wont to do, they dictated the character 
and scope of their own remedy. This lay specifically in 
the commerce clause. No prohibition of trade barriers 
as among the states could have been effective of its own 
force or by trade agreements. It had become apparent 
that such treaties were too difficult to negotiate and the 
process of securing them was too complex for this 
method to give the needed relief. Power adequate to 
make and enforce the prohibition was required. Hence, 
the necessity for creating an entirely new scheme of 
government. 
"So by a stroke as bold as it proved successful, they 
founded a nation, although they had set out only to find a 
VE::,Y to reduce trade restrictiOns. So also they solvea 
the particular problem causative of their historic action, 
by introducing the commerce clause in the new structure 
of power." W. Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith, 
at 25--26 (1947), quoted in United States v. Stasczuk, 517 
F. 2d 53, 58 (CA7) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 837 
(1975). 
There have been occasions when the Court has given ami-
serly construction to the Commerce Clause. 1 But as the 
needs of a dynamic and constantly expanding national econ-
1 See, e. g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1888) (manufacturing is 
not subject to the commerce power of Congress); United States v. E. C. 
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1895) (monopoly in manufacturing is not 
subject to the commerce power); Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 
17~179 (1908) (connection between interstate commerce and membership 
in a labor union insufficient to authorize Congress to make it a crime for an 
interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of union membership); 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 276 (1918) (Congress has no power 
81-554-CONCUR 
EEOC v. WYOMING 3 
,::...:::::::.::;.:=;~-.;;;,.~~c~e-.n~t~ra~l-.:m~Is,.s•Io~n~ In this process the Court 
as repea e y ia-te that had narrowly construed 
the clause. 2 The development of judicial doctrine has ac-
commodated the transition from a purely local, to a regional, 
and ultimately to a national economy. 3 Today, of course, .the..-Q__ 
{ nu 0 1 71 teelem economy is merely a part of an international mecha-
~ · nism no single nation could possibly regulate. 
In the statutes challenged in this case and in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1974), Congress ex-
ercised its power to regulate the American labor market. --..._. ""'----~ ___ .__ _ _ 
to prohibit interstate transportation of goods produced with child labor); 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 308-310 (1936) (commerce power 
does not extend to regulation of wages, hours, and working conditions of 
coal miners). 
2 Compare Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 524-525 (1922) with Hop-
kins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592-598 (1898); Virginian Ry. Co. v. 
Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 557 (1937) with Employers' Liability Cases, 207 
U. S. 463, 498 (1908); Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 393-394 
(1940) with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra, at 297-310; United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115-117 (1941) with Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra, 
at 269-277; United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 
U. S. 533, 542-553 (1944) with New York Life Insurance Co. v. Deer Lodge 
County, 231 U.S. 495, 502-512 (1913); Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 
334 U. S. 219, 229-235 (1948) with United States v. E . C. Knight Co., 
supra, at 12-16. 
3 See, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-125 (1942) (Con-
gress may constitutionally apply wheat marketing quota to w~t grown 
wholly for consumption on the farm, because of interdependence o national 
market); Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., supra, at 229-235 (Congress has 
power under commerce clause to prohibit price-fixing by purchasers of 
beet sugar from growers in same state); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 249-262 (1964) (Congress may prohibit racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation affecting commerce); Pe-
rez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 154-155 (1971) (Commerce Clause 
gives Congress power to regulate local loan-sharking because it is in a class 
of activities that has an impact on interstate commerce). 
(_e.. 
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There was a time when this Court would have denied that 
Congress had any such power, 4 but that chapter in our judi-
cial history has long been closed. 5 Today, there should be 
universal agreement on the proposition that Congress has 
ample power to regulate the terms and conditions of employ-
ment throu houtthe econom~ Because of the interdepen-
dence of the segments of the economy and the importance 
and magnitude of government employment, a comprehensive 
Congressional policy to regulate the lapor market may re-
quire coverage of both public and private sectors to be 
effective. 
•see, e. g., Employers' Liability Cases, supra, at 496-499; Adair v. 
United States, supra, at 176-180; Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra, at 
271-275; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra, at 303--304. 
5 See United States v. Darby, supra, at 113--124. 
6 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." U. S. Canst. Arndt. 10. 
As Chief Justice Stone wrote in United States v. Darby, supra, at 124, 
"The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered. . . . From the beginning and for many years the amend-
ment has been construed as not depriving the national government of au-
thority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are 
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." 
81-554-CONCUR -_ .... 
EEOC v. WYOMING 5 
II 
My conviction that Congress had ample power to enact this 
statute, as well as the statute at issue in National League of 
Cities, is unrelated to my views about the merits of either 
piece of legislation. As I intimated in my dissent in that 
case, I believe that federal regulation that enhances the mini-
mum price of labor inevitably reduces the number of jobs 
available to people who are ready, willing, and able to engage 
in productive work-and thereby aggravates rather than 
ameliorates our unemployment problems. I also believe, 
contrary to the popular view, that the burdens imposed on 
the national economy by legislative prohibitions against man-
datory retirement on account of age exceed the potential 
benefits. My personal views on such matters are, however, 
totally irrelevant to the judicial task I am obligated to per-
form. There is nothing novel about this point-it has been 
made repeatedly by more learned and more experienced 
judges. 7 But it is important to emphasize this obvious limit 
on the proper exercise of judicial power, one that is some-
' See, e. g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (Stewart, J., 
concurring); Adair v. United States, supra, at 191-192 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
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times overlooked by those who criticize our work product. 
The question in this case is purely one of constitutional 
power. In exercising its power to regulate the national mar-
ket for the services of individuals-either by prescribing the 
minimum price for such services or by prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination on account of age-may Congress regu-
late both the public sector and the private sector of that mar-
ket, or must it confine its ·o the private sector? If 
the power is to be a quate to e b the national govern-
ment to perform it central mission that question can have 
only one answer. 
.. 
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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM - a_ .. _, /}/ ...... 
SION, APPELLANT v. WYOMING, ET AL. ...J,IV'-"' 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING f' 
[January-, 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
While I join the Court's opinion, a complete explanation of 
my apprai'Sa.ToTffie caserequires these additional comments 
about the larger perspective in which I view the underlying 
issues. 
I 
In final analysis, we are construing the scope of the power 
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution. It is important to remember that this clause was 
the Framers' res~;>anse to the central problem that gave rise 
to the Constitution itself. As I have previously noted, Jus-
tice Rutledge described the origins and purpose of the Com-
merce Clause in these words: 
"If any liberties may be held more basic than others, 
they are the great and indispensable democratic free-
doms secured by the Fir~t Amendment. But it was not 
to assure them that t}le 
1 
Constitution was framed and 
adooted. Only later were tney added, by popular de-
? 
mand. It was rather t q__ secure freedom of trade, to 
break down the barriers to its free How, t fiat the Annap-
olis Convention was called, only to adjourn with a view 
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stitution lay in the rising volume of restraints upon com-
merce which the Confederation could not check. These 
were the proximate cause of our national existence down 
to foday. 
"As evils are wont to do, they dictated the character 
and scope of their own remedy. This lay specifically in 
the commerce clause. No prohibition of trade barriers 
as among the states could have been effective of its own 
force or by trade agreements. It had become apparent 
that such treaties were too difficult to negotiate and the 
process of securing them was too complex for this 
method to give the needed relief. Power adequate to 
make and enforce the prohibition was required. Hence, 
the necessity for creating an entirely new scheme of 
government. 
"So by a stroke as bold as it proved successful, they 
founded a nation, although they had set out only to find a 
way to reduce trade restrictions. So also they solved 
the particular problem causative of their historic action, 
by introducing the commerce clause in the new structure 
of power." W. Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith, 
at 25-26 (1947), quoted in United States v. Stasczuk, 517 
F. 2d 53, 58 (CA7) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 837 
(1975). 
There have been occasions when the Court has given a mi-
serly construction to the Commerce Clause. 1 But as the 
needs of a dynamic and constantly expanding national econ-
1 See, e. g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1888) (manufacturing is 
not subject to the commerce power of Congress); United States v. E. C. 
Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 12-16 (1895) (monopoly in manufl:lcturing is not 
subject to the commerce power); Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 
178-179 (1908) (connection between interstate commerce and membership 
in a labor union insufficient to authorize Congress to make it a crime for an 
interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of union membership); 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 276 (1918) (Congress has no power 
81-554-CONCUR 
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omy have changed, this Court has construed the Commerce 
Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion-to confer a power on the national government adequate 
to discharge its central mission. In this process the Court 
has repeatedly repudiated cases that had narrowly construed 
the clause. 2 The development of judicial doctrine has ac-
commodated the transition from a purely local, to a regional, 
and ultimately to a national economy.3 Today, of course, .the-Q__ 
( nu.o 1 71 f4aaem economy is merely a part of an international mecha-
~ · nism no single nation could possibly regulate. 
In the statutes challenged in this case and in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1974), Congress ex-
ercised its power to regulate the American labor market. 
to prohibit interstate transportation of goods produced with child labor); 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 308-310 (1936) (commerce power 
does not extend to regulation of wages, hours, and working conditions of 
coal miners). 
2 Compare Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 524-525 (1922) with Hop-
kins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 592-598 (1898); Virginian Ry. Co. v. 
Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 557 (1937) \\;th Employers' Liability Cases, 207 
U. S. 463, 498 (1908); Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 393-394 
(1940) with Carter v. Carter Coal Co. , supra, at 297-310; United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115-117 (1941) with Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra, 
at 269-277; United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 
U. S. 533, 542-553 (1944) with New York Life Insurance Co. v. Deer Lodge 
County, 231 U.S. 495, 502-512 (1913); Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 
334 U.S. 219, 229-235 (1948) ,.,;th United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 
supra, at 12-16. 
3 See, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 118-125 (1942) (Con-
gress may constitutionally apply wheat marketing quota to w~t growTI---{_e. 
wholly for consumption on the farm, because of interdependence o natwnal 
market); Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., supra, at 229-235 (Congress has 
power under commerce clause to prohibit price-fixing by purchasers of 
beet sugar from growers in same state); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 249-262 (1964) (Congress may prohibit racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation affecting commerce); Pe-
rez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 154-155 (1971) (Commerce Clause 
gives Congress power to regulate local loan-sharking because it is in a class 
of activities that has an impact on interstate commerce). 
. 
', . •.. 
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There was a time when this Court would have denied that 
Congress had any such power, 4 but that chapter in our judi-
cial history has long been closed.5 Today, there should be 
universal agreement on the proposition that Congress has 
ample power to regulate the terms and conditions of employ-
ment throughout the economy. Because of the interdepen-
dence of the segments of the economy and the importance 
and magnitude of government employment, a comprehensive 
Congressional policy to regulate the labor market may re-
quire coverage of both public and private sectors to be 
effective. 
Congress may not, of course, transcend specific limitations 
on its exercise of the commerce power that are imposed by 
other provisions of the Constitution. But there is no limita-
tion in the text of the Constitution that is even arguably ap-
plicable to this case. The only basis for questioning the fed-
eral statute at issue here is the pure judicial fiat found in this 
Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery. Nei-
ther the Tenth Amendment, 6 nor any other provision of the 
Constitution, affords any support for that judicially con-
structed limitation on the scope of the federal power granted 
to Congress by the Commerce Clause. In my opinion, that 
decision must be placed in the same category as E. C. 
• See, e. g., Employers' Liability Cases, supra, at 496-499; Adair v. 
United States, supra, at 176-180; Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra, at 
271-275; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra, at 303-304. 
6 See United States v. Darby, supra, at 113-124. 
6 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." U. S. Const. Arndt. 10. 
As Chief Justice Stone wrote in United States v. Darby, supra, at 124, 
"The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered. . . . From the beginning and for many years the amend-
ment has been construed as not depriving the national government of au-
thority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are 
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." 
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Knight, Hammer v. Dagenhart, and Carter v. Carter Coalr-
cases whose subsequent rejection is now universally re-
garded as proper. I think it so plain that National League of 
Cities not only was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsis-
tent with the central purpose of the Constitution itself, that it 
is not entitled to the deference that the doctrine of stare deci-
sis ordinarily commands for this Court's precedents. Nat-
withstanding my respect for that doctrine, I believe that the 
law would be well served by a prompt rejection of National 
League of Cities' modern embodiment of the spirit of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. 
II 
My conviction that Congress had ample power to enact this 
statute, as well as the statute at issue in National League of 
Cities, is unrelated to my views about the merits of either 
piece of legislation. As I intimated in my dissent in that 
case, I believe that federal regulation that enhances the mini-
mum price of labor inevitably reduces the number of jobs 
available to people who are ready, willing, and able to engage 
in productive work-and thereby aggravates rather than 
ameliorates our unemployment problems. I also believe, 
contrary to the popular view, that the burdens imposed on 
the national economy by legislative prohibitions against man-
datory retirement on account of age exceed the potential 
benefits. My personal views on such matters are, however, 
totally irrelevant to the judicial task I am obligated to per-
form. There is nothing novel about this point- it has been 
made repeatedly by more learned and more experienced 
judges. 7 But it is important to emphasize this obvious limit 
on the proper exercise of judicial power, one that is some-
7 See, e. g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 569 (1967) (Stewart, J ., 
concurring); Adair v. United States, supra, at 191- 192 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
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times overlooked by those who criticize our work product. 
The question in this case is purely one of constitutional 
power. In exercising its power to regulate the national mar-
ket for the services of individuals-either by prescribing the 
minimum price for such services or by prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination on account of age-may Congress regu-
late both the public sector and the private sector of that mar-
ket, or must it confine its regulation to the private sector? If 
the power is to be adequate to enable the national govern-
ment to perform its central mission, that question can have 
only one answer. 
To: Justice Brennan 
Justice White 
Justice Marshall -/ -:1--
1 
() 





From: The Chief Justice 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEREN 
-RE: 81-554-EEOC v. WYOMING 
When I have more time, I will shorten this t eatment. The 
following will show you the thrust of my diss nting views. 
The Court decides today that Congress rna dictate to the 
states, and their political subdivisions, deta1 d standards 
governing the selection of state employees, inc ding those 
charged with protecting people and homes from c · es and 
fires. Although the proposed opinion reads the Constitu 1 
to allow Congress to usurp this very fundamental state func-
tion, I have reexamined that document to see where it grants 
to the national government the power to impose such stric-
tures on the states. Those strictures are not required by 
any holding of this Court, and the Congress has not placed 
similar limits on itself in the exercise of its own sovereign 
powers to choose those who provide services for the nation. 
The statute in issue, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U. S. C. (and Supp. III) 621 et seq., was first 
enacted in 1967 to ban discriminatory treatment in private 
employment based on age. Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602. 
In 1974, when the Fair Labor Standards Act was extended to 
apply to the states in their capacities as employers, 1 the Age 
Act was similarly extended. Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74. 
This extension has the effect of invalidating statutes such as 
1 The extension of the FLSA to the states was declared unconstitutional 
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). 
j 
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the Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish War-
den Retirement Act, Wyo. Stat. §31-3--101 et seq., which 
permits the involuntary retirement of Wyoming fish and 
game wardens who are at age 55 and imposes mandatory re-
tirement at age 65. 2 
This case originated in a complaint filed with appellant, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, by Bill Crump, 
a Wyoming District Game Division supervisor who was 
mandatorily retired pursuant to § 31-3--107. When informal 
settlement procedures initiated by the Commission failed, 
the Commission filed this action against the State, charging 
that the State's statute violated the Age Act.' The action 
was dismissed by the District Court, which held that the 
Tenth Amendment barred application of the Age Act to the 
states under National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 
833 (1976). The Commission appealed directly here under 28 
U. S. C. § 1252, urging us to reverse on the ground that con-
gressional authority exists under both the Commerce Clause 
and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I would affirm. 
I 
I begin by analysing the Commerce Clause rationale, for it 
was upon this power that Congress expressly relied when it 
originally enacted the Age Act in 1967, see 29 U. S. C. § 621, 
and when it extended its protections to state and local gov-
ernment employers, see H.R. Rep. No. 93-913, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess.-(1974). 
We have had several occasions in recent years to investi-
gate the scope of congressional authority to legislate under 
the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., National League of Cities 
v. Usery, supra; Hodel v. Virginia Surface and Mining Rec-
lamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., -- U. S. --
2 Wyoming's law is hardly unique. Amici cite to us statutes in 28 
states, Brief for Alabama, et al. as Amicus Curiae 2a-5a, and 160 munici-
palities, Brieffor the National Institute of Municipal Law Enforcement Of-
ficers as Amicus Curiae la-7a, that violate the Age Act . 
'. 
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(1982). The wisdom to be drawn from these cases is that 
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause is restricted 
by the protections afforded the states by the Tenth Amend-
ment. To decide whether a particular enactment has im-
properly intruded into Tenth Amendment rights, we have 
adopted a three-prong test: 
--~ 
"First, there must be a showing that the challenged 
regulation regulates the 'States as States.' [National 
League of Cities, supra], at 854. Second, the federal 
regulation must address matters that are indisputably 
'attributes of state sovereignty.' I d., at 845. And 
third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance 
with the federal law would directly impair their ability 
'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional 
functions.' ld., at 852." Hodel, at 287-288. 
For statutes that meet each prong of this test, a final inquiry 
must be made to decide whether "the federal interest ad-
vanced [is] such that it justifies state submission." ld., at 
288 n. 29, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975); 
National League of Cities, supra, at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., 
concurring). 
We need not pause on the first prong of this test, for the 
legislation is indisputably aimed at regulating the states in 
their capacity as states, § 630(b). The Commission argues, 
however, that the legislation does not run counter to the 
other two prongs of the test. Turning then to prong two, 
whether the Age Act addresses matters that are 'attributes 
of state sovereignty,' we must first distinguish between the 
argument made by the Commission in its brief, and the posi-
tion adopted at oral argument. In its brief, the Commission 
characterized Wyoming's interest as an interest in arbitrary 
discrimination. From this it argued that discriminating ar-
bitrarily is not an 'attribute of state sovereignty,' Brief for 
Appellant 10 and 11. I agree: were Wyoming indeed claim-
ing that the Constitution permits it to discriminate without 
reason, I too might uphold national legislation preventing 
such activity as against a Tenth Amendment claim. But that 
4 EEOC v. WYOMING 
is not the case here. Indeed, the Commission has now aban-
doned this line of reasoning, and in its place, acknowledges 
that in enacting mandatory retirement laws, )Vyoming_was 
perhaps-albeit mistakenly-seeking tQ._,assurg t.h.e Qhysical 
pre~ of those who enforce laws and put out fires. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Significantly, the Commission made no 
attempt at oral argument to claim that this goal is not an 
attribute of sovereignty, for had such a claim been made, ob-
viously it would be rejected. Parks and recreation services 
were identified in National League of Cities, supra, at 851, 
as traditional state activities protected by the Tenth Amend-
ment. But even more important, it is the essence of state 
power to choose-subject only to constitutional limits-who 
is part of the state government. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 
U. S. 112, 123 (1970) (Black, J.). If poachers destroy the 
fish and game reserves of Wyoming, it is not to the Congress 
that people are going to complain. Rather, it is the state and 
local authorities who will have to justify their actions in se-
lecting wardens. Since it is the state that bears the respon-
sibility for delivering the services, it is clearly an attribute of 
state sovereignty to choose who will perform these duties-
subject only to constitutional limits. 
Interestingly, the Congress, while mandating compliance 
in the states, has been meticulously careful to preserve its 
own freedom to select employees on any basis it chooses. 
Although the Age Act was expressly made to apply to the na-
tional government, 29 U. S. C. § 633a, exceptions were built 
into the enactment. Certain categories of employment-
such as law enforcement officers-were explicitly excluded, 
and in addition, the statute provides that "[r ]easonable ex-
emptions to the provisions of this section may be established 
by the [Civil Service] Commission." 3 Nor is the Commis-
sion's explanation for these exemptions reassuring. When 
asked at oral argument why all federal workers were not 
• This function was later transferred to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, see section 2 of the 1978 Reorganization Plan No. 1, 43 
Fed. Reg. 19807, 92 Stat. 3781. 
~ 
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given the benefit of the Age Act, the Solicitor General said Pj -- -JI'-- T'~ -- T 
the reason that was not done was that some of the enclaves, Y~. 5 ~such people as CIA, air traffic controllers, law enforcement '{/ ~ 
officers, fire fighters, were subject to the primary jurisdic- J-
tion of other congressional committees and Congress did not , 
want to impinge "on their turf' before giving them an oppor-~ 
tunity to pass on the issue. 4  
My own view of our constitutional scheme is that Congress 
should think at least as carefully about impinging on the ~
"turf' of the states as it does about impinging on the "turf' of Jt? A •• A /. , J~ 
its membershi . · ~~~'1· ~ 
The ird p o of the National League of Cities test is 
that the e eral intrusion must impair the ability of the state 
to ~tegral operations. Wyoming -cite~eral 
waysin which- tllekge'A"C'trn.terferes with its ability to struc-
ture state services, and several amici briefs inform us of ad-
ditional difficulties engendered by the Act. These break 
down into two groups; economic and non-economic hardships. 
It is beyond dispute that the statute can give rise to in-
creased employment costs caused by forced employment of 
older individuals. Since these employees tend to be at the 
upper end of the pay scale, the cost of their wages while they 
are still in the work force is greater. And since most pension 
plans calculate retirement benefits on the basis of maximum 
salary or number of years of service, pension costs are 
greater when an older employee retires. 5 The employer is 
4 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. The legislative history of the FLSA of 1974 
bears out this assertion. During the debate in the House of Represen-
tatives, amendments were successfully introduced by Representatives 
Spellman and Hawkins to allow other committees the opportunity to re-
view the statute before it was applied to employees of the agencies for 
which the committees were responsible, 123 Cong. Rec. 30555--30556. 
5 This problem is exacerbated by the special retirement schemes often 
used in connection with mandatory early retirement laws. In Wyoming, 
for example, state employees who are not subject to early retirement con-
tribute less per month towards retirement than those in occupations where 
early retirement is required. So long as the early retirement laws are in 
effect, this system is actuarily sound because the employees who will spend 
6 EEOC v. WYOMING 
also forced to pay more for insuring the health of older em-
ployees because, as a group, they inevitably carry a higher-
than-average risk of illness. See, e. g., M.L. Pollock, L.R. 
Gettman, and B. U. Meyer, Analysis of Physical Fitness and 
Coronary Heart Disease Risk of Dallas Area Police Officers, 
20 J. Occup. Med. 393 (1978); N.W. Shock, Cardiac Perfor-
mance and Age, Cardiovascular Problems, 3-24 (1976); J.H. 
Hall and J.D. Zwemer, Prospective Medicine (1979). Since 
they are-especially in law enforcement-also more prone to 
on-the-job injuries, it is reasonable to conclude that the em-
ployer's disability costs are increased. See generally, D.W. 
Gregg and V.B. Lucas, Life and Health Insurance Handbook 
(3d ed. 1973); S.S. Huebner, K. Black, Jr., Life Insurance 
(lOth ed. 1982). 
Non-economic hardships are equally severe. Employers 
are prevented from hiring those physically best able to do the 
job. Since older workers occupy a disproportionate share of 
the upper-level and supervisory positions, a bar on manda-
tory retirement also impedes promotion opportunities. 
Lack of such opportunities tends to undermine younger em-
ployees' incentive to strive for excellence, and impedes the 
state from fulfilling affirmative action objectives. 
The federal government can hardly claim that the objec-
tives of decreasing costs and increasing promotional opportu-
nities are impermissible: many of the same goals are cited re-
peatedly to justify the "enclaves" of federal exceptions to the 
Age Act. For example, mandatory retirement is still the 
rule in the Armed Services, 10 U. S. C. § 1251, and the For-
eign Service, 22 U. S. C. § 4052, despite passage of the Age 
Act. The House Committee on Armed Services continues, 
apparently, to think it essential to have a mechanism for the 
removal of infirm officers from positions of command, H.R. 
less years at work pay into the system more rapidly. Simple invalidation 
of the early retirement system would work an inequity by requiring these 
workers to contribute more towards retirement than other state employ-
ees. Brief for Appellee 12, n. 5. Of course, Wyoming could revamp its 
pension system to correct this problem. Forcing the State to do so is an-
other example of the adverse impact wrought by the Age Act. 
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Rep. No. 96--1462, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980). Mandatory 
retirement was recommended after the Committee analysed 
the costs and concluded that it would cost more to keep an 
older employee on active service than it would cost to retire 
him, id., at 28. Similarly, the House Committee on Post Of-
fice and Civil Service, while acknowledging the "unfairness of 
a mandatory retirement age," H.R. Rep. 96--992 Pt. 2, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980), concluded that it remains neces-
sary in the Foreign Service "for the maintenance of predict-
able career patterns," id., to prevent "unavailability for 
worldwide assignment," id., and to "restore the 'flow' [i. e. 
promotional opportunities] to the system," id., at 15. 
The Commission answers the State's contentions by argu-
ing that even under the Age Act, it is possible to effectuate 
some of the State's goals. According to appellant, adverse 
economic impact is mitigated by § 623(f)(2), which provides 
that an employer may "observe the terms of a bona fide em-
ployee benefit_plan such as a retirement, pension, or insur-
ance plan, whicllis not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this chapter .... " 
I reject the notion that this exception ameliorates the 
State's problem to any significant extent. The reality is 
that, for Wyoming to benefit from this exception, it will have 
to enact new laws and develop new regulations to reduce its 
insurance coverage on older employees. Drafting and enact-
ing these new laws is a burden Congress has no power to im-
pose on the states. Second, it is doubtful that Wyoming 
could, as a practical matter, lower the health and disability 
insurance coverage on employees who fall under mandatory 
retirement laws. It is these employees who are, for the 
most part, in the most physically hazardous occupations, and 
thus most need the protection. Stated another way, perhaps 
Crump would not want to keep his job if the State were un-
willing to bear the economic risks of his injuries. Section 
623(f)(2) is thus a shallow alternative to mandatory 
retirement. 
Inspection of§ 623(f)(1), the Commission's answer to non-
economic hardships, fares no better. That section provides 
that mandatory early retirement is permissible "where age is 
8 EEOC v. WYOMING 
a bona fide occupational qualification [bfoq] reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of the particular business .... " 
Although superficially, this section appears to offer the states 
a means for lessening the administrative burden of retiring 
unfit employees on a case by case basis by using age when it 
is an appropriate proxy for ability, the exception does not 
work in practice. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the 
courts that have faced the question have-in response to this 
appeuant's urgings-taken a hard line on what constitutes a 
bona fide occupational qualificatiOn. ypiCa seems to be the 
approach taken in Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F. 2d 1267, 1271 (CA4 
1977), requiring the employer to prove: 
"(1) that the bfoq which it invokes is reasonably neces-
sary to the essence of its business . . . , and (2) that the 
employer has reasonable cause, i. e., a factual basis for 
believing that all or substantially all persons within the 
class . . . would be unable to perform safely and effi-
ciently the duties involved, or that it is impossible or im-
practical to deal with persons over the age limit on an in-
dividualized basis." 
See also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d 224 
(CAS 1976). Given the state of modern medicine, it is virtu-
ally impossible to prove that all persons within a class are un-
able to perform a particular job or that it is impossible to test 
employees on an individual basis, see, e. g., Johnson v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F.Supp. 1287, 1299 (D.Md. 1981), 
cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1982) (age not bfoq for 
firefighters since medical tests are available to test on a case-
by-case basis); Adams v. James, 526 F.Supp. 80, 87 (M.D. 
Ala. 1981) (evidence compiled for trial not usable to show age 
is a bfoq for police officers). 
In the face of this track record, I find it impossible to say 
that § 623(f)(1) provides an adequate method for avoiding sig-
nificant impairment to the state's ability to structure its inte-
gral governmental operations. 
Since I am satisfied that the Age Act runs afoul of all three 
prongs of the National League of Cities test, I turn to the 
EEOC v. WYOMING 9 
balancing test alluded to in JusTICE BLACKMUN's concurring 
opinion in National League of Cities, and in Hodel. The 
Commission argues that the federal interest in preventing 
unnecessary demands on the social security system and other 
maintenance programs, in protecting employees from 
arbritrary discrimination, and in eliminating unnecessary 
burdens on the free flow of commerce "is more than sufficient 
in the face of a Wyoming's bald assertion of a prerogative to 
be arbitrary." Brief for Appellant, at 19.6 
It is simply not accurate to state that Wyoming is really 
resting its challenge to the Age Act on a "sovereign" right to 
discriminate; as I read it, Wyoming is asserting a right to be 
"discriminating" in choosing its law enforcement personnel 
by taking age into account. Nor do I believe that these 
largely theoretical benefits to the federal government out-
weigh the very real danger that a fire may burn out of control 
because the firefighters are not physically able to cope; or 
that a criminal may escape because a law-enforcement offi-
cer's reflexes are too slow to react swiftly to apprehend an 
offender; or that an officer may be injured or killed for want 
of capacity to defend himself. I submit these factors may 
not be very real to Congress because it is not Congress' 
responsibility to prevent them. They are nonetheless quite 
real to the states. I would hold that Commerce Clause pow-
ers are wholly insufficient to bar the states from dealing with 
or preventing these dangers in a rational manner. Wyo-
ming's solution is plainly a rational means. 
II 
Since it was ratified after the Tenth Amendment, the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not subject to all the constraints 
discussed earlier in connection with the Commerce Clause. 
Indeed, it is well established that Congress may, under the 
powers bestowed by § 5, enact legislation affecting the states, 
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880); Fitzpatrick v. 
6 This blandly ignores Congress' assertions of authority to avoid the 
very strictures it imposes on the states. 
· .. ~ 
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Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). But this does not mean that 
Congress has been given a "blank check" to intrude into de-
tails of states' governments at will. The Tenth Amendment 
was not, after all repealed when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified: it was merely limited. The question then be-
comes whether the Fourteenth Amendment operates to 
transfer from the states to the federal government the essen-
tially local governmental function of deciding who will protect 
citizens from law breakers. 
The outer reaches of congressional power under the civil 
war amendments have always been uncertain. One factor is, 
however, clear: Congress may act only where a violation 
lurks. The flaw in the Commission's analysis is that in this 
instance, no one-not the Court, not the Congress 7-has de-
termined that mandatory retirement plans violate any rights 
protected by these amendments. We cannot say that the Ju-
diciary made this determination, for we have considered the 
constitutionality of mandatory retirement schemes twice, in 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 
(1976), for state police, and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93 
(1979), for Foreign Service officers; we rejected both equal 
protection challenges. In both instances, we arrived at our 
conclusion by examining, arguendo, the retirement schemes 
under the rational-basis standard. It was not necessary that 
we be convinced that equal protection guarantees extend to 
classes defined by age because governmental employment is 
not a fundamental right and those who are mandatorily re-
tired are not a suspect class. 
In Murgia, we found that early retirement of policemen 
was justified by the states' objective of "protect[ing] the pub-
lic by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police," 
id., at 314; in Bradley, we held that early retirement of for-
eign service personnel was justified by Congress' perception 
7 The ability of Congress to define independently protected classes is a 
controversial issue, and I do not mean to propose a resolution here. 
Rather, I think that the Age Act is unconstitutional even if it is assumed 
that Congress has this power. 
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of a need to assure "opportunities for promotion would be 
available," "the high quality of those occupying positions crit-
ical to the conduct of our foreign relation," and in order to 
"minimize[] the risk of less than superior performance by rea-
son of poor health or loss of vitality," 440 U. S., at 101 and 
103-104. Congress was simply using a rational means for 
solving a practical governmental problem within its constitu-
tional jurisdiction. 
Were we asked to review the constitutionality of the Wyo-
ming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Re-
tirement Act, I have litte doullt we would reaeh a result ec;m-A 
sistent with Bradley and Murgia. Like Congress dealing 
with military personnel, FBI agents and foreign service offi-
cers, the State of Wyoming has an interest in the physical 
ability of its highway patrol, game, and fish wardens. It is 
within Wyoming's authority to motivate personnel to high 
performance by assuring opportunities for advancement; Wy-
oming reasonably considers safety conditions on its highways 
and game preserves critical to the well-being of its citizenry. 
In short, it cannot be said that in applying the Age Act to the 
states Congress has acted to enforce equal protection guaran-
tees as they have been defined by this Court. 
Nor can appellant claim that Congress has used the powers 
we recognized in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 
156, 17~177 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra; Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 437-444 (1968); South Car-
olina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), to enact legislation that pro-
hibits conduct not in itself unconstitutional because it consid-
ered the prohibition necessary to guard against encroach-
ment of guaranteed rights or to rectify past discrimination. 
There has been no finding, as there was in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, supra, at 309, that the abrogated state law in-
fringed on rights identified by this Court. 8 Nor did Con-
8 At oral argument, the Solicitor General argued that in applying the 
rational-basis test in Murgia and Bradley, the Court sub silentio agreed 
that age discrimination is protected by the Equal Protection Clause, and 
... ,., ... 
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gress use, as it did in Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra,, at 656, 
its "specially informed legislative competence" to decide that 
the state law it invalidated was too intrusive on federal rights 
to be an appropriate means to achieve the ends sought by the 
state. Instead, the Age Act can be sustained only if we as-
sume first, that Congress can define rights wholly indepen-
dently of our case law, and second, that Congress has done so 
here. I agree with neither proposition. 
Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights 
statutorily that it has independently defined fundamentally 
alters our scheme of government. Although the South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach line of cases may be read to allow Con-
gress a degree of flexibility in deciding what the Fourteenth 
Amendment safeguards, I have always read Oregon v. Mitch-
ell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to which Con-
gress may substitute its own judgment for that of the states 
and assume this Court's "role of final arbiter," Mitchell, at 
205 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mitchell, after all, involved 
legislation in the area of suffrage, where Congress had spe-
cial competence and special reasons to limit the powers of the 
states. It is significant, however, that while we there sus-
tained the portions of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 lowering 
the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 in federal elections, 
that all Congress has done is alter the burden needed to prove compliance 
with its guarantees. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. I do not read these deci-
sions to support this notion. Murgia and Bradley presented us with no 
occasion to determine the scope of the equal protection guarantee because 
we found the legislation challenged there sustainable even if we assumed 
the class was protected. Moreover, there are good arguments for finding 
that a class defined in temporal terms is not protected. Since all citizens 
(if they are lucky and live that long) become old, the majoritarian process is 
adequate to protect their interest. 
This is not to say definitively that age discrimination is not protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment because this case does not squarely raise that 
issue. Rather, I am pointing out that since this Court has not decided the 
question, the Government cannot support this enactment on the ground 
that Congress was attempting to establish further safeguards for a class 
we have found to be constitutionally protected . 
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barring literacy tests in state and federal elections, and for-
bidding states from disqualifying voters in presidential elec-
tions for failure to meet state residency requirements, a ma-
jority of the Mitchell Court did not agree to allow Congress r.:: 
to alter voting requirements in state elections. We struck ~-
that portion of the Voting Rights Actoe-ealise we thought it a 
"plain fact of history" that Congress lacked this power, see 
id., at 125 and 294 (Black and Stewart, JJ.); id., at 154--215 
(Harlan, J.); and because we thought that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not a license to "overstep the letter or spirit 
of any constitutional restriction," id., at 287 (Stewart, J.). 
For me, this same reasoning leads inevitably to the conclu-
sion that Congress lacked power to apply the Age Act to the 
states. There is no hint in the body of the Constitution rati-
fied in 1789 or in the relevant amendments that every classifi-
cation based on age is outlawed. Yet there is much in the 
Constitution and the relevant amendments to indicate that 
states retain sovereign powers not expressly surrendered, 
and these surely include the power to choose the employees 
they feel are best able to serve and protect their citizens. 9 
And even were we to assume for purposes of argument 
that Congress could redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, I 
would still reject the power of Congress to impose the Age 
Act on the states because there is no evidence that Congress 
intended to redefine it. Surely Congress would not, in the 
same year that the Age Act was extended to the states, have 
passed mandatory retirement legislation of its own, Pub. L. 
93-350, 88 Stat. 356, codified at 5 U. S. C. § 8335, for law en-
•It has been suggested that where a congressional resolution of a policy 
question hinges on legislative facts, the Court should defer to Congress's 
judgment because Congress is in a better position than the Court to find 
the relevant facts. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Deter-
minations, 40 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 187, 229-230 (1971). While this theory 
may have some importance in matters of federal concern, it has no place in 
deciding between two legislative judgments because Congress is simply 
not as well equipped as local legislators to make decisions involving purely 
local legislative facts. 
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. forcement officers and firefighters, if it thought that the leg-
islation would violate its own newly declared constitutional 
guarantee. 
I cannot view this inconsistency as a mere instance of 
underinclusiveness, as appellant urges. An underinclusive 
statute is one that fails to tackle a problem in its entirety and 
leaves a portion of an identified evil untouched for later reso-
lution. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 
(1955). Enacting new inconsistent laws is a far cry from suf-
fering with a situation pending development of a solution. 
Eight years have elapsed since the Age Act was extended to 
the states, yet early retirement is still required of federal air 
traffic controllers, 5 U. S. C. § 8335(a), federal law enforce-
ment officers, § 8335(b), federal firefighters, id., employees 
of the Panama Canal Comm'n and the Alaska Railroad, 
§8335(c), members ofthe Foreign Sevice, 22 U.S. C. §4052, 
and members of the Armed Services, 10 U. S. C. § 1251. 
Even were I to change my views and uphold equal protection 
statutes based on congressional identification of a new class 
of protected "entitlees," I would not do so in this case, when 
Congress itself ignores the rights of employees who are simi-
larly situated to those it sees as meriting protection from the 
states. 
III 
I believe I have demonstrated that neither the Constitu-
tion nor any of its amendments have transferred from the 
states to the federal government the essentially local function 
of establishing standards for choosing state employees. The 
Framers did not give Congress the power to decide local em-
ployment standards; they wisely realized that Congress as a 
body lacked the means to analyse the factors that bear on this 
decision, such as occupational risks, climate, geography, and 
demography. Since it is local conditions that determine how 
a job should be performed, and who should perform it, the 
authority and responsibility for making employment deci-
sions must be in the hands of local governments, subject only 
to those restrictions unmistakably contemplated by the Four-
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teenth Amendment. Intrusion by Congress can lead only to 
ill informed decisionmaking. 
And even if Congress had infinite fact-finding means at its 
disposal, conditions in various parts of the country are too di-
verse to be susceptible to a uniformly applicable solution. 
Wyoming is a state with large sparsely populated areas, 
where law enforcement often requires substantial physical 
stamina; the same conditions are not always encountered by 
law enforcement officers in Rhode Island, which has far less 
land area. Problems confronting law enforcement officers in 
Alaska or Maine may be unlike those encountered in Hawaii 
and Florida. Barring states from making employment deci-
sions tailored to meet specific local needs undermines the 
flexibility that has long allowed industrial states to live under 
the same flag as rural states, and small, densely populated 
states to coexist with large, sparsely populated ones. 
Justice Brandeis' classic conception of the states as labora-
tories, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), is turned on its head when 
national rather than state governments assert the authority 
to make decisions on age standards. Without the knowledge 
to experiment wisely, a national experiment will surely fail. 
But if, in the Brandeis spirit, a state that is cognizant of its 
local needs wishes to experiment by having some of its em-
ployees denied retirement until age 70 or 75, it should be en-
couraged to do so; if, on the other hand, a state wishes to ex-
periment with some retirements at age 55 or 60, that should 
also be permissible. This flexibility for experimentation not 
only permits each state to find the best solutions to its own 
problems, it is the means by which each state may profit from 
the activities of all the rest. I see nothing in the Constitu-
tion that permits Congress to force the states into a Procrus-
tean national mold. That is the antithesis of what the au-
thors of the Constitution contemplated for our federal 
system. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
The Court decides today that Congress may dictate to the 
states, and their political subdivisions, detailed standards 
governing the selection of state employees, including those 
charged with protecting people and homes from crimes and 
fires. Although the opinion reads the Constitution to allow 
Congress to usurp this fundamental state function, I have re-
examined that document and I fail to see where it grants to 
the national government the power to impose such strictures 
on the states either expressly or by implication. Those stric-
tures are not required by any holding of this Court, and it is 
not wholly without significance that Congress has not placed 
similar limits on itself in the exercise of its own sovereign 
powers. Accordingly, I would hold the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (Age Act) unconstitutional as applied to 
the states, and affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
I begin by analysing the Commerce Clause rationale, for it 
was upon this power that Congress expressly relied when it 
originally enacted the Age Act in 1967, see 29 U. S. C. § 621, 
and when it extended its protections to state and local gov-
ernment employers, see H.R. Rep. No. 93-913, 93d Gong., 
2d Sess.-(1974).' 
' The Age Act was extended to the states along with the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74. Extension of the FLSA was 
declared unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 
·; 
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We have had several occasions in recent years to investi-
gate the scope of congressional authority to legislate under 
the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
and Mining Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264 
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 
-- U. S. -- (1982). The wisdom to be drawn from these 
cases is that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause 
is restricted by the protections afforded the states by the 
Tenth Amendment. To decide whether a particular enact-
ment has improperly intruded into Tenth Amendment rights, 
we have adopted a three-prong test: 
"First, there must be a showing that the challenged 
regulation regulates the 'States as States.' [National 
League of Cities, supra], at 854. Second, the federal 
regulation must address matters that are indisputably 
'attributes of state sovereignty.' !d., at 845. And 
third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance 
with the federal law would directly impair their ability 
'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional 
functions.' !d., at 852." Hodel, at 287-288. 
For statutes that meet each prong of this test, a final inquiry 
must be made to decide whether "the federal interest ad-
vanced [is] such that it justifies state submission." !d., at 
288 n. 29, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975); 
National League of Cities, supra, at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., 
concurring). 
We need not pause on the first prong of this test, for the 
legislation is indisputably aimed at regulating the states in 
their capacity as states, § 630(b). The Commission argues, 
however, that the legislation does not run counter to the 
other two prongs of the test. Turning then to prong two, 





EEOC v. WYOMING 3 
of state sovereignty,' we may assume that in enacting the 
Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden 
Retirement Act, Wyo. Stat. §31-3-101 et seq., Wyoming 
sought to assure the physical preparedness of its game war-
dens and others who enforce its laws. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. 
This goal is surely an attribute of sovereignty, for _parks and 
recreation ervices were identified in National League of Cit-
ies, supra, at 851, as ra 1 ional state activities protected by 
the Tenth Amendmen~t, it is the es-
sence of state power to choose-subject only to constitu-
tional limits-who is to be part of the state government. Cf. 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 123 (1970) (Black, J.). If 
poachers destroy the fish and game reserves of Wyoming, it 
is not to the Congress that people are going to complain, but 
to state and local authorities who will have to justify their ac-
tions in selecting wardens. Since it is the state that bears 
the responsibility for delivering the services, it is clearly an 
attribute of state sovereignty to choose who will perform 
these duties. 
To decide whether a challenged activity is an attribute of 
sovereignty, it is instructive to inquire whether other gov-
ernment entities have attempted to enact similar legislation. 
A finding that other governmental units have passed manda-
tory retirement laws, although not conclusive, is persuasive 
evidence that such laws are traditional methods for insuring 
an efficient workforce for certain governmental functions. 
My research indicates that more than one-half the states 
have retirement laws that, lil(e the Wyorlling State 1fighway 
Patrol a;aGam~ and Fish Warden Retirement Act, violate 
the Age Act. 2 More important, Congress, while mandating 
/ 
2 See, e. g., Ala. Code § 3~27-16(a)(1)(e) (Supp. 1982) (police; age 60); 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 455 (1977) (police; 65); Cal. GOV Code Ann. § 20980 
(West 1980) (highway patrol; 60); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 8323 (1974) 
(police; 55); Idaho Code § 50-1514(a) (Supp. 1981) (police; 65); Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 24, ~ 10-2.1-17 (Supp. 1982) (police and firemen; 65); Ind. Code 
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compliance in the states, carefully preserved its own freedom 
to select employees on any basis it chooses. Although the 
Age Act was expressly made to apply to the national govern-
ment, 29 U. S. C. § 633a, exceptions were built into the en-
actment. Certain categories of employment-such as law 
enforcement officers-were explicitly excluded, and in addi-
tion, the statute provides that "[r ]easonable exemptions to 
the provisions of this section may be established by the [Civil 
Service] Commission." 3 I conclude that defining the quali-
fications of employees is an essential of sovereignty. 
§ 36-8-3.5-20 (1981) (police and firemen; 65); Iowa Code § 97B.46(3) (Supp. 
1982) (peace officers and firefighters; 65); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-4975(b) 
(1980) (patrolmen; 60); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 691 (West 1982) (law enforce-
ment personnel and firefighters; 65); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 88B, § 53(1)(C) 
(1979) (police; 60); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 32, § 69(d) (West 1966) & 
§ 83A(d) (Supp. 1982) (police; 65); Mich. Comp. Laws§ 38.556(c) (1982) (po-
lice and firemen; 65); Minn. Stat. § 423.075(1) (West 1982) (police and fire-
men; 65); Miss. Code Ann. § 25-1~11 (Supp. 1982) (highway patrol; 55) & 
§ 21-29-245 (Supp. 1982) (police and firemen; 60); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 104.010 
& § 104.080 (Supp. 1982) (highway patrol; 60); Mont. Code Ann. § 19-6-504 
(1981) (highway patrol; 60) & § 19-9-801 (1981) (police; 65); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 81-2025(2) (1981) (patrolmen; 60); N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law 
§ 381~(e) (police; 65); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-03.1-18 (1980) (highway pa-
trol; 60); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5505.16 (Supp. 1981) (highway patrol; 55); 
Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, § 2-305A (Supp. 1982) (police; 60); Ore. Rev. Stat. 
§ 237.129(1) (1981) (police and firemen; 60); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 71, § 65(d) 
(Purdon Supp. 1981) (police; 60); R.I. Gen. Laws§ 45-21.2-5 (1980) (police 
and firemen; 65); S.C. Code§ 9-1-1535 (Supp. 1982) (conservation officers; 
65); Tenn. Code Ann. § ~~205(1) (1980) (police; 60 or 65); Tex. Rev. Civ. 
Stat. Ann., Art. 6423g-1, § ll(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (police; 65); Vt. Stat. 
Ann., Tit. 3, § 459(a)(2) (Supp. 1982) (police; 55); Wash. Rev. Code 
§43.43.250(1) (1981) (state patrol; 60); W.Va. Code §8-22-25(d) (Supp. 
1982) (police and firemen; 65); Wyo. Stat. § 15-5-307(a) (Supp. 1982) (po-
lice; 60). See also Brief for the National Institute of Municipal Law En-
forcement Officers as Amicus Curiae 1a-7a, citing 160 municipalities that 
have laws violating the Age Act. 
3 This function was later transferred to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, see section 2 of the 1978 Reorganization Plan No. 1, 43 
Fed. Reg. 19807, 92 Stat. 3781. 
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The third prong of the National League of Cities test is 
that the federal intrusion must impair the ability of the state 
to structure integral operations. Wyomin cites several 
ways in which the Age Act interferes with its abi 'ty to struc-
ture s ate seriices;-an severa amwi 1 orm us o a ditional 
difficUlties, some economic, some not, that are engendered by 
the Act. 
It is beyond dispute that the statute can give rise to in-
creased employment costs caused by forced employment of 
older individuals. Since these employees tend to be at the 
upper end of the pay scale, the cost of their wages while they 
are still in the work force is greater. And since most pension 
plans calculate retirement benefits on the basis of maximum 
salary or number of years of service, pension costs are 
greater when an older employee retires. 4 The employer is 
also forced to pay more for insuring the health of older em-
ployees because, as a group, they inevitably carry a higher-
than-average risk of illness. See, e. g., M.L. Pollock, L.R. 
Gettman, and B. U. Meyer, Analysis of Physical Fitness and 
Coronary Heart Disease Risk of Dallas Area Police Officers, 
20 J. Occup. Med. 393 (1978); N.W. Shock, Cardiac Perfor-
mance and Age, Cardiovascular Problems, 3-24 (1976); J.H. 
Hall and J.D. Zwemer, Prospective Medicine (1979). Since 
they are-especially in law enforcement-also more prone to 
• This problem is exacerbated by the special retirement schemes often 
used in connection with mandatory early retirement laws. In Wyoming, 
for example, state employees who are not subject to early retirement con-
tribute less per month towards retirement than those in occupations where 
early retirement is required. So long as the early retirement laws are in 
effect, this system is actuarily sound because the employees who will spend 
less years at work pay into the system more rapidly. Simple invalidation 
of the early retirement system would work an inequity by requiring these 
workers to contribute more towards retirement than other state employ-
ees. Brief for Appellee 12, n. 5. Of course, Wyoming could revamp its 
pension system to correct this problem. Forcing the State to do so is an-
other example of the adverse impact wrought by the Age Act. 
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on-the-job injuries, it is reasonable to conclude that the em-
ployer's disability costs are increased. See generally, D.W. 
Gregg and V.B. Lucas, Life and Health Insurance Handbook 
(3d ed. 1973); S.S. Huebner, K. Black, Jr., Life Insurance 
(lOth ed. 1982). 
Non-economic hardshi s are e ually severe. Employers 
are prevente om irmg those physically best able to do the 
job. Since older workers occupy a disproportionate share of 
the upper-level and supervisory positions, a bar on manda-
tory retirement also impedes promotion opportunities. 
Lack of such opportunities tends to undermine younger em-
ployees' incentive to strive for excellence, and impedes the 
state from fulfilling affirmative action objectives. 
The Federal Government can hardly claim that the objec-
tives of decreasing costs and increasing promotional opportu-
nities are impermissible: many of the same goals are cited re-
peatedly to justify the "enclaves" of federal exceptions to the 
Age Act. For examp].g,_mandatory retirement is still the 
rule in tl;le"l\r:rned SetV1ce~1251, and the For-
eign Se~ee;-22 U. S. C. § 4052, despite passage of the Age 
Act. The House Committee on Armed Services continues, 
apparently, to think it essential to have a mechanism to as-
sure that officers from positions of command are vigorous and 
free from infirmities generally associated with age. H. R. 
Rep. No. 96-1462, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980). Similarly, 
the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, while 
acknowledging the "unfairness of a mandatory retirement 
age," H.R. Rep. 96-992 Pt. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (~ 
concluded that it remains necessary in ~ Foreign Ser~ce/ 
"for the maintenance of predictable care~i>atterns," i d., to 
prevent "unavailability for worldwide assignment," id., and 
to "restore the 'flow' [i. e. promotional opportunities] to the 
system," id., at 15. See also 5 U. S. C. § 335. It is difficult 
to grasp just how Congress reconciles that view with its leg-
islation forcing the states to comply with rigid standards. 
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The Commission answers the State's contentions by argu-
ing that even under the Age Act, it is possible to effectuate 
some of the State's goals. According to appellant, adverse 
economic impact is mitigated by § 623(f)(2), which provides 
that an employer may "observe the terms of a bona fide em-
ployee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insur-
ance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this chapter .... " 
I reject the notion that this exception ameliorates the 
State's problem to any significant extent. The reality is 
that, for Wyoming to benefit from this exception, it will have 
to enact new laws and develop new regulations to reduce its 
insurance coverage on older employees. Drafting and enact-
ing these new laws is a burden Congress has no power to im-
pose on the states. Second, it is doubtful that Wyoming 
could, as a practical matter, lower the health and disability 
insurance coverage on employees who fall under mandatory 
retirement laws. It is these employees who are, for the 
most part, in the most physically hazardous occupations, and 
thus most need protection. Stated another way, perhaps 
Crump would not want to keep his job if the State were un-
willing to bear the economic risks of his injuries. Section 
623(f)(2) is thus a shallow alternative to mandatory 
retirement. 
Section 623(f)(l), the Commission's answer to the problem 
of protecting the state's ability to deliver its services effec-
tively, provides no solution either. That section provides 
that mandatory early retirement is permissible "where age is 
a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness .... " Although superficially, this section appears to 
offer the states a means for lessening the administrative bur-
den of retiring unfit employees on a case by case basis, the 
exception does not work in practice. In the absence of statu-
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tory guidelines, the courts that have faced the question 
have-in response to this appellant's urgings-established a 
high standard of what constitutes a bona fide occupational 
qualification. Typical seems to be the approach taken in 
Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F. 2d 1267, 1271 (CA4 1977), requiring 
the employer to prove: 
"(1) that the bfoq which it invokes is reasonably neces-
sary to the essence of its business . . . , and (2) that the 
employer has reasonable cause, i. e., a factual basis for 
believing that all or substantially all persons within the 
class . . . would be unable to perform safely and effi-
ciently the duties involved, or that it is impossible or im-
practical to deal with persons over the age limit on an in-
dividualized basis." 
See also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d 224 
(CA5 1976). Given the state of modern medicine, it is virtu-
ally impossible to prove that all persons within a class are un-
able to perform a particular job or that it is impossible to test 
employees on an individual basis, see, e. g., Johnson v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F.Supp. 1287, 1299 (D.Md. 1981), 
cert. denied,-- U.S.- (1982). 
In the face of this track record, I find it impossible to say 
that § 623(f)(1) provides an adequate method for avoiding sig-
nificant impairment to the state's ability to structure its inte-
gral governmental operations. 5 
Since I am satisfied that the Age Act runs afoul of the 
three prongs of the National League of Cities test, I tur11 to 
the balancin test alluded to in J STICE BLACKMUN'S concur-
rmJtQiilllion in atwnal League of Cities, and in Hodel. The 
Commission argues that the federal interest in preventing 
5 In addition, states that choose to invoke the BFOQ exception expose r 
themselves to lawsuits requiring them to defend their choices. Defense of 
lawsuits is a costly and time-consuming endeavor that is, in itself, a burden 
impermissible for Congress to impose on the states. 
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unnecessary demands on t4e social security system and other 
maintenance programs, in protecting employees from 
arbritrary discrimination, and in eliminating unnecessary 
burdens on the free flow of commerce "is more than sufficient 
in the face of a Wyoming's bald assertion of a prerogative to 
be arbitrary." Brief for Appellant, at 19. 
It is simply not accurate to state that Wyoming is resting I 
its challenge to the Age Act on a "sovereign" right to dis-
criminate; as I read it, Wyoming is asserting a right to set 
standards to meet local needs. Nor do I believe that these 
largely theoretical benefits to the Federal Government out-
weigh the very real danger that a fire may burn out of control 
because the firefighters are not physically able to cope; or 
that a criminal may escape because a law-enforcement offi-
cer's reflexes are too slow to react swiftly enough to appre-
hend an offender; or that an officer may be injured or killed 
for want of capacity to defend himself. These factors may 
not be real to Congress but it is not Congress' responsibility 
to prevent them; they are nonetheless real to the states. I 
would hold that Commerce Clause powers are wholly insuffi-
cient to bar the states from dealing with or preventing these 
dangers in a rational manner. Wyoming's solution is plainly 
a rational means. 
II 
Since it was ratified after the Tenth Amendment, the 
Fourteenth Amendmentl s notsu6ject to t1ie constraints dis-
cussed earlier in connection with the Commerce Clause. In-
deed, it is well established that Congress may, under the 
powers bestowed by § 5, enact legislation affecting the states, 
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880); Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). But this does not mean that 
Congress has been given a "blank check" to intrude into de-
tails of states' governments at will. The I_enth Am~ndment 
was not, after all repealed when the Fourteenth Amendment 
'( - __.,____.... ___....,/ 
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was ratified: it was merely limited. The question then be-
comes whether the Fourteenth Amendment operates to 
transfer from the states to the Federal Government the es-
sentially local governmental function of deciding who will 
protect citizens from law breakers. 
The outer reaches of congressional power under the civil 
war amendments have always been uncertain. One factor is, 
however, clear: Congress may act only where a violation 
lurks. The flaw in the Commission's analysis is that in this 
instance, no one-not the Court, not the Congress 6-has de-
termined that mandato retirement plans violate an rights 
protected by_ t ese amendments. e cannot say that the J u-
diciary madetiiiSdetermimition, for we have considered the 
constitutionality of mandatory retirem~t-schemes twice, in 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Uu.rg.i~27 U. S. 307 
(1976), for state police, and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93 
(1979), for Foreign Service officers; we rejected both equal 
protection challenges. In both instances, we arrived at our 
conclusion by examining, arguendo, the retirement schemes 
under the rational-basis standard. It was not necessary that 
we be convinced that equal protection guarantees extend to 
classes defined by age because governmental employment is 
not a fundamental right and those who are mandatorily re-
tired are a suspect class. 
In urgt~e found that early retirement of policemen 
was · stifie<!bf the states' objective of "protect[ing] the pub-
lic by assuring ph~l preparedness of its uniformed police," 
id. , at 314; iiJ Bradlf'{J , we held that early retirement of for-
eign service }>e_rsetlnel was justified by Congress' perception 
~
f a need to assure "opportunities for promotion would be 
vailable," "the high quality of those occupying positions crit-
cal to the conduct of our foreign relation," and in order to 
6 The ability of Congress to define independently protected classes is an 
issue that I do not mean to resolve here. Rather, I think that the Age Act 
is unconstitutional even if it is assumed that Congress has this power. 
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"minimize[] the risk of less than superior performance by rea-
son of poor health or loss of vitality," 440 U. S., at 101 and 
103-104. Congress was simply using a rational means for 
solving a practical governmental problem within its constitu-
tional jurisdiction. 
Were we asked to review the constitutionality of the Wyo-
ming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Re-
tirement Act, we would reach a result consistent with Brad-
ley and Murgia. Like Congress dealing with military 
personnel, FBI agents and foreign service officers, the State 
of Wyoming has an interest in the physical ability of its high-
way patrol, game, and fish wardens. It is within Wyoming's 
authority to motivate personnel to high performance by as-
suring opportunities for advancement; Wyoming reasonably 
considers safety conditions on its highways and game pre-
serves critical to the well-being of its citizenry. In short, it 
cannot be said that in applying the Age Act to the states Con-
gress has acted to enforce equal protection guarantees as 
they have been defined by this Court. 
Nor can appellant claim that Congress has used the powers 
we recognized in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 
156, 176--177 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra; Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 437-444 (1968); South Car-
olina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), to enact legislation that pro-
hibits conduct not in itself unconstitutional because it consid-
ered the prohibition necessary to guard against encroach-
ment of guaranteed rights or to rectify past discrimination. 
There has been no finding, as there was in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, supra, at 309, that the abrogated state law in-
fringed on rights identified by this Court. 7 Nor did Con-
7 At oral argument, the Solicitor General argued that in applying the 
rational-basis test in Murgia and Bradley, the Court sub silentio agreed 
that age discrimination is protected by the Equal Protection Clause, and 
that Congress has merely altered the burden needed to prove compliance 
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gress use, as it did in Katzen bach v. Morgan, supra, at 656, 
its "specially informed legislative competence" to decide that 
the state law it invalidated was too intrusive on federal rights 
to be an appropriate means to achieve the ends sought by the 
state. Instead, the Age Act can be sustained only if we as-
sume first, that Congress can define rights wholly indepen-
dently of our case law, and second, that Congress has done so 
here. I agree with neither proposition. 
Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights 
statutorily that it has independently defined fundamentally 
alters our scheme of government. Although the South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach line of cases may be read to allow Con-
gress a degree of flexibility in deciding what the Fourteenth 
Amendment safeguards, I have always read Oregon v. Mitch-
ell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to which Con-
gress may substitute its own judgment for that of the states 
and assume this Court's "role of final arbiter," Mitchell, at 
205 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mitchell, after all, involved 
legislation in the area of suffrage, where Congress had spe-
cial competence and special reasons to limit the powers of the 
states. It is significant, however, that while we there sus-
tained the portions of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 lowering 
the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 in federal elections, 
barring literacy tests in state and federal elections, and for-
bidding states from disqualifying voters in presidential elec-
with its guarantees. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. I do not read these deci-
sions to support this notion. Murgia and Bradley presented us with no 
occasion to determine the scope of the equal protection guarantee because 
we found the legislation challenged there sustainable even if we assumed 
the class was protected. 
This is not to say definitively that age discrimination is not protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment because this case does not squarely raise that 
issue. Rather, I am pointing out that since this Court has not decided the 
question, the Government cannot support this enactment on the ground 
that Congress was attempting to establish further safeguards for a class 
we have found to be constitutionally protected. 
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tions for failure to meet state residency requirements, a ma-
jority of the Mitchell Court did not agree to allow Congress 
to alter votin re uirements in state elections. We struck 
that portion of the Voting Rights Act Because we thought it a 
"plai,p fact of history" that Congress lacked this power, see 
id., at 125 and 294 (Black and Stewart, JJ.); id., at 154-215 
(Harlan, J.); and because we thought that the Fourteenth 
Ainendment was not a license to "overstep the letter or spirit 
of any constitutional restriction," id., at 287 (Stewart, J.). 
For me, this same reasoning leads inevitably to the conclu-
sion that Congress lacked power to apply the Age Act to the 
states. There is no hint in the body of the Constitution rati-
fied in 1789 or in the relevant amendments that every classifi-
cation based on age is outlawed. Yet there is much in the 
Constitution and the relevant amendments to indicate that 
states retain sovereign powers not expressly surrendered, 
and these surely include the power to choose the employees 
they feel are best able to serve and protect their citizens. 8 
And even were we to assume, arguendo, that Congress 
could redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, I would still re-
ject the power of Congress to impose the Age Act on the 
states when Congress, in the same year that the Age Act was 
extended to the states, passed mandatory retirement legisla-
tion of its own, Pub. L. 93--350, 88 Stat. 356, codified at 5 
U. S. C. § 8335, for law enforcement officers and firefighters. 
Eight years have elapsed since the Age Act was extended to 
the states, yet early retirement is still required of federal air 
8 It has been suggested that where a congressional resolution of a policy 
question hinges on legislative facts, the Court should defer to Congress's 
judgment because Congress is in a better position than the Court to find 
the relevant facts. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Deter-
minations, 40 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 187, 229-230 (1971). While this theory 
may have some importance in matters of strictly federal concern, it has no 
place in deciding between the legislative judgments of Congress and that of 
the Wyoming Legislature. Congress is simply not as well equipped as 
state legislators to make decisions involving purely local needs. 
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traffic controllers, 5 U. S. C. § 8335(a), federal law enforce-
ment officers, § 8335(b), federal firefighters, id., employees 
of the Panama Canal Commission and the Alaska Railroad, 
§8335(c), members of the Foreign Sevice, 22 U. S. C. §4052, 
and members of the Armed Services, 10 U. S. C. § 1251. 
III 
I believe I have demonstrated that neither the Constitu-
tion nor any of its amendments have transferred from the 
states to the federal government the essentially local function 
of establishing standards for choosing state employees. The 
Framers did not give Congress the power to decide local em-
ployment standards because they wisely realized that as a 
body, Congress lacked the means to analyse the factors that 
bear on this decision, such as the diversity of occupational 
risks, climate, geography, and demography. Since local con-
ditions generally determine how a job should be performed, 
and who should perform it, the authority and responsibility 
for making employment decisions must be in the hands of 
local governments, subject only to those restrictions unmis-
takably contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment. In-
trusion by Congress into this area can lead only to ill in-
formed decisionmaking. 
And even if Congress had infinite fact-finding means at its 
disposal, conditions in various parts of the country are too di-
verse to be susceptible to a uniformly applicable solution. 
Wyoming is a state with large sparsely populated areas, 
where law enforcement often requires substantial physical 
stamina; the same conditions are not always encountered by 
law enforcement officers in Rhode Island, which has far less 
land area, no mountains, and no wilderness. Problems con-
fronting law enforcement officers in Alaska or Maine may be 
unlike those encountered in Hawaii and Florida. Barring 
states from making employment decisions tailored to meet 
specific local needs undermines the flexibility that has long 
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allowed industrial states to live under the same flag as rural 
states, and small, densely populated states to coexist with 
large, sparsely populated ones. 
The reserved powers of the states and Justice Brandeis' 
classic conception of the states as laboratories, New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), are turned on their heads when national rather than 
state governments assert the authority to make decisions on 
the age standard of state law enforcement officers. Flexibil-
ity for experimentation not only permits each state to find 
the best solutions to its own problems, it is the means by 
which each state may profit from the experiences and activi-
ties of all the rest. Nothing in the Constitution permits Con-
gress to force the states into a Procrustean national mold that 
takes no account of local needs and conditions. That is the 
antithesis of what the authors of the Constitution contem-
plated for our federal system. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
The Court decides today that Congress may dictate to the 
states, and their political subdivisions, detailed standards 
governing the selection of state employees, including those 
charged with protecting people and homes from crimes and 
fires. Although the opinion reads the Constitution to allow 
Congress to usurp this fundamental state function, I have re-
examined that document and I fail to see where it grants to 
the national government the power to impose such strictures 
on the states either expressly or by implication. Those stric-
tures are not required by any holding of this Court, and it is 
not wholly without significance that Congress has not placed 
similar limits on itself in the exercise of its own sovereign 
powers. Accordingly, I would hold the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (Age Act) unconstitutional as applied to 
the states, and affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
I begin by analysing the Commerce Clause rationale, for it 
was upon this power that Congress expressly relied when it 
originally enacted the Age Act in 1967, see 29 U. S. C. § 621, 
and when it extended its protections to state and local gov-
ernment employers, see H.R. Rep. No. 93--913, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess.-(1974). 1 
1 The Age Act was extended to the states along with the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74. Extension of the FLSA was 
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We have had several occasions in recent years to investi-
gate the scope of congressional authority to legislate under 
the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
and Mining Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264 
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 
--U.S.-- (1982). The wisdom to be drawn from these 
cases is that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause 
is restricted by the protections afforded the states by the 
Tenth Amendment. To decide whether a particular enact-
ment has improperly intruded into Tenth Amendment rights, 
we have adopted a three-prong test: 
"First, there must be a showing that the challenged 
regulation regulates the 'States as States.' [National 
League of Cities, supra], at 854. Second, the federal 
regulation must address matters that are indisputably 
'a~utes of state soverei~ty.' Id., at 845. And 
third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance 
with the federal law would directl impair their ability 
'to structure integral op~ m reas of traditional 
functions.' Id., at 85 !"' Hodel, at 87-288. 
For statutes that meet each p o this test, a final inquiry 
must be made to decide whether "the federal interest ad-
vanced [is] such that it justifies state submission." I d., at 
288 n. 29, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975); 
National League of Cities, supra, at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., 
concurring). 
We need not pause on the first prong of this test, for the 
legislation is indisputably aimed at regulating the states in 
their capacity as states, § 630(b). The Commission argues, 
however, that the legislation does not run counter to the 
other two prongs of the test. Turning then to prong two, 
whether the Age Act addresses matters that are 'attributes 
833 (1976) . 
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of state sovereignty,' we may assume that in enacting the 
Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden 
Retirement Act, Wyo. Stat. §31-3--101 et seq., Wyoming 
sought to assure the physical preparedness of its game war-
dens and others who enforce its laws. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. 
This goal is surely an attribute of sovereignty, for parks and 
recreation services were identified inN ational League of Cit-
ies, supra, at 851, as traditional state activities protected by 
the Tenth Amendment. Even more important, it is the es-
sence of state power to choose-subject only to constitu-
tional limits-who is to be part of the state government. Cf. 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 123 (1970) (Black, J.). If 
poachers destroy the fish and game reserves of Wyoming, it 
is not to the Congress that people are going to complain, but 
to state and local authorities who will have to justify their ac-
tions in selecting wardens. Since it is the state that bears 
the responsibility for delivering the services, it is clearly an 
attribute of state sovereignty to choose who will perform 
these duties. 
To decide whether a challenged activity is an attribute of 
sovereignty, it is instructive to inquire whether other gov-
ernment entities have attempted to enact similar legislation. 
A finding that other governmental units have passed manda-
tory retirement laws, although not conclusive, is persuasive 
evidence that such laws are traditional methods for insuring 
an efficient workforce for certain governmental functions. 
My research indicates that more than one-half the states 
have retirement laws that, like the Wyoming State Highway 
Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement Act, violate 
the Age Act. 2 More important, Congress, while mandating 
2 See, e. g., Ala. Code § 36-27-16(a)(l)(e) (Supp. 1982) (police; age 60); 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 455 (1977) (police; 65); Cal. GOV Code Ann. § 20980 
(West 1980) (highway patrol; 60); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 8323 (1974) 
(police; 55); Idaho Code § 50-1514(a) (Supp. 1981) (police; 65); Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 24, ~ 10-2.1-17 (Supp. 1982) (police and firemen; 65); Ind. Code 
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compliance in the states, carefully preserved its own freedom 
to select employees on any basis it chooses. Although the 
Age Act was expressly made to apply to the national govern-
ment, 29 U. S. C. § 633a, exceptions were built into the en-
actment. Certain categories of employment-such as law 
enforcement officers-were explicitly excluded, and in addi-
tion, the statute provides that "[r ]easonable exemptions to 
the provisions of this section may be established by the [Civil 
Service] Commission." 3 I conclude that defining the quali-
fications of employees is an essential of sovereignty. 
§ 36--8-3.5-20 (1981) (police and firemen; 65); Iowa Code § 97B.46(3) (Supp. 
1982) (peace officers and firefighters; 65); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-4975(b) 
(1980) (patrolmen; 60); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 691 (West 1982) (law enforce-
ment personnel and firefighters; 65); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 88B, § 53(1)(C) 
(1979) (police; 60); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 32, § 69(d) (West 1966) & 
§ 83A(d) (Supp. 1982) (police; 65); Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.556(c) (1982) (po-
lice and firemen; 65); Minn. Stat. § 423.075(1) (West 1982) (police and fire-
men; 65); Miss. Code Ann. § 25-13-11 (Supp. 1982) (highway patrol; 55) & 
§ 21-29-245 (Supp. 1982) (police and firemen; 60); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 104.010 
& § 104.080 (Supp. 1982) (highway patrol; 60); Mont. Code Ann. § 19-6-504 
(1981) (highway patrol; 60) & § 19-9-801 (1981) (police; 65); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 81-2025(2) (1981) (patrolmen; 60); N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law 
§ 381-6(e) (police; 65); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-03.1-18 (1980) (highway pa-
trol; 60); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5505.16 (Supp. 1981) (highway patrol; 55); 
Okla. Stat. , Tit. 47, § 2-305A (Supp. 1982) (police; 60); Ore. Rev. Stat. 
§237.129(1) (1981) (police and firemen; 60); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 71, §65(d) 
(Purdon Supp. 1981) (police; 60); R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-21.2-5 (1980) (police 
and firemen; 65); S.C. Code§ 9-1-1535 (Supp. 1982) (conservation officers; 
65); Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-36-205(1) (1980) (police; 60 or 65); Tex. Rev. Civ. 
Stat. Ann. , Art. 6423g-1, § ll(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (police; 65); Vt. Stat. 
Ann., Tit. 3, § 459(a)(2) (Supp. 1982) (police; 55); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 43.43.250(1) (1981) (state patrol; 60); W.Va. Code § 8-22-25(d) (Supp. 
1982) (police and firemen; 65); Wyo. Stat. § 15-5-307(a) (Supp. 1982) (po-
lice; 60). See also Brief for the National Institute of Municipal Law En-
forcement Officers as Amicus Curiae 1a-7a, citing 160 municipalities that 
have laws violating the Age Act. 
3 This function was later transferred to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, see section 2 of the 1978 Reorganization Plan No. 1, 43 
Fed. Reg. 19807, 92 Stat. 3781. 
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The third prong of the National League of Cities test is 
that the federal intrusion must impair the ability of the state 
to structure integral operations. Wyoming cites several 
ways in which the Age Act interferes with its ability to struc-
ture state services, and several amici inform us of additional 
difficulties, some economic, some not, that are engendered by 
the Act. 
It is beyond dispute that the statute can give rise to in-
creased employment costs caused by forced employment of 
older individuals. Since these employees tend to be at the 
upper end of the pay scale, the cost of their wages while they 
are still in the work force is greater. And since most pension 
plans calculate retirement benefits on the basis of maximum 
salary or number of years of service, pension costs are 
greater when an older employee retires. 4 The employer is 
also forced to pay more for insuring the health of older em-
ployees because, as a group, they inevitably carry a higher-
than-average risk of illness. See, e. g., M.L. Pollock, L.R. 
Gettman, and B. U. Meyer, Analysis of Physical Fitness and 
Coronary Heart Disease Risk of Dallas Area Police Officers, 
20 J. Occup. Med. 393 (1978); N.W. Shock, Cardiac Perfor-
mance and Age, Cardiovascular Problems, 3--24 (1976); J.H. 
Hall and J.D. Zwemer, Prospective Medicine (1979). Since 
they are-especially in law enforcement-also more prone to 
'This problem is exacerbated by the special retirement schemes often 
used in connection with mandatory early retirement laws. In Wyoming, 
for example, state employees who are not subject to early retirement con-
tribute less per month towards retirement than those in occupations where 
early retirement is required. So long as the early retirement laws are in 
effect, this system is actuarily sound because the employees who will spend 
less years at work pay into the system more rapidly. Simple invalidation 
of the early retirement system would work an inequity by requiring these 
workers to contribute more towards retirement than other state employ-
ees. Brief for Appellee 12, n. 5. Of course, Wyoming could revamp its 
pension system to correct this problem. Forcing the State to do so is an-
other example of the adverse impact wrought by the Age Act. 
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on-the-job injuries, it is reasonable to conclude that the em-
ployer's disability costs are increased. See generally, D.W. 
Gregg and V.B. Lucas, Life and Health Insurance Handbook 
(3d ed. 1973); S.S. Huebner, K. Black, Jr., Life Insurance 
(lOth ed. 1982). 
Non-economic hardships are equally severe. Employers 
are prevented from hiring those physically best able to do the 
job. Since older workers occupy a disproportionate share of 
the upper-level and supervisory positions, a bar on manda-
tory retirement also impedes promotion opportunities. 
Lack of such opportunities tends to undermine younger em-
ployees' incentive to strive for excellence, and impedes the 
state from fulfilling affirmative action objectives. 
The Federal Government can hardly claim that the objec-
tives of decreasing costs and increasing promotional opportu-
nities are impermissible: many of the same goals are cited re-
peatedly to justify the "enclaves" of federal exceptions to the 
Age Act. For example, mandatory retirement is still the 
rule in the Armed Services, 10 U. S. C. § 1251, and the For-
eign Service, 22 U. S. C. § 4052, despite passage of the Age 
Act. The House Committee on Armed Services continues, 
apparently, to think it essential to have a mechanism to as-
sure that officers from positions of command are vigorous and 
free from infirmities generally associated with age. H.R. 
Rep. No. 96--1462, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980). Similarly, 
the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, while 
acknowledging the "unfairness of a mandatory retirement 
age," H.R. Rep. 96--992 Pt. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980), 
concluded that it remains necessary in the Foreign Service 
"for the maintenance of predictable career patterns," id., to 
prevent "unavailability for worldwide assignment," id., and 
to "restore the 'flow' [i. e. promotional opportunities] to the 
system," id., at 15. See also 5 U.S. C. §335. It is difficult 
to grasp just how Congress reconciles that view with its leg-
islation forcing the states to comply with rigid standards. 
> 1 
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The Commission answers the State's contentions by argu-
ing that even under the Age Act, it is possible to effectuate 
some of the State's goals. According to appellant, adverse 
economic impact is mitigated by § 623(f)(2), which provides 
that an employer may "observe the terms of a bona fide em-
ployee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insur-
ance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this chapter .... " 
I reject the notion that this exception ameliorates the 
State's problem to any significant extent. The reality is 
that, for Wyoming to benefit from this exception, it will have 
to enact new laws and develop new regulations to reduce its 
insurance coverage on older employees. Drafting and enact-
ing these new laws is a burden Congress has no power to im-
pose on the states. Second, it is doubtful that Wyoming 
could, as a practical matter, lower the health and disability 
insurance coverage on employees who fall under mandatory 
retirement laws. It is these employees who are, for the 
most part, in the most physically hazardous occupations, and 
thus most need protection. Stated another way, perhaps 
Crump would not want to keep his job if the State were un-
willing to bear the economic risks of his injuries. Section 
623(f)(2) is thus a shallow alternative to mandatory 
retirement. 
Section 623(f)(l), the Commission's answer to the problem 
of protecting the state's ability to deliver its services effec-
tively, provides no solution either. That section provides 
that mandatory early retirement is permissible "where age is 
a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness .... " Although superficially, this section appears to 
offer the states a means for lessening the administrative bur-
den of retiring unfit employees on a case by case basis, the 
exception does not work in practice. In the absence of statu-
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tory guidelines, the courts that have faced the question 
have-in response to this appellant's urgings-established a 
high standard of what constitutes a bona fide occupational 
qualification. Typical seems to be the approach taken in 
Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F. 2d 1267, 1271 (CA4 1977), requiring 
the employer to prove: 
"(1) that the bfoq which it invokes is reasonably neces-
sary to the essence of its business . . . , and (2) that the 
employer has reasonable cause, i. e., a factual basis for 
believing that all or substantially all persons within the 
class . . . would be unable to perform safely and effi-
ciently the duties involved, or that it is impossible or im-
practical to deal with persons over the age limit on an in-
dividualized basis." 
See also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d 224 
(CA5 1976). Given the state of modern medicine, it is virtu-
ally impossible to prove that all persons within a class are un-
able to perform a particular job or that it is impossible to test 
employees on an individual basis, see, e. g., Johnson v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F.Supp. 1287, 1299 (D.Md. 1981), 
cert. denied, - U. S. - (1982). 
In the face of this track record, I find it impossible to say 
that § 623(f)(1) provides an adequate method for avoiding sig-
nificant impairment to the state's ability to structure its inte-
gral governmental operations. 5 
Since I am satisfied that the Age Act runs afoul of the 
three prongs of the National League of Cities test, I turn to 
the balancing test alluded to in JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concur-
ring opinion inN ational League of Cities, and in Hodel. · The 
Commission argues that the federal interest in preventing 
5 In addition, states that choose to invoke the BFOQ exception expose 
themselves to lawsuits requiring them to defend their choices. Defense of 
lawsuits is a costly and time-consuming endeavor that is, in itself, a burden 
impermissible for Congress to impose on the states. 
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unnecessary demands on t~e social security system and other 
maintenance programs, in protecting employees from 
arbritrary discrimination, and in eliminating unnecessary 
burdens on the free flow of commerce "is more than sufficient 
in the face of a Wyoming's bald assertion of a prerogative to 
be arbitrary." Brief for Appellant, at 19. 
It is simply not accurate to state that Wyoming is resting 
its challenge to the Age Act on a "sovereign" right to dis-
criminate; as I read it, Wyoming is asserting a right to set 
standards to meet local needs. Nor do I believe that these 
largely theoretical benefits to the Federal Government out-
weigh the very real danger that a fire may burn out of control 
because the firefighters are not physically able to cope; or 
that a criminal may escape because a law-enforcement offi-
cer's reflexes are too slow to react swiftly enough to appre-
hend an offender; or that an officer may be injured or killed 
for want of capacity to defend himself. These factors may 
not be real to Congress but it is not Congress' responsibility 
to prevent them; they are nonetheless real to the states. I 
would hold that Commerce Clause powers are wholly insuffi-
cient to bar the states from dealing with or preventing these 
dangers in a rational manner. Wyoming's solution is plainly 
a rational means. 
II 
Since it was ratified after the Tenth Amendment, the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not subject to the constraints dis-
cussed earlier in connection with the Commerce Clause. In-
deed, it is well established that Congress may, under the 
powers bestowed by§ 5, enact legislation affecting the states, 
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880); Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). But this does not mean that 
Congress has been given a "blank check" to intrude into de-
tails of states' governments at will. The Tenth Amendment 
was not, after all repealed when the Fourteenth Amendment 
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was ratified: it was merely limited. The question then be-
comes whether the Fourteenth Amendment operates to 
transfer from the states to the Federal Government the es-
sentially local governmental function of deciding who will 
protect citizens from law breakers. 
The outer reaches of congressional power under the civil 
war amendments have always been uncertain. One factor is, 
however, clear: Congress may act only where a violation 
lurks. The flaw in the Commission's analysis is that in this 
instance, no one-not the Court, not the Congress 6-has de-
termined that mandatory retirement plans violate any rights 
protected by these amendments. We cannot say that the J u-
diciary made this determination, for we have considered the 
constitutionality of mandatory retirement schemes twice, in 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 
(1976), for state police, and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93 
(1979), for Foreign Service officers; we rejected both equal 
protection challenges. In both instances, we arrived at our 
conclusion by examining, arguendo, the retirement schemes 
under the rational-basis standard. It was not necessary that 
we be convinced that equal protection guarantees extend to 
classes defined by age because governmental employment is 
not a fundamental right and those who are mandatorily re-
tired are not a suspect class. 
In Murgia, we found that early retirement of policemen 
was justified by the states' objective of "protect[ing] the pub-
lic by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police," 
id., at 314; in Bradley, we held that early retirement of for-
eign service personnel was justified by Congress' perception 
of a need to assure "opportunities for promotion would be 
available," "the high quality of those occupying positions crit-
ical to the conduct of our foreign relation," and in order to 
• The ability of Congress to define independently protected classes is an 
issue that I do not mean to resolve here. Rather, I think that the Age Act 
is unconstitutional even if it is assumed that Congress has this power. 
.. ~ .. 
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"minimize[] the risk of less than superior performance by rea-
son of poor health or loss of vitality," 440 U. S., at 101 and 
103--104. Congress was simply using a rational means for 
solving a practical governmental problem within its constitu-
tional jurisdiction. 
Were we asked to review the constitutionality of the Wyo-
ming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Re-
tirement Act, we would reach a result consistent with Brad-
ley and Murgia. Like Congress dealing with military 
personnel, FBI agents and foreign service officers, the State 
of Wyoming has an interest in the physical ability of its high-
way patrol, game, and fish wardens. It is within Wyoming's 
authority to motivate personnel to high performance by as-
suring opportunities for advancement; Wyoming reasonably 
considers safety conditions on its highways and game pre-
serves critical to the well-being of its citizenry. In short, it 
cannot be said that in applying the Age Act to the states Con-
gress has acted to enforce equal protection guarantees as 
they have been defined by this Court. 
Nor can appellant claim that Congress has used the powers 
we recognized in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 
156, 176--177 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra; Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 437-444 (1968); South Car-
olina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), to enact legislation that pro-
hibits conduct not in itself unconstitutional because it consid-
ered the prohibition necessary to guard against encroach-
ment of guaranteed rights or to rectify past discrimination. 
There has been no finding, as there was in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, supra, at 309, that the abrogated state law in-
fringed on rights identified by this Court. 7 Nor did Con-
7 At oral argument, the Solicitor General argued that in applying the 
rational-basis test in Murgia and Bradley, the Court sub silentio agreed 
that age discrimination is protected by the Equal Protection Clause, and 
that Congress has merely altered the burden needed to prove compliance 
... 
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gress use, as it did in Katzen bach v. Morgan, supra, at 656, 
its "specially informed legislative competence" to decide that 
the state law it invalidated was too intrusive on federal rights 
to be an appropriate means to achieve the ends sought by the 
state. Instead, the Age Act can be sustained only if we as-
sume first, that Congress can define rights wholly indepen-
dently of our case law, and second, that Congress has done so 
here. I agree with neither proposition. 
Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights 
statutorily that it has independently defined fundamentally 
alters our scheme of government. Although the South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach line of cases may be read to allow Con-
gress a degree of flexibility in deciding what the Fourteenth 
Amendment safeguards, I have always read Oregon v. Mitch-
ell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to which Con-
gress may substitute its own judgment for that of the states 
and assume this Court's "role of final arbiter," Mitchell, at 
205 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mitchell, after all, involved 
legislation in the area of suffrage, where Congress had spe-
cial competence and special reasons to limit the powers of the 
states. It is significant, however, that while we there sus-
tained the portions of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 lowering 
the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 in federal elections, 
barring literacy tests in state and federal elections, and for-
bidding states from disqualifying voters in presidential elec-
with its guarantees. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. I do not read these deci-
sions to support this notion. Murgia and Bradley presented us with no 
occasion to determine the scope of the equal protection guarantee because 
we found the legislation challenged there sustainable even if we assumed 
the class was protected. 
This is not to say definitively that age discrimination is not protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment because this case does not squarely raise that 
issue. Rather, I am pointing out that since this Court has not decided the 
question, the Government cannot support this enactment on the ground 
that Congress was attempting to establish further safeguards for a class 
we have found to be constitutionally protected . 
! ... 
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tions for failure to meet state residency requirements, a ma-
jority of the Mitchell Court did not agree to allow Congress 
to alter voting requirements in state elections. We struck 
that portion of the Voting Rights Act because we thought it a 
"plain fact of history" that Congress lacked this power, see 
id., at 125 and 294 (Black and Stewart, JJ.); id., at 154-215 
(Harlan, J.); and because we thought that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not a license to "overstep the letter or spirit 
of any constitutional restriction," id., at 287 (Stewart, J.). 
For me, this same reasoning leads inevitably to the conclu-
sion that Congress lacked power to apply the Age Act to the 
states. There is no hint in the body of the Constitution rati-
fied in 1789 or in the relevant amendments that every classifi-
cation based on age is outlawed. Yet there is much in the 
Constitution and the relevant amendments to indicate that 
states retain sovereign powers not expressly surrendered, 
and these surely include the power to choose the employees 
they feel are best able to serve and protect their citizens. 8 
And even were we to assume, arguendo, that Congress 
could redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, I would still re-
ject the power of Congress to impose the Age Act on the 
states when Congress, in the same year that the Age Act was 
extended to the states, passed mandatory retirement legisla-
tion of its own, Pub. L. 93-350, 88 Stat. 356, codified at 5 
U. S. C. § 8335, for law enforcement officers and firefighters. 
Eight years have elapsed since the Age Act was extended to 
the states, yet early retirement is still required of federal air 
8 lt has been suggested that where a congressional resolution of a policy 
question hinges on legislative facts, the Court should defer to Congress's 
judgment because Congress is in a better position than the Court to find 
the relevant facts. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Deter-
minations, 40 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 187, 229-230 (1971). While this theory 
may have some importance in matters of strictly federal concern, it has no 
place in deciding between the legislative judgments of Congress and that of 
the Wyoming Legislature. Congress is simply not as well equipped as 
state legislators to make decisions involving purely local needs. 
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traffic controllers, 5 U. S. C. §8335(a), federal law enforce-
ment officers, § 8335(b), federal firefighters, id., employees 
of the Panama Canal Commission and the Alaska Railroad, 
§8335(c), members of the Foreign Sevice, 22 U. S. C. §4052, 
and members of the Armed Services, 10 U. S. C. § 1251. 
III 
I believe I have demonstrated that neither the Constitu-
tion nor any of its amendments have transferred from the 
states to the federal government the essentially local function 
of establishing standards for choosing state employees. The 
Framers did not give Congress the power to decide local em-
ployment standards because they wisely realized that as a 
body, Congress lacked the means to analyse the factors that 
bear on this decision, such as the diversity of occupational 
risks, climate, geography, and demography. Since local con-
ditions generally determine how a job should be performed, 
and who should perform it, the authority and responsibility 
for making employment decisions must be in the hands of 
local governments, subject only to those restrictions unmis-
takably contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment. In-
trusion by Congress into this area can lead only to ill in-
formed decisionmaking. 
And even if Congress had infinite fact-finding means at its 
disposal, conditions in various parts of the country are too di-
verse to be susceptible to a uniformly applicable solution. 
Wyoming is a state with large sparsely populated areas, 
where law enforcement often requires substantial physical 
stamina; the same conditions are not always encountered by 
law enforcement officers in Rhode Island, which has far less 
land area, no mountains, and no wilderness. Problems con-
fronting law enforcement officers in Alaska or Maine may be 
unlike those encountered in Hawaii and Florida. Barring 
states from making employment decisions tailored to meet 
specific local needs undermines the flexibility that has long 
.. .. . ~ 
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allowed industrial states to live under the same flag as rural 
states, and small, densely populated states to coexist with 
large, sparsely populated ones. 
The reserved powers of the states and Justice Brandeis' 
classic conception of the states as laboratories, New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), are turned on their heads when national rather than 
state governments assert the authority to make decisions on 
the age standard of state law enforcement officers. Flexibil-
ity for experimentation not only permits each state to find 
the best solutions to its own problems, it is the means by 
which each state may profit from the experiences and activi-
ties of all the rest. Nothing in the Constitution permits Con-
gress to force the states into a Procrustean national mold that 
takes no account of local needs and conditions. That is the 
antithesis of what the authors of the Constitution contem-
plated for our federal system . 
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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, APPELLANT v. WYOMING, ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 
[February -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JusTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STE-
VENS' revisionist view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the 
Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to 
the Constitution itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a 
subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court 
has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of 
the Framers . . . to confer a power on the national govern-
ment adequate to discharge its central mission." Ante, at 3 
(emphasis added).l JusTICE STEVENS further states that 
"National League of Cities not only was incorrectly decided, 
but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Con-
stitution itself .... " Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). 
1 The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is an extra-
judiciallecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 1-2. Jus-
tice Rutledge declared that the "proximate cause of our national existence" 
l------::w:=a-:-s-::-n-,.,.o to assure the great "democratic freedoms"; rather it wa "to secure 
freedom of trade" within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A Declaration 
of Legal Faith 25 (1947). 
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No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's purposes. I sug-
gest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or 
greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled 
in Philadel hia an t e e egates who debated the issue in 
the stat ratification onventions. No doubt there were dif-
ferences of opmwn as to the principal shortcomings of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that 
few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers 
among the States were "the central problem," or that their 
e 1 'nation was the "central mission" of the Consti!}!tiona 
Conve ion. Creating a national govern oot--w1fliln a fed-
Unlt.VIficl ~ateJ. eral syst was far more centr n any eighteenth-cen-
~ V\ (;l tury concer or interstat ommerce. 
It is true , o ours , at this Court properly has construed 
W'lr'MtA1 II\ able the Commerce 1 se, and extended its reach, to accommo-
.~--_.1.---~d::-a~te::-Tlth::-::e changes hat have occurred in our country since the 
. . 
Constitu ion was ratified. If JUSTICE STEVENS had written 
that the Founders' intent in adopting the Commerce Clause 
nearly two centuries ago is of little relevance to the world in 
which we live today, I would not have disagreed. But .:--. ..___ __ 
concurring opinion purports to rely on their in-
tent. Antel\at 3. I therefore write-briefly!Jn view of the ~ 
scope of the subject-to place the Commerce Clause in 
proper historical perspective, and further to suggest that 
even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE STEVENS appears to 
believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The Constitution's central purpose was, as the name im-
plies, to constitute a government. The most important pro-
visions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relat-
ing to the establishment of that government. The system of 
checks and balances, for example, is far more central to the 
larger perspective than any single power conferred on any 
branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from 
pc..r"tltul~rly il) 
ti~J.f<~ port-aria II'\ 
a~~ 
t:ommi.H'I icatiM' 
f\O bl oe-l< 
~I)Cte 
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which the enti Convention began its work, focuses on the 
framework of government without even mentioning the FounJer~ 
power to regulate commerce. 2 ~ 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the 
stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble to the 
Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty. . . . " 
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common de-
fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare." Art. III. Although the "general Wel-
fare" recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free 
flow of trade among States (despite the fact that the same 
2 Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, it is clear that 
the focus of attention at the Constitutional Convention in P Jladelphia was 
the formation of a new government. Madison's report of the proceedings 
begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the 
deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of Government." 1 
M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. eel. 
1937) (footnote omitted). After dealing with several preliminary matters, 
see id., at 1-17, the "main business," id., at 18 (J. Madison), opened on 
May 29 with Edmund Randolph's speech proposing the Virginia Plan. Al-
most all of the Plan's resolutions dealt with the appropriate structure for 
the new government. Only the sixth resolution dealt with legislative pow-
ers at all. And far from stressing any power to regulate interstate com-----. merce it sim ly declared, in relevant part, 
"that the National Legislature ought to be impowered t JOY the Legisla-
tive Rights vested in Congress by the Confederati & moreover to legis-
late in all cases to which the separate States are · competent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be inte upted by the exercise of 
no £,1otL< individual L~slation . . .. " at 21. 
11.vot~ <:; While this language was , no doubt, broad enough to include the power to 
v regulate interstate commerce, there was certainly no emphasis on that par-
ticular power. 
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language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear 
that security "against foreign invasion [and] against dis 
tions between members of the Union" was of at le equal 
importance. See Speech by Edmund Randol (May 29, 
1787), reprinted in 1M. Farrand, The Recor of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) ( . Madison). 3 
The power to achieve th• purposes was not delegated 
solely to Congress. If, however, one looks at the powers 
that were so delegated, the position of the Commerce Clause 
hardly suggests that it was "central" among the concerns w:-----
the patriots who formed our ~ion. The enu~~of 
powers in Article I, section 8 begins with tl~Power To lay 
and collect Taxes." 4 This is followed 9YAfie power "to pay 
the Debts" of the United States. 1)1-en, consistent with the 
Preamble, comes the power to " tbvide for the common De-
fence and general Welfare." ee note 3, supra. The per-
ceived need for a national! 'slature with the power to tax, 
and to maintain an army d navy for the common defense, 
loomed far larger in the ounders' thinking than the need to 
eliminate~ barriers Among the remaining enumerated 
powers, the power to regulate interstate commerce is only 
one among roughly a score. It is given no place of particular 
minence. So much for what the Constitution's language 
and structure teach about the Framers' intent. 
3 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the 
country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See 
The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269--276 (J. Cooke eel. 1961) (J. Madison). 
Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to 
give Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war." Art. IX. All of the evidence indicates that this most 
basic purpose of government was far more important to the Founders than 
-...,...,1------;~e -=r~egu~lation of interstate commerce. 
' A major weakness of the system create by the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the central government's inability o collect taxes directly. See 1 
Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of Hamilton). Remedy-
ing this defect was thus one of the most 1mportant purposes of the Con-
stitutional Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 
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III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a na-
tional government with delegated powers and state govern-
ments that retained a significant measure of sovereign au-
thority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the 
debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the 
early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been adopted, much less ratified, if 
it had been understood that the Commerce Clause embodied 
the national government's "central mission," a mission to be 
accomplished even at the expense of regulating the personnel 
practices of state and local governments. 
A 
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on national 
power~. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." This limitation was, of course, im-
plicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those 
who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute 
the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that 
it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain 
powers to the central government, and those not delegated 
were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 5 Fur-
5 Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federal-
ist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment "declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment"); United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended 
to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as origi-
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thermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of the national government itself. Mem-
bers of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, sec-
tion 4 requires a republican form of government in each 
State. The initial ratification of the Constitution was accom-
plished on a state-by-state basis, and subsequent amend-
ments require approval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Con-
stitution," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negociation, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all the ob-
jects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern 
the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the 
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State." The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 
1961). 
here can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared 
is view. See, e. {J., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver 
lsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), re-
printed in 3 Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed 
Constitution) (The "powers [vested in Congress] extend only 
to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and 
nally ratified .... "). 
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are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their 
sovereignty in all other matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union ~ 
to assert its rights as a State against the v~derall6Jovernment. 
In 1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson ~afted life Kentucky 
Resolutions, 6 which were passed by the Kentucky legislature 
to protest the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, Act of June 
18, 1798, c. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, c. 58, 1 Stat. .@ 
570; Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of J y-14, 
1798, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, M_9.di'Son drafted 
similar Virginia Resolutions, which were a <:(J)ted by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly. See 4 J. E~··ot, Debates on the 
Federal Constitution 528-529 (2d ed. 1 3). In both cases it 
was clear that the powers reserve to the States were 
treated as a substantive limitation on authority, 
It was asserted that these powers enabled a State to inter- I_!) 
pose its will against any action by the 3 5 ~overnment. lJ!c-tt ti?J'Itt / 
Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's views were ex-
panded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification doctrine-the 
extreme view that eventually led to the War Between the 
States. 7 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 1-57 (R. 
6 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"(t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general govern-
ment; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for 
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general 
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right 
to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and 
of no force." Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
' In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that 
either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitution-
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Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South Carolina Exposition 
of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the St · itea 
the delegated powers of the Government was I 1J 
confined to the South. The New England States, for exam-
ple, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 
c. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in 
defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the 
support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of 
Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to en-
force the embargo. 8 In Massachusetts the story was simi-
lar: The legislature denounced the enforcement Act as "un-
d--jus£, o~ and unconstitutional, and not le all 
binding on the citizens of this state." Resolution of the 
Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. 
ally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history's bloodi-
est fratricides, ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great 
figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question 
whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would 
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States. 
• The Governor explained a special session of the state legislatur 
tha """'s 3 b 
'-" 
"( w ]henever our national legislature is l d to overleap the prescr · ed 
bounds of their [sic] cons itutional powe s, on the ,!tate~gislature , i@ 
great emergencies, devolv the arduous t k-it is tlie1r rignt-it bee mes 
t e1r uty, tom erpo e their protecting hield between the right an lib-
/ 
Sbeec~f----------:·er·t~y~o~f;jthe people, a the assumed po er of the.(ieneral(iovernm nt.'@ 
_ ' ~ 75 ~of Governor Trumbull (Feb. 2 , 1809), r'eprinted-fn H. es, 
State Documents on Federal Relations£ Jt I 40 (190 ).-:::> 
~ The Assembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor's posi-
tion and concluding that the embargo legislation was "incompatible with 
the constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites 
o! [the] State." Resolutio~of the General Assembly 
?. (Feb. 809), reprinted in Ames, supra, at . n v1ew of its duty 
to support t Constitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in 
giving effec to the aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the 
Embargo." Ibid . 
ftVi& no p~wtr 
i? morf ''5overe;f' 
,, 
fhM1 fJle rr 1 bt t 
oF ~ ~a vern MftlT 
to Jett'rfo'\lllf rite 
term$ a~tt& 
coV~J. i tftJVI-5 of 
ern p l o ~ W1 e r~ t oF 
~ oFFicer~ 
ant! e mployee-5 
who CIJYI!.h f'1,4.te 
tne jovern wtent, 
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s, Sta Documents on Federal Relation~1••••• 
11 (190 ) When Congress enacted the Embargo Act of 
Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature 
declared it "a manifest . . . abuse of power" that infringed the 
"sovereignty reserved to the States" 9 and justified theJegi -
lature in "inter os[in ] its power" to protect its citiZeils from 
o pression," Resolution of the Massa~hu efts L · 
(Feb. , 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra at 2. Even Dan-
iel Webster, famous for his defense of he Mational~vern­
men recognized that principles of1ederali8m limit 
Congress's power. 10 
B 
~st:e~~il(!)l!l& of history are clearer than the fact that 
state sovereignty has always been a basic assumption of 
American political theory. Although its contours have 
changed over two centuries, state sovereignty remains a fun-
damental component of our system that this Court has recog-
nized time and time again. Even to refer to the highlights 
would go far beyond the scope of this dissent. I therefore 
mention only a few of the decisions from last Term alone in 
which the Court expressly noted that States retain signifi-
cant sovereign powers. 11 In Com;;_unity Communicatio~ns ""'s-
• 
9 The legislature explained that the tate's sovereignty was reserved, · '-" 
part, to protect its citizens from exc sive federal power. Resolutio of 
~.sachusetts Legislature (Feb. , 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra n. 
10 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the en-
listment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were enacted 
it would be "the solemn duty of the State Governments" to interpose their 
authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was "among the ob-
jects for which the State Governments exist." Speech on the Conscription 
Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Daniel 
Webster 55, 68 (1903). 
n Se~ River·a-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, -- U. S. 
--, _;>_ (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autonomous political en-
tity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution."') (quoting 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), we considered the 
/C) state action exemption from the antitrust laws. Since 
~nder the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only 
as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their author-
ity,"' id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351 
(1943)), we had previously recognized an antitrust exemption 
for States acting "in the exercise of [their] sovereign pow-
ers," id., at 48. We held that this exemption does not ex-
tend to cities, but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the sov-
ereign nature of States. See id., at 48-54. In United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 
(1982), we unanimously upheld the application of the Railway 
Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. We reached this con-
clusion, however, only by finding that operation of the rail-
road was not one of the State's "constitutionally preserved 
sovereign function[s]." /d., at 683. And in Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, -- U. S. -- (1982), 
we considered whether parts of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act "constituted an invasion of state sovereignty· in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., at--. Although 
the Court upheld the statute, it was clear that state sover-
eignty was an essential element to be considered in reaching 
that conclusion. See id., at ----
Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974)); 
Insurance Corp. of heland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite.s de Gui?tea, 
- U. S. -, -, n. 10 (1982) (States are •Qoequal sovereigns in a fed-
eral system'") (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U. S. 286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac,- U. S. -,- (1982) (dis-
cussing "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. 
Guar·anty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the structure of 
our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers"); 
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State's 
"sovereign" police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. 
McNanJ, 454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those "of a different, 
though paramount sovereignty") (quoting Matthews v. Rodge1·s, 284 U. S. 
521, 525 (1932)). 
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In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of 
the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the 
States' reserved powers to be a limitation on Congress's 
power-including its power under the Commerce Cl e. 
And the Court has recognized and acce this fac or al-
most two hundred years. 12 tb F 
Cem1re~~ 
>----,....J:_u_s.;,__TICE STEVENS' cone rring opinion re gnizes no limita-
tion on abilitYJ to override sta sovereignty in ex-
ercising its powers under the Comme ce Clause. His opin-
IOn oes not men 10 either federal' m or state sovereignty. 
Instead it declares that "[t]he onl basis for questioning the 
federal statute at issue here is t e pure judicial fiat found i~n 
this Court's opinion in Nationa League of Cities v. Usery." §/ 
Ante, at 4 (emphasis added). nder this view it is not easJ; 
to think of any state function hat could not be preempted. 
'
2 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. 
It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, how-
ever, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles 
of federalism. 
EEO~] 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-554 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, APPELLANT v. WYOMING, ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 
[February -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STE-
VENS' revisionist view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the 
Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to 
the Constitution itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a 
subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court 
has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of 
the Framers . . . to confer a power on the national govern-
ment adequate to discharge its central mission." Ante, at 3 
(emphasis added). 1 JusTICE STEVENS further states that 
"National League of Cities not only was incorrectly decided, 
but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Con-
stitution itself .... " Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). 
1 The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is an extra-
judicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 1-2. Jus-
tice Rutledge declared that the "proximate cause of our national existence" 
was not the desire to assure the great "democratic freedoms"; rather it was 
the need "to secure freedom of trade" within the former colonies. W. Rut-
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branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from 
which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the 
framework of the national government without even men-
tioning the power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the 
Founders stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble 
to the Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty. . . . " 
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common de-
fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare." Art. III. Although the "general Wel-
fare" recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free 
flow of trade among States (despite the fttct that the same 
2 Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, ee ante, at 1, 
it is clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutiona Convention i 
Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Madi of 
the proceedings begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the 
meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of 
Government." 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). After dealing with several 
preliminary matters, see id., at 1-17, the "main business," id., at 18 (J. 
Madison), opened on May 29 with Edmund Randolph's speech proposing 
the Virginia Plan. Almost all of the Plan's resolutions dealt with the ap-
propriate structure for the new government. Only the sixth resolution 
dealt with legislative powers at all. And far from stressing any power to 
regulate interstate commerce, it simply declared, in relevant part, "that 
the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative 
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in 
all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the har-
mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation .... " Id., at 21. While this language was, no doubt, broad 
enough to include the power to regulate interstate commerce, there was 
certainly no emphasis on that particular power. 
..... 
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language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear 
that security "against foreign invasion [and] against dissen-
tions between members of the Union" was of at least equal 
importance. See Speech by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 
1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison). 3 
The power to achieve the purposes identified in the Pream-
ble was not delegated solely to Congress. If, however, one 
looks at the powers that were so delegated, the position of 
the Commerce Clause hardly suggests that it was "central" 
among the concerns of the patriots who formed our Union. 
The enumeration of powers in Article I, section 8 begins with 
the "Power To lay and collect Taxes." 4 This is followed by 
the power "to pay the Debts" of the United States. Then, 
consistent with the Preamble, comes the power to "provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare." See note 3, 
supra. The perceived need for a national legislature with 
the power to tax, and to maintain an army and navy for the 
common defense, loomed far larger in the Founders' thinking 
than the need to eliminate barriers to the fledgling commerce 
among the States. Among the remaining enumerated pow-
ers, the power to regulate interstate commerce is only one 
among roughly a score. It is given no place of particular 
3 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the 
country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See 
The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269--276 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to 
give Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war." Art. IX. All of the evidence indicates that this most 
basic purpose of government was far more important to the Founders than 
the regulation of interstate commerce. 
• A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the central government's inability to collect taxes directly. See 1 
Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of A. Hamilton). Remedying this 
defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Constitutional 
Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954); The 
Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton) . 
·~ 
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prominence. So much for what the Constitution's language 
and structure teach about the Framers' intent. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a na-
tional government with delegated powers and state govern-
ments that retained a significant measure of sovereign au-
thority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the 
debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the 
early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been aae~t6d, much less ratified, if 
it had been understood that the Colhmerce Clause embodied 
the national government's "central mission," a mission to be 
accomplished even at the expense of regulating the personnel 
practices of state and local governments. 
A 
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on national 
powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." This limitation was, of course, im-
plicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those 
who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute 
the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that 
it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain 
powers to the central government, and those not delegated 
were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 5 Fur-
6 Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federal-
ist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment "declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
- ~ 
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thermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of the national government itself. Mem-
bers of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, sec-
tion 4 requires a republican form of government in each 
State. The initial ratification of the Constitution was accom-
plished on a state-by-state basis, and subsequent amend-
ments require approval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Con-
stitution," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negociation, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all the ob-
jects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern 
the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the 
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State." The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 
1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared 
this view. See, e. g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver 
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment"); United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended 
to confinn the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as origi-
nally ratified . ... "). 
t 
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Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), 
reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed 
Constitution) (The "powers [vested in Congress] extend only 
to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and 
are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their 
sovereignty in all other matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union 
to assert its rights as a State against the Federal Govern-
ment. In 1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the 
Kentucky Resolutions, 6 which were passed by the Kentucky 
legislature to protest the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, 
Act of June 18, 1798, c. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, 
c. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of 
July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison 
drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were adopted by 
the Virginia General Assembly. See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on 
the Federal Constitution 528-529 (2d ed. 1863). In both 
cases it was clear that the powers reserved to the ·States 
were treated as a substantive limitation on the authority of 
Congress. It was asserted that these powers enabled a 
State to interpose its will against any action by the National 
Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's 
views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification 
6 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general govern· 
ment; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for 
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general 
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right 
to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and 
of no force." Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
8 
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doctrine-the extreme view that eventually led to the War 
Between the States. 7 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 
1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South Carolina Ex-
position of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the National Government was not 
confined to the South. The New England States, for exam-
ple, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 
c. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in 
defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the 
support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of 
Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to en-
force the embargo. 8 In Massachusetts the story was simi-
7 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that 
either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitution-
ally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history's bloodi· 
est fratricides, ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great 
figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question 
whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would 
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States. And no power is more "sovereign" 
than the right of a government to determine the terms and conditions of 
employment of the officers and employees who constitute the government. 
8 The Governor explained to a special session of the state legislature 
that "[ w ]henever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed 
bounds of their [sic] constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in 
great emergencies, devolves the arduous task-it is their right-it be-
comes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right 
and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Govern-
ment." Speech of Governor Jonathan Trumbull (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted 
in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations 40 (1906). The As-
sembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor's position 
and concluding that the embargo legislation was "incompatible with the 
constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites of 
[the] State." Resolutions of the General Assembly (Feb. 23, 1809), re-
printed in Ames, supra, at 41. In view of its duty to support the Con-
stitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the 
aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the Embargo." Ibid. 
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lar: The legislature denounced the enforcement Act as "un-
just, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding 
on the citizens of this state." Resolutions of the Massachu-
setts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, 
State Documents on Federal Relations 35 (1906). When 
Congress enacted the Embargo Act of Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 
Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature declared it "a mani-
fest . . . abuse of power" that infringed the "sovereignty re-
served to the States" 9 and justified the legislature in "inter-
pos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppression," 
Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 71-72. Even Daniel 
Webster, famous for his defense of the rights of the National 
Government, recognized that principles of federalism limit 
Congress's power. 10 · 
as a ways een a basic assumption of 
American political theory. Although its contours have 
changed over two centuries, state sovereignty remains a fun-
damental component of our system that this Court has recog-
nized time and time again. Even to refer to the highlights 
would go far beyond the scope of this dissent. I therefore 
mention only a few of the decisions from last Term alone in 
which the Court expressly noted that States retain signifi-
9 The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was reserved, in 
part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal power. Resolutions of 
the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra 
n. 8, at 71. 
10 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the 
enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were en-
acted it would be "the solemn duty of the State Governments" to interpose 
their authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was "among the 
objects for which the State Governments exist." Speech on the Conscrip-
tion Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Dan-
iel Webster 55, 68 (1903). 
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cant sovereign powers. 11 In Community Communications 
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), we considered the 
state action exemption from the antitrust laws. Since 
"'under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only 
as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their author-
ity,"' id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351 
(1943)), we had previously recognized an antitrust exemption 
for States acting "in the exercise of [their] sovereign pow-
ers," id., at 48. We held that this exemption does not ex-
tend to cities, but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the sov-
ereign nature of States. See id., at 48-54. In United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 
(1982), we unanimously upheld the application of the Railway 
Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. We reached this con-
clusion, however, only by finding that operation of the rail-
road was not one of the State's "constitutionally preserved 
sovereign function[s]." !d., at 683. And in Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, -- U. S. -- (1982), 
we considered whether parts of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act "constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in 
11 See, e. g., Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,-- U. S. 
--, -- (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autonomous political en-
tity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.'") (quoting 
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974)); 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 10 (1982) (States are "'coequal sovereigns in a 
federal system'") (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac,- U.S.-,- (1982) (dis-
cussing "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins . 
Guaranty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the structure of 
our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers"); 
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State's 
"sovereign" police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. 
McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those "of a different, 
though paramount sovereignty") (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 
521, 525 (1932)). 
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violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., at--. Although 
the Court upheld the statute, it was clear that state sover-
eignty was an essential element to be considered in reaching 
that conclusion. See id., at -----. 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of 
the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the 
States' reserved powers to be a limitation on Congress's 
power-including its power under the Commerce Clause. 
And the Court has recognized and accepted this fact for al-
most two hundred years. 12 
IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion recognizes no limita-
tion on the ability of Congress to override state sovereignty 
in exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His 
opinion does not mention explicitly either federalism or state 
sovereignty. Instead it declares that "[t]he only basis for 
questioning the federal statute at issue here is the pure judi-
cial fiat found in this Court's opinion in National League of 
Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 4 (emphasis added). Under this 
view it is not easy to think of any state function-however 
sovereign-that could not be preempted. 13 
12 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. 
It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, how-
ever, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles 
of federalism. 
13 This case illustrates how far the Federal Government, with the Court's 
approval, has departed from the principles upon which our federal union 
was formed. The authority relied upon today is a provision of the Con-
stitution giving Co~gress the power to "regulate Commerce ... among the 
several States .... " The perceived "Commerce," incredible as it would 
have seemed even a few years ago, is the effect on trade among the States 
of Wyoming's requirement that its game wardens retire at age 65 rather 
than 70. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JusTICE STE-
VENS' revisionist view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the 
Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to 
the Constitution itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a 
subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court 
has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of 
the Framers ... to confer a power on the national govern-
ment adequate to discharge its central mission." Ante, at 3 
(emphasis added). 1 JUSTICE STEVENS further states that 
"National League of Cities not only was incorrectly decided, 
but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Con-
1 The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is an extra-
judiciallecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 1-2. Jus-
tice Rutledge declared that the "proximate cause of our national existence" 
was not the desire to assure the great "democratic freedoms"; rather it was 
the need "to secure freedom oftrade" within the former colonies. W. Rut-
ledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith 25 (1947). 
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stitution itself .... " Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). 
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's purposes. I sug-
gest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or 
greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled 
in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the ratification 
issue in the state conventions. No doubt there were differ-
ences of opinion as to the principal shortcomings of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that 
few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers 
among the States were "the central problem," or that their 
elimination was the "central mission" of the Constitutional 
Convention. Creating a national government within a fed-
eral system was far more central than any 18th century con-
cern for interstate commerce. 
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has construed 
the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommo-
date the unanticip~ted and unimaginable changes, particu-
larly in transportation and communication, that have oc-
curred in our country since the Constitution was ratified. If 
JUSTICE STEVENS had written that the Founders' intent in 
adopting the Commerce Clause nearly two centuries ago is of 
little relevance to the world in which we live today, I would 
not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion purports to 
rely on their intent. Ante, at 3. I therefore write-briefly, 
in view of the scope of the subject-to place the Commerce 
Clause in proper historical perspective, and further to sug-
gest that even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE STEVENS 
appears to believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The Constitution's central purpose was, as the name im-
plies, to constitute a government. The most important pro-
visions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relat-
ing to the establishment of that government. The system of 
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larger perspective than any single power conferred on any 
branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from 
which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the 
framework of the national government without even men-
tioning the power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the 
Founders stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble 
to the Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty. . . . " 
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common de-
fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare." Art. III. Although the "general Wel-
fare" recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free 
'Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, see ante, at 1, 
it is clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Madison's report of 
the proceedings begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the 
meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of 
Government." 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). After dealing with several 
preliminary matters, see id., at 1-17, the "main business," id., at 18 (J. 
Madison), opened on May 29 with Edmund Randolph's speech proposing 
the Virginia Plan. Almost all of the Plan's resolutions dealt with the ap-
propriate structure for the new government. Only the sixth resolution 
dealt with legislative powers at all. And far from stressing any power to 
regulate interstate commerce, it simply declared, in relevant part, "that 
the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative 
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in 
all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the har-
mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation .... " Id., at 21. While this language was, no doubt, broad 
enough to include the power to regulate interstate commerce, there was 
certainly no emphasis on that particular power. 
. . . 
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flow of trade among States (despite the fact that the same 
language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear 
that security "against foreign invasion [and] against dissen-
tions between members of the Union" was of at least equal 
importance. See Speech by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 
1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison). 3 
The power to achieve the purposes identified in the Pream-
ble was not delegated solely to Congress. If, however, one 
looks at the powers that were so delegated, the position of 
the Commerce Clause hardly suggests that it was "central" 
among the concerns of the patriots who formed our Union. 
The enumeration of powers in Article I, § 8 begins with the 
"Power To lay and collect Taxes." 4 This is followed by the 
power "to pay the Debts" of the United States. Then, con-
sistent with the Preamble, comes the power to "provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare." See note 3, 
supra. The perceived need for a national legislature with 
the power to tax, and to maintain an army and navy for the 
common defense, loomed far larger in the Founders' thinking 
than the need to eliminate barriers to the fledgling commerce 
among the States. Among the remaining enumerated pow-
ers, the power to regulate interstate commerce is only one 
3 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the 
country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See 
The Federalist No. 41, pp. 26~276 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to 
give Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war." Art. IX. All of the evidence indicates that this most 
basic purpose of government was far more important to the Founders than 
the regulation of interstate commerce. 
• A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the central government's inability to collect taxes directly. See 1 
Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of A. Hamilton). Remedying this 
defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Constitutional 
Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954); The 
Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton) . 
81-554-DISSENT 
EEOC v. WYOMING 5 
among roughly a score. It is given no place of particular 
prominence. So much for what the Constitution's language 
and structure teach about the Framers' intent. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a na-
tional government with delegated powers and state govern-
ments that retained a significant measure of sovereign au-
thority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the 
debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the 
early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been recommended by the Conven-
tion, much less ratified, if it had been understood that the 
Commerce Clause embodied the national government's "cen-
tral mission," a mission to be accomplished even at the ex-
pense of regulating the personnel practices of state and local 
governments. 
A 
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on national 
powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." This limitation was, of course, im-
plicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those 
who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute 
the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that 
it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain 
powers to the central government, and those not delegated 
were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 5 Fur-
5 Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federal-
ist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also United States v. 
• • -~ 
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thermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of the national government itself. Mem-
bers of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, § 4 re-
quires a republican form of government in each State. The 
initial ratification of the Constitution was accomplished on a 
state-by-state basis, and subsequent amendments require ap-
proval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Con-
stitution," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negocia-
tion, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment "declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment"); United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended 
to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as origi-
nally ratified .... "). 
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this view. See, e. g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver 
Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), 
reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed 
Constitution) (The "powers [vested in Congress] extend only 
to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and 
are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their 
sovereignty in all other matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union 
to assert its rights as a State against the Federal Govern-
ment. In 1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the 
Kentucky Resolutions, 6 which were passed by the Kentucky 
legislature to protest the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, 
Act of June 18, 1798, c. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, 
c. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of 
July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison 
drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were adopted. by 
the Virginia General Assembly. See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on 
the Federal Constitution 52~29 (2d ed. 1863). In both 
cases it was clear that the powers reserved to the States 
were treated as a substantive limitation on the authority of 
Congress. It was asserted that these powers enabled a 
State to interpose its will against any action by the National 
Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's 
6 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general govern-
ment; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for 
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general 
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right 
to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and 
of no force." Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
81-554-DISSENT 
8 EEOC v. WYOMING 
views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification 
doctrine-the extreme view that eventually led to the War 
Between the States. 7 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 
1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South Carolina Ex-
position of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the National Government was not 
confined to the South. The New England States, for exam-
ple, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 
c. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in 
defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the 
support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of 
Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to en-
force the embargo. 8 In Massachusetts the story was simi- . 
7 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that 
either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitution-
ally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history's bloodi-
est fratricides, ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great 
figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question 
whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would 
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States. And no power is more "sovereign" 
than the right of a government to determine the terms and conditions of 
employment of the officers and employees who constitute the government. 
8 The Governor explained to a special session of the state legislature 
that "[ w ]henever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed 
bounds of their [sic] constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in 
great emergencies, devolves the arduous task-it is their right-it be-
comes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right 
and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Govern-
ment." Speech of Governor Jonathan Trumbull (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted 
in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations 40 (1906). The As-
sembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor's position 
and concluding that the embargo legislation was "incompatible with the 
constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites of 
[the] State." Resolutions of the General Assembly (Feb. 23, 1809), re-
printed in Ames, supra, at 41. In view of its duty to support the Con-
stitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the 
. ·' 
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lar: The legislature denounced the enforcement Act as "un-
just, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding 
on the citizens of this state." Resolutions of the Massachu-
setts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, 
State Documents on Federal Relations 35 (1906). When 
Congress enacted the Embargo Act of Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 
Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature declared it "a mani-
fest ... abuse of power" that infringed the "sovereignty re-
served to the States" 9 and justified the legislature in "inter-
pos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppression," 
Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 71-72. Even Daniel 
Webster, famous for his defense of the rights of the National 
Government, recognized that prin~iples of federalism limit 
Congress's power. 10 
B 
It is clear beyond question fact that state sovereignty al-
ways has been a basic assumption of American political the-
ory. Although its contours have changed over two centu-
ries, state sovereignty remains a fundamental component of 
our system that this Court has recognized time and time 
again. Even to refer to the highlights would go far beyond 
the scope of this dissent. I therefore mention only a few of 
the decisions from last Term alone in which the Court ex-
aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the Embargo." Ibid. 
9 The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was reserved, in 
part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal power. Resolutions of 
the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra 
n. 8, at 71. 
10 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the 
enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were en-
acted it would be "the solemn duty of the State Governments" to interpose 
their authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was "among the 
objects for which the State Governments exist." Speech on the Conscrip-
tion Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of 
Daniel Webster 55, 68 (1903) . 
·,·~o:s. 
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pressly noted that States retain significant sovereign pow-
ers.11 In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boul-
der, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), we considered the state action 
exemption from the antitrust laws. Since "'under the Con-
stitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress 
may constitutionally subtract from their authority,"' id., at 
49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351 (1943)), we 
had previously recognized an antitrust exemption for States 
acting "in the exercise of [their] sovereign powers," id., at 
48. We held that this exemption does not extend to cities, 
but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the sovereign nature 
of States. See id., at 48-54. In United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), we unani-
mously upheld the application of the Railway Labor Act to a 
state-owned railroad. We reached this conclusion, however, 
only by finding that operation of the railroad was not one of 
the State's "constitutionally preserved sovereign ftmc-
tion[s]." Id., at 683. And in Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n v. Mississippi,-- U. S. -- (1982), we consid-
ered whether parts of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act "constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation , 
11 See, e. g., Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,-- U. S. 
--, -- (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autonomous political en-
tity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution."') (quoting 
Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 673 (1974)); 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 10 (1982) (States are "'coequal sovereigns in a 
federal system'") (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U. S. 286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac, - U. S. -, - (1982) (dis-
cussing "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. 
Guaranty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the structure of 
our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers"); 
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State's 
"sovereign" police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. 
McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those "of a different, 
though paramount sovereignty") (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 
521, 525 (1932)). 
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of the Tenth Amendment," id., at--. Although the Court 
upheld the statute, it was clear that state sovereignty was an 
essential element to be considered in reaching that conclu-
sion. See id., at --- --. 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of 
the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the 
States' reserved powers to be a limitation on Congress's 
power-including its power under the Commerce Clause. 
And the Court has recognized and accepted this fact for al-
most 200 years. 12 
IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion recognizes no limita-
tion on the ability of Congress to override state sovereignty 
in exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His 
opinion does not mention explicitly either federalism or state 
sovereignty. Instead it declares that "[t]he only basis for 
questioning the federal statute at issue here is the pure judi-
cial fiat found in this Court's opinion in National League of 
Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 4 (emphasis added). Under this 
view it is not easy to think of any state function-however 
sovereign-that could not be preempted. 13 
12 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. 
It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, how-
ever, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles 
of federalism. 
13 This case illustrates how far the Federal Government, with the Court's 
approval, has departed from the principles upon which our federal union 
was formed. The authority relied upon today is a provision of the Con-
stitution giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce ... among the 
several States .... " The perceived "Commerce," incredible as it would 
have seemed even a few years ago, is the effect on trade among the States 
of Wyoming's requirement that its game wardens retire at age 65 rather 
than 70. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, 
dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JuSTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STE-
VENS' revisionist view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JuSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the 
Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to 
the Constitution itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a 
subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court 
has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of 
the Framers . . . to confer a power on the national govern-
ment adequate to discharge its central mission." Ante, at 3 
(emphasis added).' JuSTICE STEVENS further states that 
"National League of Cities not only was incorrectly decided, 
'The authority on which JuSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is an extra-
judicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 1-2. Jus-
tice Rutledge declared that the "proximate cause of our national existence" 
was not the desire to assure the great "democratic freedoms"; rather it was 
the need "to secure freedom of trade" within the former colonies. W. Rut-
ledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith 25 (1947). 
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but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Con-
stitution itself .... " Ante, at 6 (emphasis added). 
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's purposes. I sug-
gest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or 
greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled 
in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the ratification 
issue in the state conventions. No doubt there were differ-
ences of opinion as to the principal shortcomings of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that 
few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers 
among the States were "the central problem," or that their 
elimination was the "central mission" of the Constitutional 
Convention. Creating a national government within a fed-
eral system was far more central than any 18th century con-
cern for interstate commerce. 
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has construed 
the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommo-
date the unanticipated and unimaginable changes, particu-
larly in transportation and communication, that have oc-
curred in our country since the Constitution was ratified. If 
JUSTICE STEVENS had written that the Founders' intent in 
adopting the Commerce Clause nearly two centuries ago is of 
little relevance to the world in which we live today, I would 
not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion purports to 
rely on their intent. Ante, at 3. I therefore write-briefly, 
in view of the scope of the subject-to place the Commerce 
Clause in proper historical perspective, and further to sug-
gest that even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE STEVENS 
appears to believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The Constitution's central purpose was, as the name im-
plies, to constitute a government. The most important pro-
visions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relat-
ing to the establishment of that government. The system of 
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checks and balances, for example, is far more central to the 
larger perspective than any single power conferred on any 
branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from 
which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the 
framework of the national government without even men-
tioning the power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the 
Founders stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble 
to the Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty .... " 
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common de-
fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare." Art. III. Alth{mgh the "general Wel-
2 Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, see ante, at 
1-2, & 2-3 n. 1, it is clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Mad-
ison's report of the proceedings begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 was the 
day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the 
federal system of Government." 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). After 
dealing with several preliminary matters, see id., at 1-17, the "main busi-
ness," id., at 18 (J. Madison), opened on May 29 with Edmund Randolph's 
speech proposing the Virginia Plan. Almost all of the Plan's resolutions 
dealt with the appropriate structure for the new government. Only the 
sixth resolution dealt with legislative powers at all. And far from stress-
ing any power to regulate interstate commerce, it simply declared, in rele-
vant part, "that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy 
the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & more-
over to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, 
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
exercise of individual Legislation .... " !d., at 21. While this language 
was, no doubt, broad enough to include the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, there was certainly no emphasis on that particular power. 
'. 
81-554-DISSENT 
4 EEOC v. WYOMING' 
fare" recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free 
flow of trade among States (despite the fact that the same 
language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear 
that security "against foreign invasion [and] against dissen-
tions between members of the Union" was of at least equal 
importance. See Speech by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 
1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison). 3 
The power to achieve the purposes identified in the Pream-
ble was not delegated solely to Congress. If, however, one 
looks at the powers that were so delegated, the position of 
the Commerce Clause hardly suggests that it was the "cen-
tral" concern of the patriots who formed our Union. The 
enumeration of powers in Article I, § 8 begins with the 
"Power To lay and collect Taxes." 4 This is followed by the 
power "to pay the Debts" of the United States. Then, con-
sistent with the Preamble, comes the power to "provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare." See note 3, 
supra. The power to regulate interstate commence is only 
one among nearly a score of other powers that followed. It 
is evident that the authority to tax and to "provide for the 
common Defence" loomed larger among the concerns of the 
Founders than other powers granted Congress. The Com-
merce Clause was given no place of particular prominence. 
3 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the 
country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See 
The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to 
give Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war." Art. IX. 
• A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the central government's inability to collect taxes directly. See 1 
Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of A. Hamilton). Remedying this 
defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Constitutional 
Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954); The 
Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton). 
.~' 
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So much for what the Constitution's language and structure 
teach about the Framers' intent. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a na-
tional government with delegated powers and state govern-
ments that retained a significant measure of sovereign au-
thority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the 
debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the 
early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been recommended by the Conven-
tion, much less ratified, if it had been understoop that the 
Commerce Clause embodied the national government's "cen-
tral mission," a mission to be accomplished even at the ex-
pense of regulating the personnel practices of state and local 
governments. 
A 
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on national 
powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." This limitation was, of course, im-
plicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those 
who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute 
the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that 
it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain 
powers to the central government, and those not delegated 
were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 5 Fur-
6 Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federal-
ist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment "declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
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thennore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of the national government itself. Mem-
bers of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, § 4 re-
quires a republican form of government in each State. The 
initial ratification of the Constitution was accomplished on a 
state-by-state basis, and subsequent amendments require ap-
proval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Con-
stitution," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The fonner will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negocia-
tion, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared 
this view. See, e. g., Letter of Roger Shennan & Oliver 
Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), 
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment"); United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended 
to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as origi-
nally ratified . . .. ") . 
. ~ ,. .. ; . 
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reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed 
Constitution) (The "powers [vested in Congress] extend only 
to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and 
are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their 
sovereignty in all other matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union 
to assert its rights as a State against the Federal Govern-
ment. In 1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the 
Kentucky Resolutions, 6 which were passed by the Kentucky 
legislature to protest the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, 
Act of June 18, 1798, c. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, 
c. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of 
July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison 
drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were adopted by 
the Virginia General Assembly. See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on 
the Federal Constitution 528-529 (2d ed. 1863). In both 
cases it was clear that the powers reserved to the States 
were treated as a substantive limitation on the authority of 
Congress. It was asserted that these powers enabled a 
State to interpose its will against any action by the National 
Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's 
views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification 
doctrine-the extreme view that eventually led to the War 
6 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general govern-
ment; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for 
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general 
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right 
to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and 
of no force." Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
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Between the States.7 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 
1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South Carolina Ex-
position of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the National Government was not 
confined to the South. The New England States, for exam-
ple, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 
c. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in 
defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the 
support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of 
Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to en-
force the embargo. 8 In Massachusetts the story was simi-
lar: The legislature denounced the enforcement Act as "un-
7 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that 
either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitution-
ally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history's bloodi-
est fratricides , ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great 
figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question 
whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would 
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States. And no power is more "sovereign" 
than the right of a government to determine the terms and conditions of 
employment of the officers and employees who constitute the government. 
8 The Governor explained to a special session of the state legislature 
that "[ w ]henever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed 
bounds of their [sic] constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in 
great emergencies, devolves the arduous task-it is their right-it be-
comes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right 
and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Govern-
ment." Speech of Governor Jonathan Trumbull (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted 
in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations 40 (1906). The As-
sembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor's position 
and concluding that the embargo legislation was "incompatible with the 
constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites of 
[the] State." Resolutions of the General Assembly (Feb. 23, 1809), re-
printed in Ames, supra, at 41. In view of its duty to support the Con-
stitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the 
aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the Embargo." Ibid. 
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just, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding 
on the citizens of this state." Resolutions of the Massachu-
setts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, 
State Documents on Federal Relations 35 (1906). When 
Congress enacted the Embargo Act of Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 
Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature declared it "a mani-
fest . . . abuse of power" that infringed the "sovereignty re-
served to the States" 9 and justified the legislature in "inter-
pos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppression," 
Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 71-72. Even Daniel 
Webster, famous for his defense of the rights of the National 
Government, recognized that principles of federalism limit 
Congress's power. 10 
B 
It is clear beyond question that state sovereignty always 
has been a basic assumption of American political theory. 
Although its contours have changed over two centuries, state 
sovereignty remains a fundamental component of our system 
that this Court has recognized time and time again. Even to 
refer to the highlights would go far beyond the scope of this 
dissent. I therefore mention only a few of the decisions from 
last Term alone in which the Court expressly noted that 
States retain significant sovereign powers. 11 In Community 
9 The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was reserved, in 
part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal power. Resolutions of 
the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra 
n. 8, at 71. 
10 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the 
enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were en-
acted it would be ''the solemn duty of the State Governments" to interpose 
their authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was "among the 
objects for which the State Governments exist." Speech on the Conscrip~ 
tion Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of 
Daniel Webster 55, 68 (1903). 
11 See, e. g., Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, - U. S. 
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Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), 
we considered the state action exemption from the antitrust 
laws. Since "'under the Constitution, the states are sover-
eign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract 
from their authority,"' id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341, 351 (1943)), we had previously recognized an 
antitrust exemption for States acting "in the exercise of 
[their] sovereign powers," id., at 48. We held that this ex-
emption does not extend to cities, but in so doing we repeat-
edly stressed the sovereign nature of States. See id., at 
48-54. In United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. 
Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), we unanimously upheld the appli-
cation of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. 
We reached this conclusion, however, only by finding that op-
eration of the railroad was not one of the State's "constitu-
tionally preserved sovereign function[s]." !d., at 683. And 
in Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi,--
U. S. -- (1982), we considered whether parts of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act "constituted an invasion of 
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., 
at--. Although the Court upheld the statute, it was clear 
-, - (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autonomous political en-
tity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.'") (quoting 
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co ., 416 U. S. 663, 673 (1974)); 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 
-U. S.-,-, n. 10 (1982) (States are "'coequal sovereigns in a 
federal system'") (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac,- U.S.-,- (1982) (dis-
cussing "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. 
Guaranty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the structure of 
our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers"); 
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State1s 
"sovereign" police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. 
McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those "of a different, 
though paramount sovereignty'') (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 
521, 525 (1932)). 
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that state sovereignty was an essential element to be consid-
ered in reaching that conclusion. See id., at -- - --. 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of 
the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the 
States' reserved powers to be a limitation on Congress's 
power-including its power under the Commerce Clause. 
And the Court has recognized and accepted this fact for al-
most 200 years. 12 
IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion recognizes no limita-
tion on the ability of Congress to override state sovereignty 
in exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His 
opinion does not mention explicitly either federalism or state 
sovereignty. Instead it declares that "[t]he only basis for 
questioning the federal statute at issue here is the pure judi-
cial fiat found in this Court's opinion in National League of 
Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). Under this 
view it is not easy to think of any state function-however 
sovereign-that could not be preempted. 13 
12 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. 
It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, how-
ever, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles 
of federalism. 
18 This case illustrates how far the Federal Government, with the Court's 
approval, has departed from the principles upon which our federal union 
was formed. The authority relied upon today is a provision of the Con-
stitution giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce ... among the 
several States .... " The perceived "Commerce," incredible as it would 
have seemed even a few years ago, is the effect on trade among the States 
of Wyoming's requirement that its game wardens retire at age 65 rather 
than 70. 
.... , .... - . 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-554 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, APPELLANT v. 
WYOMING ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 
[February -, 1983] 
I 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JusTICE O'CONNOR joins, I 
dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JusTICE STE-
VENS' revisionist view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the 
Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to 
the Constitution itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a 
subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court 
has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of 
the Framers . . . to confer a power on the national govern-
ment adequate to discharge its central mission." Ante, at 
3-4 (emphasis added).' JUSTICE STEVENS further states I 
that "National League of Cities not only was incorrectly de-
1 The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is an extra-
judiciallecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 1-2. Jus-
tice Rutledge declared that the "proximate cause of our national existence" 
was not the desire to assure the great "democratic freedoms"; rather it was 
the need "to secure freedom of trade" within the former colonies. W. Rut-
ledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith 25 (1947). 
" 
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cided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the l 
Constitution itself .... " Ante, at 6 (emphasis added). 
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's purposes. I sug-
gest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or 
greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled 
in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the ratification 
issue in the state conventions. No doubt there were differ-
ences of opinion as to the principal shortcomings of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that 
few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers 
among the States were "the central problem," or that their 
elimination was the "central mission" of the Constitutional 
Convention. Creating a national government within a fed-
eral system was far more central than any 18th century con-
cern for interstate commerce. 
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has construed 
the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommo-
date the unanticipated and unimaginable changes, particu-
larly in transportation and communication, that have oc-
curred in our country since the Constitution was ratified. If 
JusTICE STEVENS had written that the Founders' intent in 
adopting the Commerce Clause nearly two centuries ago is of 
little relevance to the world in which we live today, I would 
not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion purports to 
rely on their intent. Ante, at 3. I therefore write-briefly, 
in view of the scope of the subject-to place the Commerce 
Clause in proper historical perspective, and further to sug-
gest that even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE STEVENS 
appears to believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The Constitution's central purpose was, as the name im-
plies, to constitute a government. The most important pro-
visions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relat-
ing to the establishment of that government. The system of 
\, 
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checks and balances, for example, is far more central to the 
larger perspective than any single power conferred on any 
branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from 
which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the 
framework of the national government without even men-
tioning the power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the 
Founders stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble 
to the Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty. . . . " 
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common de-
fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare." Art. III. Although the "general Wel-
2 Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, see ante, at 
1-2, & 2-3 n. 1, it is clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutional I 
Convention in Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Mad-
ison's report of the proceedings begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 was the 
day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the 
federal system of Government." 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). After 
dealing with several preliminary matters, see id., at 1-17, the "main busi-
ness," id., at 18 (J. Madison), opened on May 29 with Edmund Randolph's 
speech proposing the Virginia Plan. Almost all of the Plan's resolutions 
dealt with the appropriate structure for the new government. Only the 
sixth resolution dealt with legislative powers at all. And far from stress-
ing any power to regulate interstate commerce, it simply declared, in rele-
vant part, ''that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy 
the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & more-
over to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, 
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
exercise of individual Legislation .... " /d., at 21. While this language 
was, no doubt, broad enough to include the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, there was certainly no emphasis on that particular power. 
' , 
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fare" recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free 
flow of trade among States (despite the fact that the same 
language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear 
that security "against foreign invasion [and] against dissen-
tions between members of the Union" was of at least equal 
importance. See Speech by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 
1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison). 3 
The power to achieve the purposes identified in the Pream-
ble was not delegated solely to Congress. If, however, one 
looks at the powers that were so delegated, the position of 
the Commerce Clause hardly suggests that it was the "cen- ' 
tral" concern of the patriots who formed our Union. The 
enumeration of powers in Article I, § 8 begins with the 
"Power To lay and collect Taxes." 4 This is followed by the 
power "to pay the Debts" of the United States. Then, con-
sistent with the Preamble, comes the power to "provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare." See note 3, 
supra. The power to regulate interstate commence is only 
one among nearly a score of other powers that followed. It 
is evident that the authority to tax and to "provide for the 
common Defence" loomed larger among the concerns of the 
Founders than other powers granted Congress. The Com-
merce Clause was given no place of particular prominence. 
3 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the 
country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See 
The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to 
give Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war." Art. IX. A 
• A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the central government's inability to collect taxes directly. See 1 
Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of A. Hamilton). Remedying this 
defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Constitutional 
Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954); The 
Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton). 
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So much for what the Constitution's language and structure 
teach about the Framers' intent. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a na-
tional government with delegated powers and state govern-
ments that retained a significant measure of sovereign au-
thority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the 
debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the 
early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been recommended by the Conven-
tion, much less ratified, if it had been understood that the 
Commerce Clause embodied the national government's "cen-
tral mission," a mission to be accomplished even at the ex-
pense of regulating the personnel practices of state and local 
governments. 5 
6 JUSTICE STEVENS' citation of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1 
(1824), in support of his position, see ante, at 5---U, n. 8, is essentially irrele-
vant, for Chief Justice Marshall was not concerned with a State's sovereign 
power. Gibbons carried passengers between New Jersey and New York 
on two steamboats licensed under an Act of Congress, while Ogden claimed 
the benefit of a New York law granting an exclusive right to navigate 
steamboats on New York waters. The power to grant such a monopoly 
clearly is not one of a State's traditional sovereign powers. On the con-
trary, it is part of the power to regulate interstate navigation that lies 
within the very core of the Commerce Clause. I certainly do not suggest 
that principles offederalism should prevent Congress from regulating navi-
gation. The present case, however, concerns the power to determine the 
terms and conditions of employment for the officers and employees who 
constitute a State's government. This is as sovereign a power as any that 
a State possesses, and it is far removed from the original concerns of the 
Commerce Clause. Indeed, this case illustrates how far the Federal Gov-
ernment, with the Court's approval, has departed from the principles upon 
which our federal union was formed. The "commerce" at issue, incredible 
as it would have seemed even a few years ago, let alone in Chief Justice 
Marshall's day, is the effect on trade among the States of Wyoming's re-
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The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on national 
powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." This limitation was, of course, im-
plicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those 
who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute 
the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that 
it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain 
powers to the central government, and those not delegated 
were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 6 Fur-
thermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of the national government itself. Mem-
bers of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, § 4 re-
quires a republican form of government in each State. The 
initial ratification of the Constitution was accomplished on a 
state-by-state basis, and subsequent amendments require ap-
proval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
quirement that its game wardens retire at age 65 rather than 70. I 
6 Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federal-
ist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment "declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment"); United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended 
to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as origi-
nally ratified .... "). 
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Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Con-
stitution," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negocia-
tion, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared 
this view. See, e. 'g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver 
Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), 
reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed 
Constitution) (The "powers [vested in Congress] extend only 
to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and 
are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their 
sovereignty in all other matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union 
to assert its rights as a State against the Federal Govern-
ment. In 1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the 
Kentucky Resolutions, 7 which were passed by the Kentucky 
7 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general govern-
ment; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for 
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general 
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right 
' 
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legislature to protest the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, 
Act of June 18, 1798, c. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, 
c. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of 
July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison 
drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were adopted by 
the Virginia General Assembly. See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on 
the Federal Constitution 528-529 (2d ed. 1863). In both 
cases it was clear that the powers reserved to the States 
were treated as a substantive limitation on the authority of 
Congress. It was asserted that these powers enabled a 
State to interpose its will against any action by the National 
Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's 
views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification 
doctrine-the extreme view that eventually led to the War 
Between the States. 8 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun \ 
1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South Carolina Ex-
position of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the National Government was not 
confined to the South. The New England States, for exam-
ple, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 
c. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in 
defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the 
support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of 
Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to en-
to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and 
of no force." Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
8 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that I 
either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitution-
ally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history's bloodi-
est fratricides , ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great 
figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question 
whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would 
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sover-
1 eign powers reserved to the States. See note 5, supra. 
: 
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force the embargo. 9 In Massachusetts the story was simi- \ 
lar: The legislature denounced the enforcement Act as "un-
just, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding 
on the citizens of this state." Resolutions of the Massachu-
setts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, 
State Documents on Federal Relations 35 (1906). When 
Congress enacted the Embargo Act of Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 
Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature declared it "a mani-
fest ... abuse of power" that infringed the "sovereignty re-
served to the States" 10 and justified the legislature in "inter- \ 
pos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppression," 
Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 71-72. Even Daniel 
Webster, famous for his defense of the rights of the National 
Government, recognized that principles of federalism limit I 
Congress's power. 11 
9 The Governor explained to a special session of the state legislature \ 
that "[ w ]henever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed 
bounds of their [sic] constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in 
great emergencies, devolves the arduous task-it is their right-it be-
comes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right 
and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Govern-
ment." Speech of Governor Jonathan Trumbull (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted 
in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations 40 (1906). The As-
sembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor's position 
and concluding that the embargo legislation was "incompatible with the 
constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites of 
[the] State." Resolutions of the General Assembly (Feb. 23, 1809), re-
printed in Ames, supra, at 41. In view of its duty to support the Con-
stitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the 
aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the Embargo." Ibid. 
'"The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was reserved, in ' 
part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal power. Resolutions of 
the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra 
n. 9, at 71. r 
11 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the 
enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were en-
acted it would be "the solemn duty of the State Governments" to interpose 
their authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was "among the 
-. 
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B 
It is clear beyond question that state sovereignty always l 
has been a basic assumption of American political theory. 
Although its contours have changed over two centuries, state 
sovereignty remains a fundamental component of our system 
that this Court has recognized time and time again. Even to 
refer to the highlights would go far beyond the scope of this 
dissent. I therefore mention only a few of the decisions from 
last Term alone in which the Court expressly noted that 
States retain significant sovereign powers. 12 In Community \ 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), 
we considered the state action exemption from the antitrust 
laws. Since "'under the Constitution, the states are sover-
eign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract 
from their authority,"' id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341, 351 (1943)), we had previously recognized an 
antitrust exemption for States acting "in the exercise of 
objects for which the State Governments exist." Speech on the Conscrip-
tion Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of 
Daniel Webster 55, 68 (1903). 
12 See, e. g., Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,-- U. S. 
--, -- (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autonomous political en-
tity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution."') (quoting 
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974)); 
Insuran.ce Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 10 (1982) (States are "'coequal sovereigns in a 
federal system'") (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U. S. 286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac,- U. S.-,- (1982) (dis-
cussing "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins . 
Guaranty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the structure of 
our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers"); 
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State's 
"sovereign" police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. 
McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those "of a different, 
though paramount sovereignty'') (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 
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[their] sovereign powers," id., at 48. We held that this ex-
emption does not extend to cities, but ip so doing we repeat-
edly stressed the sovereign nature of States. See id., at 
48-54. In United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. 
Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), we unanimously upheld the appli-
cation of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. 
We reached this conclusion, however, only by finding that op-
eration of the railroad was not one of the State's "constitu-
tionally preserved sovereign function[s]." !d., at 683. And 
in Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, --
U. S. -- (1982), we considered whether parts of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act "constituted an invasion of 
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., 
at --. Although the Court upheld the statute, it was clear 
that state sovereignty was an essential element to be consid-
ered in reaching that conclusion. See id., at -- - --. 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of 
the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the 
States' reserved powers to be a limitation on Congress's 
power-including its power under the Commerce Clause. 
And the Court has recognized and accepted this fact for al- I 
most 200 years. 13 
IV 
JusTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion recognizes no limita-
tion on the ability of Congress to override state sovereignty 
in exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His 
opinion does not mention explicitly either federalism or state 
sovereignty. Instead it declares that "[t]he only basis for 
13 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. I 
It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, how-
ever, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles 
of federalism . 
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questioning the federal statute at issue here is the pure judi-
cial fiat found in this Court's opinion in National League of 
Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). Under this f 
view it is not easy to think of any state function-however 
sovereign-that could not be preempted. A brt'!iSS(OYl 
'' 
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I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STE- l 
VENS' novel view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the 
Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to 
the Constitution itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a 
subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court 
has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of 
the Framers . . . to confer a power on the national govern-
ment adequate to discharge its central mission." Ante, at 
3-4 (emphasis added). 1 JUSTICE STEVENS further states 
that "National League of Cities not only was incorrectly de-
1 The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is an extra-
judiciallecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 1-2. Jus-
tice Rutledge declared that the "proximate cause of our national existence" 
was not the desire to assure the great "democratic freedoms"; rather it was 
the need "to secure freedom of trade" within the former colonies. W. Rut-
ledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith 25 (1947) . 
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cided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the 
Constitution itself .... " Ante, at 6 (emphasis added). 
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's purposes. I sug-
gest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or 
greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled 
in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the ratification 
issue in the state conventions. No doubt there were differ-
ences of opinion as to the principal shortcomings of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that 
few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers 
among the States were "the central problem," or that their 
elimination was the "central mission" of the Constitutional 
Convention. Creating a national government within a fed-
eral system was far more central than any 18th century con-
cern for interstate commerce. 
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has construed 
the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommo-
date the unanticipated and unimaginable changes, particu-
larly in transportation and communication, that have oc-
curred in our country since the Constitution was ratified. If 
JUSTICE STEVENS had written that the Founders' intent in 
adopting the Commerce Clause nearly two centuries ago is of 
little relevance to the world in which we live today, I would 
not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion purports to 
rely on their intent. Ante, at 3. I therefore write-briefly, 
in view of the scope of the subject-to place the Commerce 
Clause in proper historical perspective, and further to sug-
gest that even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE STEVENS 
appears to believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The Constitution's central purpose was, as the name im-
plies, to constitute a government. The most important pro-
visions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relat-
ing to the establishment of that government. The system of 
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checks and balances, for example, is far more central to the 
larger perspective than any single power conferred on any 
branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from 
which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the 
framework of the national government without even men-
tioning the power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the 
Founders stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble 
to the Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty. . . . " 
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common de-
fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare." Art. III. Although the "general Wei-
2 Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, see ante, at 
1-2, & 2--3 n. 1, it is clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Mad-
ison's report of the proceedings begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 was the 
day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the 
federal system of Government." 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). After 
dealing with several preliminary matters, see id., at 1-17, the "main busi-
ness," id., at 18 (J. Madison), opened on May 29 with Edmund Randolph's 
speech proposing the Virginia Plan. Almost all of the Plan's resolutions 
dealt with the appropriate structure for the new government. Only the 
sixth resolution dealt with legislative powers at all. And far from stress-
ing any power to regulate interstate commerce, it simply declared, in rele-
vant part, "that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy 
the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & more-
over to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, 
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
exercise of individual Legislation .... " I d., at 21. While this language 
was, no doubt, broad enough to include the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, there was certainly no emphasis on that particular power. 
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fare" recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free 
flow of trade among States (despite the fact that the same 
language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear 
that security "against foreign invasion [and] against dissen-
tions between members of the Union" was of at least equal 
importance. See Speech by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 
1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison). 3 
The power to achieve the purposes identified in the Pream-
ble was not delegated solely to Congress. If, however, one 
looks at the powers that were so delegated, the position of 
the Commerce Clause hardly suggests that it was the "cen-
tral" concern of the patriots who formed our Union. The 
enumeration of powers in Article I, § 8 begins with the 
"Power To lay and collect Taxes." 4 This is followed by the 
power "to pay the Debts" of the United States. Then, con-
sistent with the Preamble, comes the power to "provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare." See note 3, 
supra. The power to regulate interstate commence is only 
one among nearly a score of other powers that followed. It 
is evident that the authority to tax and to "provide for the 
common Defence" loomed larger among the concerns of the 
Founders than other powers granted Congress. The Com-
merce Clause was given no place of particular prominence. 
3 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the 
country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See 
The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to 
give Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war." Art. IX. 
• A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the central government's inability to collect taxes directly. See 1 
Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of A. Hamilton). Remedying this 
defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Constitutional 
Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954); The 
Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton). 
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So much for what the Constitution's language and structure 
teach about the Framers' intent. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a na-
tional government with delegated powers and state govern-
ments that retained a significant measure of sovereign au-
thority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the 
debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the 
early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been recommended by the Conven-
tion, much less ratified, if it had been understood that the 
Commerce Clause embodied the national government's "cen-
tral mission," a mission to be accomplished even at the ex-
pense of regulating the personnel practices of state and local 
governments. 5 
5JUSTICE STEVENS' citation of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1 
(1824) , in support of his position, see ante, at 5-6, n. 8, is essentially irrele-
vant, for Chief Justice Marshall was not concerned with a State's sovereign 
power. Gibbons carried passengers between New Jersey and New York 
on two steamboats licensed under an Act of Congress, while Ogden claimed 
the benefit of a New York law granting an exclusive right to navigate 
steamboats on New York waters. The power to grant such a monopoly 
clearly is not one of a State's traditional sovereign powers. On the con-
trary, it is part of the power to regulate interstate navigation that lies 
within the very core of the Commerce Clause. I certainly do not suggest 
that principles of federalism should prevent Congress from regulating navi-
gation. The present case, however, concerns the power to determine the 
terms and conditions of employment for the officers and employees who 
constitute a State's government. This is as sovereign a power as any that 
a State possesses, and it is far removed from the original concerns of the 
Commerce Clause. Indeed, this case illustrates how far the Federal Gov-
ernment, with the Court's approval, has departed from the principles upon 
which our federal union was formed. The "commerce" at issue, incredible 
as it would have seemed even a few years ago, let alone in Chief Justice 
Marshall's day, is the effect on trade among the States of Wyoming's re-
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A 
The Bill qf Rights imposes express limitations on national 
powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." This limitation was, of course, im-
plicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those 
who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute 
the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that 
it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain 
powers to the central government, and those not delegated 
were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 6 Fur-
thermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of the national government itself. Mem-
bers of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, § 4 re-
quires a republican form of government in each State. The 
initial ratification of the Constitution was accomplished on a 
state-by-state basis, and subsequent amendments require ap-
proval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
quirement that its game wardens retire at age 65 rather than 70. 
6 Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federal-
ist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment "declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment"); United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended 
to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as origi-
nally ratified .... "). 
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Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Con-
stitution," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negocia-
tion, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared 
this view. See, e. g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver 
Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), 
reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed 
Constitution) (The "powers [vested in Congress] extend only 
to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and 
are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their 
sovereignty in all other matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union 
to assert its rights as a State against the Federal Govern-
ment. In 1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the 
Kentucky Resolutions, 7 which were passed by the Kentucky 
' In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general govern-
ment; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for 
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general 
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right 
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legislature to protest the unpopular Ali~n and Sedition Acts, 
Act of June 18, 1798, c. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, 
c. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of 
July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison 
drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were adopted by 
the Virginia General Assembly. See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on 
the Federal Constitution 528--529 (2d ed. 1863). In both 
cases it was clear that the powers reserved to the States 
were treated as a substantive limitation on the authority of 
Congress. It was asserted that these powers enabled a 
State to interpose its will against any action by the National 
Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's 
views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification 
doctrine-the extreme view that eventually led to the War 
Between the States. 8 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 
1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South Carolina Ex-
position of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the National Government was not 
confined to the South. The New England States, for exam-
ple, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 
c. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in 
defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the 
support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of 
Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to en-
to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and 
of no force." Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
8 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that 
either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitution-
ally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history's bloodi-
est fratricides, ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great 
figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question 
whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would 
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States. See note 5, supra. 
... 
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force the embargo. 9 In Massachusetts the story was simi-
lar: The legislature denounced the enforcement Act as "un-
just, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding 
on the citizens of this state." Resolutions of the Massachu-
setts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, 
State Documents on Federal Relations 35 (1906). When 
Congress enacted the Embargo Act of Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 
Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature declared it "a mani-
fest . . . abuse of power" that infringed the "sovereignty re-
served to the States" 10 and justified the legislature in "inter-
pos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppression," 
Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 71-72. Even Daniel 
Webster, famous for his defense of the rights of the National 
Government, recognized that principles of federalism limit 
Congress's power. 11 
9 The Governor explained to a special session of the state legislature 
that "[ w ]henever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed 
bounds of their [sic] constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in 
great emergencies, devolves the arduous task-it is their right-it be-
comes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right 
and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Govern-
ment." Speech of Governor Jonathan Trumbull (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted 
in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations 40 (1906). The As-
sembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor's position 
and concluding that the embargo legislation was "incompatible with the 
constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites of 
[the] State." Resolutions of the General Assembly (Feb. 23, 1809), re-
printed in Ames, supra, at 41. In view of its duty to support the Con-
stitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the 
aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the Embargo." Ibid. 
10 The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was reserved, in 
part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal power. Resolutions of 
the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra 
n. 9, at 71. 
11 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the 
enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were en-
acted it would be "the solemn duty of the State Governments" to interpose 
their authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was "among the 
, . . 
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B 
It is clear beyond question that state sovereignty always 
has been a basic assumption of American political theory. 
Although its contours have changed over two centuries, state 
sovereignty remains a fundamental component of our system 
that this Court has recognized time and time again. Even to 
refer to the highlights would go far beyond the scope of this 
dissent. I therefore mention only a few of the decisions from 
last Term alone in which the Court expressly noted that 
States retain significant sovereign powers. 12 In Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), 
we considered the state action exemption from the antitrust 
laws. Since "'under the Constitution, the states are sover-
eign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract 
from their authority,'" id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341, 351 (1943)), we had previously recognized an 
antitrust exemption for States acting "in the exercise of 
objects for which the State Governments exist." Speech on the Conscrip-
tion Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of 
Daniel Webster 55, 68 (1903). 
'
2 See, e. g., Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U. S. I 
1, 8 (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, 
'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.'") (quoting Calera-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974)); Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 ' 
U. S. 694, 703, n. 10 (1982) (States are "'coequal sovereigns in a federal 
system'") (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 
286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128 (1982) (discussing "the 
States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters National As-
surance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty 
Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the structure of our Nation 
as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers"); Cabell v. 
Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State's "sover-
eign" police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 
454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those "of a different, though par-
amount sovereignty") (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 
(1932)). 
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[their] sovereign powers," id., at 48. We held that this ex-
emption does not extend to cities, but in so doing we repeat-
edly stressed the sovereign nature of States. See id., at 
48-54. In United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. 
Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), we unanimously upheld the appli-
cation of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. 
We reached this conclusion, however, only by finding that op-
eration of the railroad was not one of the State's "constitu-
tionally preserved sovereign function[s]." !d., at 683. And 
in Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 ' 
U. S. 742 (1982), we considered whether parts of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act "constituted an invasion of 
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., 
at 752. Although the Court upheld the statute, it was clear I 
that state sovereignty was an ·essential element to be consid-
ered in reaching that conclusion. See id., at 758-771. I 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of 
the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the 
States' reserved powers to be a limitation on Congress's 
power-including its power under the Commerce Clause. 
And the Court has recognized and accepted this fact for al-
most 200 years. 13 
IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion recognizes no limita-
tion on the ability of Congress to override state sovereignty 
in exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His 
opinion does not mention explicitly either federalism or state 
sovereignty. Instead it declares that "[t]he only basis for 
'
3 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. 
It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, how-
ever, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles 
of federalism. 
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questioning the federal statute at issue here is the pure judi-
cial fiat found in this Court's opinion in National League of 
Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). Under this 
view it is not easy to think of any state function-however 
sovereign-that could not be preempted. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STE-
VENS' revisionist view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the 
Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to 
the Constitution itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a 
subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court 
has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of 
the Framers . . . to confer a power on the national govern-
ment adequate to discharge its central mission." Ante, at 3 
(emphasis added). 1 JUSTICE STEVENS further states that 
"National League of Cities not only was incorrectly decided, 
but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Con-
stitution itself. ... " Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). 
'The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is an extra-
judicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 1-2. Jus-
tice Rutledge declared that the "proximate cause of our national existence" 
was not to assure the great "democratic freedoms"; rather it was "to secure 
freedom of trade" within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A Declaration 
of Legal Faith 25 (1947). 
g 
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No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's purposes. I sug-
gest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or 
greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled 
in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the issue in 
the state ratification conventions. No doubt there were dif-
ferences of opinion as to the principal shortcomings of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that 
few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers 
among the States were "the central problem," or that their 
elimination was the "central mission" of the Constitutional 
Convention. Creating a national government within a fed-
eral system was far more central than any eighteenth-cen-
tury concern for interstate commerce. 
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has construed 
the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommo-
date the changes that have occurred in our country since the 
Constitution was ratified. If JUSTICE STEVENS had written 
that the Founders' intent in adopting the Commerce Clause 
nearly two centuries ago is of little relevance to the world in 
which we live today, I would not have disagreed. But his 
concurring opinion purports to rely on their contemporary in-
tent. Ante at 3. I therefore write-briefly in view of the 
scope of the subject-to place the Commerce Clause in 
proper historical perspective, and further to suggest that 
even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE STEVENS appears to 
believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The Constitution's central purpose was, as the name im-
plies, to constitute a government. The most important pro-
visions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relat-
ing to the establishment of that government. The system of 
checks and balances, for example, is far more central to the 
larger perspective than any single power conferred on any 
branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from 
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which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the 
framework of government without even mentioning the 
power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the Fram-
ers stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble to the 
Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty. . . . " 
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common de-
fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare." Art. III. Although the "general Wel-
fare" recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free 
flow of trade among States (despite the fact that the same 
2 Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, it is clear that 
the focus of attention at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia was 
the formation of a new government. Madison's report of the proceedings 
begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the 
deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of Government." 1 
M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 
1937) (footnote omitted). After dealing with several preliminary matters, 
see id., at 1-17, the "main business," id., at 18 (J. Madison), opened on 
May 29 with Edmund Randolph's speech proposing the Virginia Plan. Al-
most all of the Plan's resolutions dealt with the appropriate structure for 
the new government. Only the sixth resolution dealt with legislative pow-
ers at all. And far from stressing any power to regulate interstate com-
merce, it simply declared, in relevant part, 
"that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legisla-
tive Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legis-
late in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual Legislation .... " 1 Farrand, supra, at 21. 
While this language was, no doubt, broad enough to include the power to 
regulate interstate commerce, there was certainly no emphasis on that par-
ticular power. 
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language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear 
that security "against foreign invasion [and] against dissen-
tions between members of the Union" was of at least equal 
importance. See Speech by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 
1787), reprinted in 1M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison). 3 
The power to achieve these purposes was not delegated 
solely to Congress. If, however, one looks at the powers 
that were so delegated, the position of the Commerce Clause 
hardly suggests that it was "central" among the concerns of 
the patriots who formed our union. The enumeration of 
powers in Article I, section 8 begins with the "Power To lay 
and collect Taxes." 4 This is followed by the power "to pay 
the Debts" of the United States. Then, consistent with the 
Preamble, comes the power to "provide for the common De-
fence and general Welfare." See note 3, supra. The per-
ceived need for a national legislature with the power to tax, 
and to maintain an army and navy for the common defense, 
loomed far larger in the Founders' thinking than the need to 
eliminate trade barriers. Among the remaining enumerated 
powers, the power to regulate interstate commerce is only 
one among roughly a score. It is given no place of particular 
prominence. So much for what the Constitution's language 
and structure teaches about the Framers' intent. 
3 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the 
country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See 
The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 (J. Cooke eel. 1961) (J. Madison). 
Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to 
give Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war." Art. IX. All of the evidence indicates that this most 
basic purpose of government was far more important to the Founders than 
the regualation of interstate commerce. 
'A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the central government's inability to collect taxes directly. See 1 
Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton). Remedy-
ing this defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Con-
stitutional Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 
(1954); The Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton). 
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III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a na-
tional government with delegated powers and state govern-
ments that retained a significant measure of sovereign au-
thority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the 
debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the 
early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been adopted, much less ratified, if 
it had been understood that the Commerce Clause embodied 
the national government's "central mission," a mission to be 
accomplished even at the expense of regulating the personnel 
practices of state and local governments. 
A 
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on national 
powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." This limitation was, of course, im-
plicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those 
who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute 
the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that 
it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain 
powers to the central government, and those not delegated 
were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 5 Fur-
• Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federal-
ist No. 84, pp. 578--579 (J. Cooke eel. 1961). See also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment "declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment"); United States v. 
Spmgue, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended 
to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
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thermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of the national government itself. Mem-
bers of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, sec-
tion 4 requires a republican form of government in each 
State. The initial ratification of the Constitution was accom-
plished on a state-by-state basis, and subsequent amend-
ments require approval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Con-
stitution," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negociation, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all the ob-
jects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern 
the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the 
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State." The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 
1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared 
this view. See, e. g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver 
Elsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), re-
printed in 3 Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed 
Constitution) (The "powers [vested in Congress] extend only 
to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and 
nally ratified. . . . "). 
• ,·"'<~~ . 
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are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their 
sovereignty in all other matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union 
to assert its rights as a State against the federal government. 
In 1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky 
Resolutions, 6 which were passed by the Kentucky legislature 
to protest the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, Act of June 
18, 1798, c. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, c. 58, 1 Stat. 
570; Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of July 14, 
1798, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison drafted 
similar Virginia Resolutions, which were adopted by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly. See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the 
Federal Constitution 52&-529 (2d ed. 1863). In both cases it 
was clear that the powers reserved to the States were 
treated as a substantive limitation on Congress's authority. 
It was asserted that these powers enabled a State to inter-
pose its will against any action by the Federal Government. 
Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's views were ex-
panded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification doctrine-the 
extreme view that eventually led to the War Between the 
States. 7 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 1-57 (R. 
6 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general govern-
ment; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for 
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general 
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right 
to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and 
of no force." Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d eel. 1863). 
7 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that 
either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitution-
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Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South Carolina Exposition 
of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the Federal Government was l:taFdly 
confined to the South. The New England States, for exam-
ple, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 
c. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in 
defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the 
support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of 
Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to en-
force the embargo. 8 In Massachusetts the story was simi-
lar: The legislature denounced the enforcement Act as "un-
just, oppressive, and unconstitutional, and not legally 
binding on the citizens of this state." Resolution of the 
Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. 
ally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history's bloodi-
est fratricides, ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great 
figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question 
whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would 
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States. ~ 
• The Governor explained to a special session of the state legislature 
that 
"[ w ]henever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed 
bounds of their [sic] constitutional powers, on the state legislatures, in 
great emergencies, devolve the arduous task-it is their right-it becomes 
their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right and lib-
erty of the people, and the assumed power of the general government." 
Message of Governor Trumbull (Feb. 25, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, 
State Documents on Federal Relations, 1789--1861, at pp. 3~0 (1907). 
The Assembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor's posi-
tion and concluding that the embargo legislation was "incompatible with 
the constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites 
of [the] State." Resolution of the Connecticut General Assembly (Special 
Session Feb. 1809), reprinted in Ames, supra, at--. In view of its duty 
to support the Constitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in 
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Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, 1789-1861, at 
p. 27 (1907). When Congress enacted the Embargo Act of 
Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature 
declared it "a manifest . . . abuse of power" that infringed the 
"sovereignty reserved to the States" 9 and justified the legis-
lature in "interpos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from 
"oppression," Resolution of the Massachusetts Legislature 
(Feb. 4, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 72. Even Dan-
iel Webster, famous for his defense of the national govern-
ment's powers, recognized that principles of federalism limit 
Congress's power. 10 
B 
Few perceptions of history are clearer than the fact that 
state sovereignty has always been a basic assumption of 
American political theory. Although its contours have 
changed over two centuries, state sovereignty remains a fun-
damental component of our system that this Court has recog-
nized time and time again. Even to refer to the highlights 
would go far beyond the scope of this dissent. I therefore 
mention only a few of the decisions from last Term alone in 
which the Court expressly noted that States retain signifi-
cant sovereign powers. 11 In Community Communications 
9 The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was reserved, in 
part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal power. Resolution of 
the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 4, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra n. 
8, at 72. 
10 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the en-
listment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were enacted 
it would be "the solemn duty of the State Governments" to interpose their 
authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was "among the ob-
jects for which the State Governments exist." Speech on the Conscription 
Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Daniel 
Webster 55, 68 (1903). 
11 See also Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autonomous political en-
tity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.'") (quoting 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), we considered the 
state action exemption from the antitrust laws. Since 
"'under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only 
as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their author-
ity,"' id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351 
(1943)), we had previously recognized an antitrust exemption 
for States acting "in the exercise of [their] sovereign pow-
ers," id., at 48. We held that this exemption does not ex-
tend to cities, but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the sov-
ereign nature of States. See id., at 48-54. In United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 
(1982), we unanimously upheld the application of the Railway 
Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. We reached this con-
clusion, however, only by finding that operation of the rail-
road was not one of the State's "constitutionally preserved 
sovereign function[s]." !d., at 683. And in Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, -- U. S. -- (1982), 
we considered whether parts of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act "constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., at --. Although 
the Court upheld the statute, it was clear that state sover-
eignty was an essential element to be considered in reaching 
that conclusion. See id., at -----. 
Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 673 (1974)); 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 
- U. S. -, -, n. 10 (1982) (States are "'coequal sovereigns in a fed-
eral system"') (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac,- U. S. -,- (1982) (dis-
cussing "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. 
Guaranty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the structure of 
our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers"); 
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State's 
"sovereign" police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. 
McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those "of a different, 
though paramount sovereignty") (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 
521, 525 (1932)). 
•' 
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EEOC v. WYOMING 11 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of 
the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the 
States' reserved powers to be a limitation on Congress's 
power-including its power under the Commerce Clause. 
And the Court has recognized and accepted this fact for al-
most two hundred years. 12 
IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion recognizes no limita-
tion on Congress's ability to override state sovereignty in ex-
ercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His opin-
ion does not mention either federalism or state sovereignty. 
Instead it declares that "[t]he only basis for questioning the 
federal statute at issue here is the pure judicial fiat found in 
this Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery." 
Ante, at 4 (emphasis added). Under this view it is not easy~ J 
1 
1 
to think of any state fu~that could not be preemp-ted. :...::../ 
~-~~--
'
2 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. 
It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, how-
ever, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles 
of federalism. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, but write 
separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STEVENS's 
revisionist view of our country's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the Framers' 
response to the central problem that gave rise to the Constitu-
tion itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a subsequent 
point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court has construed 
the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers ... to 
co~fer a power on the national government adequate to discharge 
its central miss ion." Ante, at 3 (emphasis added) . 1 JUSTICE 
STEVENS further states that "National League of Cities not only 
was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the cen-
tral purpose of the Constitution itself .... " Ante, at 5 (empha-
sis added). 
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's central purposes. I 
suggest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or 
1The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is 
an extrajudicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. 
Ante, at 1-2. Justice Rutledge declared that the "proximate 
cause of our national existence" was not to assure the great 
"democratic freedoms": rather it was "to secure freedom of trade" 
within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal 
Faith 25 (1947). 
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greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled in 
Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the issue in the state 
ratification conventions. No doubt there were differences of 
opinion as to the primacy of the various purposes. But one can 
be reasonably sure that few of the Founding Fathers thought that 
trade barriers were "the central problem," or that their elimina-
tion was the "central mission" of the Constitutional Convention. 
Creating a national government within a federal system was far 
more central than any eighteenth-century concern for interstate 
commerce. 
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has con-
strued the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommo-
date the changes that have occurred in our country since the Con-
stitution was ratified. If JUSTICE STEVENS had written that the 
Founders' intent in adopting the Commerce Clause nearly two cen-
turies ago is of little relevance to the world in which we live 
today, I would not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion 
purports to rely on their contemporary intent. Ante at 3. I 
therefore write--briefly in view of the scope of the subject--to 
place the Commerce Clause in proper historical perspective, and 
further to suggest that even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE 
STEVENS appears to believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The central purpose of the Constitution was, as the name 
implies, to constitute a government. The most important provi-
sions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relating 
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to the establishment of the government. The system of checks and 
balances, for example, is far more central to the larger perspec-
tive than any single power conferred on any branch. Indeed, the 
Virginia Plan, the initial proposal on which the entire Conven-
tion was based, focuses on the framework of government without 
even mentioning the power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the Fram-
ers stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble to the Con-
stitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, in-
sure domestic Tr anqui 1 i ty, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty .•.. " 
2whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, it is 
clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutional Conven-
tion in Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Mad-
ison's report of the proceedings begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 
was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention 
for revising the federal system of Government." 1 M. Farrand, 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 
1937). After dealing with several preliminary matters, see id., 
at 1-17, the "main business," id., at 18 (J. Madison), opened on 
May 29 with Edmund Randolph's speech proposing the Virginia Plan. 
Almost all of the Plan's resolutions dealt with the appropriate 
structure for the new government. Only the sixth resolution 
dealt with legislative powers at all. And far from stressing any 
power to regulate interstate commerce, it simply declared, in 
relevant part, 
"that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to 
enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to 
which the separate States are incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by 
the exercise of individual Legislation " 1 
Farrand, supra, at 21. 
While this language was, no doubt, broad enough to include the 
power to regulate interstate commerce, there was certainly no 
emphasis on that particular power. 
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These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common defence, 
the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general 
welfare." Article III. Although the "general Welfare" recog-
nized by the Constitution could embrace the free flow of trade 
among States (despite the fact that the same language in the Ar-
ticles of Confederation did not) , it is clear that security 
"against foreign invasion [and] against dissentions betweeen mem-
bers of the Union" was of at least equal importance. See Speech 
by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) 
(J. Madison) . 3 
The power to achieve these purposes was not delegated 
solely to Congress. If, however, one looks at the powers that 
were so delegated, the position of the Commerce Clause hardly 
suggests that it was "central" among the concerns of the patriots 
who formed our union. The enumeration of powers in Article I, 
section 8 begins with the "Power To lay and collect Taxes. " 4 
3No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to 
defend the country was essential, and must be given to the cen-
tral government. See The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Even under the Articles of Confed-
eration, it was considered necessary to give Congress "the sole 
and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war." 
Art. IX. All of the evidence indicates that this most basic pur-
pose of government was far more important to the Founders than 
the regualation of interstate commerce. 
4A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of 
Confederation was the central government's inability to collect 
taxes directly. See 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 284 (remarks of 
Alexander Hamilton). Remedying this defect was thus one of the 
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This is followed by the power "to pay the Debts" of the United 
States. Then, consistent with the Preamble, comes the power to 
"provide for the common Defence and general Welfare." See note 
3, supra. The perceived need for a government with the power to 
tax, and to maintain an army and navy for the common defense, 
loomed far larger in the Founders' thinking than the need to 
eliminate trade barriers. Among the remaining enumerated powers, 
the power to regulate interstate commerce is only one among 
roughly a score. It is given no place of particular prominence. 
So much for what the Constitution's language and structure teach-
es about the Framers' intent. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, composed of the central 
government and States that retained a significant measure of sov-
ereign authority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, 
from the debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from 
the early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been adopted, much less ratified, if it 
had been understood that the Commerce Clause embodied the nation-
principal purposes of the Constitutional Convention. See R. 
Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954). The importance 
of the taxing power in the minds of the Founding Fathers is obvi-
ous from the Convention and the ratification debates. See, e.g., 
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al government's "central mission," a mission to be accomplished 
even at the expense of regulating the personnel practices of 
state and local governments. 
A 
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on na-
tional powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people." This limitation was, of course, implicit in the 
Constitution as originally ratified. Even those who opposed the 
adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute the propriety of 
such a limitation. Rather, they argued that it was unnecessary, 
for the Constitution delegated certain powers to the central gov-
ernment, and those not delegated were necessarily retained by the 
States or the people. 5 Furthermore, the inherent federal nature 
of the system is clear from the structure of government itself. 
Members of Congress and presidential electors are chosen by 
5Alexander Hamil ton, for example, made this argument in The 
Federalist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also 
United States v. Darby, 312 u.s. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment 
"declaratory of the relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before 
the amendment"); United States v. Sprague, 282 u.s. 716, 733 
(1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the under-
standing of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, 
that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the 
States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as 
originally ratified .... "). 
' 
' 
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States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by States, 
regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit Clause gives 
particular recognition to the States' "public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings." Article IV, section 4 requires a republi-
can form of government in each State. The initial ratification 
of the Constitution was accomplished on a state-by-state basis, 
and subsequent amendments require approval by three fourths of 
the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a federal 
system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Constitution," ex-
plained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are numer-
ous and indefinite. The former will be exercised prin-
cipally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negociation, and foreign commerce .... The powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the 
objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, con-
cern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of 
the State." The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke 
ea. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared this 
view. See, e.g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver Elsworth to 
the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), reprinted in 3 
Farrand, supra, at 99 (description of proposed Constitution) (The 
"powers [vested in Congress] extend only to matters respecting 
the common interests of the union, and are specially defined, so 
that the particular states retain their sovereignty in all other 
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During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the union to 
assert its rights as a State against the federal government. In 
1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolu-
tions,6 which were passed by the Kentucky legislature to protest 
the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, Act of June 18, 1798, c. 
54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, c. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of 
July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 
Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison drafted similar Virginia 
Resolutions, which were adopted by the Virginia General Assembly. 
See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 528-529 {2d 
ed~ 1863). In both cases it was clear that the powers reserved 
to the States were treated as a substantive limitation on Con-
gress' s authority. It was asserted that these powers enabled a 
State to interpose its will against ~ action by the Federal 
Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson's and Madison's views 
6 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States 
of America are not united on the principle of unlimited 
submission to their general government; but that, by 
compact, under the style and title of a Constitution 
for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they 
constituted a general government for special purposes, 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, 
reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of 
right to their own self-government; and that whensoever 
the general government assumes undelegated powers, its 
acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force." Ken-
tucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, 
Debates on the Federal Constitution 540 {2d ed. 1863). 
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were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification doctrine--
the extreme view that eventually led to the War Between the 
States. 7 See 6 The Works of John c. Calhoun 1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 
1859) (original draft of South Carolina Exposition of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the Federal Government was hardly con-
fined to the South. The New England States, for example, vehe-
mently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, c. 5, 2 Stat. 
451, and they turned to their rights as States in defense. In 
1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the support of the legis-
lature, refused to comply with the Act of Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 
Stat. 506, which Congress passed to enforce the embargo. 8 In 
7 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not 
suggest that either the doctrine of interposition or that of nul-
lification was constitutionally sound. In any event, they were 
laid to rest in one of history's bloodiest fratricides, ending at 
Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great figures in our his-
tory are, however, directly pertinent to the question whether 
there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would em-
power the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sov-
ereign powers reserved to the States. 
8The Governor explained to a special session of the state 
legislature that 
"[w)henever our national legislature is led to overleap 
the prescribed bounds of their [sic] constitutional 
powers, on the state legislatures ;-Tn great emergen-
cies, devolve the arduous task--it is their right--it 
becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting 
shield between the right and liberty of the people, and 
the assumed power of the general government." Message 
of Governor Trumbull (???), reprinted in H. Ames, State 
Documents on Federal Relations, 1789-1861, at pp. 39-40 
(1907). 
The Assembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the 
Governor's position, and concluding that the embargo legislation 
Footnote continued on next page. 
• . 
. . .. 
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Massachusetts the story was similar. The Massachusetts legisla-
ture denounced the enforcement Act as "unjust, oppressive, and 
unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of this 
state." Resolution of the Massachusetts Legislature (???), re-
printed in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, 1789-
1861, at p. 27 (1907). When Congress enacted the Embargo Act of 
Dec. 17, 1813, c. 1, 3 Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature 
declared it "a manifest abuse of power" that infringed the 
"sovereignty reserved to the States" 9 and justified the legisla-
ture in "interpos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from 
"oppression," Resolution of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 
4, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 72. Even Daniel Webster, 
famous for his defense of the national government's powers, rec-
ognized that principles of federalism limit Congress's power. 10 
was "incompatible with the constitution of the United States, and 
encroach [ed] upon the immunites of [the] State." Resolution of 
the Connecticut General Assembly (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted in 
Ames, supra, at ___ . In view of its duty to support the Consti-
tution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur in giving 
effect to the aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce 
the Embargo." Ibid. 
9The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was 
reserved, in part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal 
power. Resolution of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 4, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra note 8, at 72. 
10During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a 
bill for the enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these 
measures were enacted it would be "the solemn duty of the State 
Governments" to interpose their authority to prevent enforcement. 
In his view, this was "among the objects for which the State Gov-
ernments exist." Speech on the Conscription Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), 
reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster 55, 
68 (1903). 
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B 
Few perceptions of history are clearer than the fact 
that state sovereignty was a basic assumption of American politi-
cal theory. Although its contours changed with conditions, state 
sovereignty remains a fundamental component of our system that 
this Court has recognized time and time again. Even to refer to 
the highlights would go far beyond the scope of this dissent. I 
therefore mention only a few of the decisions from last Term 
alone in which the Court expressly noted that States retain sig-
nificant sovereign powers. 11 In Community Communications Co. v. 
City of Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 (1982), we considered the state ac-
tion exemption from the antitrust laws. Since "'under the Con-
sti tution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may 
constitutionally subtract from their authority,'" id., at 49 
(quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)), there is an 
11see also Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, __ 
U.S. , (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autono-
mous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the 
Constitution.'") (quoting Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974)): Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, ----r u.s. __ , __ n. 10 
(1982) (States are "'coequal sovereigns 1n a federal system"') 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
292 (1980)): Engle v. Isaac, __ U.S. __ , __ (1982) (discussing 
"the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"): Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health 
Ins . Guaranty Assn • , 4 5 5 U. S . 6 91 , 7 0 4 ( 19 8 2 ) ( r e cog n i z in g " the 
structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing 
equal sovereign powers"): Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 
444-447 (1982) (relying on State's "sovereign" police powers): 
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 u.s. 100, 108 
(1981) (state courts are those "of a different, though paramount 
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antitrust exemption for States acting "in the exercise of [their] 
sovereign powers," id., at 48. We held that this exemption does 
not extend to cities, but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the 
sovereign nature of States. See id., at 48-54. In United Trans-
portation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), we 
unanimously upheld the application of the Railway Labor Act to a 
state-owned railroad. We reached this conclusion, however, only 
by finding that operation of the railroad was not one of the 
State's "constitutionally preserved sovereign function[s] ." Id., 
at 683. And in Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 
U.S. (1982), we considered whether parts of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act "constituted an invasion of state 
sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., at 
Although the Court upheld the statute, it was clear that state 
sovereignty was an essential element to be considered in reaching 
that conclusion. See id., at . ----
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance 
of the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the earliest 
phases of constitutional development, understood the States' re-
served powers to be a limitation on Congress's power--including 
its power under the Commerce Clause. And the Court has recog-
nized and accepted this fact for almost two hundred vears.12 
12of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce 
Clause. It is essential to the functioning of our National Gov-
ernment. It is, however, only one provision of a Constitution 
that embodies strong principles of federalism. 
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IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion recognizes no limi-
tation on Congress's ability to override state sovereignty in 
exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His opinion 
does not mention either federalism or state sovereignty. Instead 
it declares that "[t] he only basis for questioning the federal 
statute at issue here is the pure judicial fiat found in this 
Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 
4 (emphasis added) • Under this view it is not easy to think of 
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sep~tately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STEVENS's 
revisionist view of our Nation's history. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS begins his concurring opinion with the 
startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the Framers' 
response to the central problem that gave rise to the Constitu-
tion itself." Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a subsequent 
point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court h as construed 
the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers •.. to 
confer a power on the national government adequate to discharge 
its central mission." Ante, at 3 (emphasis added) . 1 JUSTICE 
STEVENS further states that "National League of Cities not only 
was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the cen-
tral purpose of the Constitution itself •..• " Ante, at 5 (empha-
sis added). 
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between 
the States was one of the Constitution's purposes. I suggest, 
however, that there were other purposes of equal or greater im-
lThe authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is 
an extrajudicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 194~. 
Ante, at 1-2. Justice Rutledge declared that the "proximate 
cause of our national existence" was not to assure the great 
"democratic freedoms"; rather it was "to secure freedom of trade" 
within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal 
Faith 25 (1947). 
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portance motivating the statesmen who assembled in Philadelphia 
and the delegates who debated the issue in the state ratification 
conventions. No doubt there were differences of opinion as to 
the principal shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation. But 
one can be reasonably sure that few of the Founding Fathers 
thought that trade barriers among the States were "the central 
problem," or that their elimination was the "central mission" of 
the Constitutional Convention. Creating a national government 
within a federal system was far more central than any eighteenth-
century concern for interstate commerce. 
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has con-
strued the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommo-
date the changes that have occurred in our country since the Con-
stitution was ratified. If JUSTICE STEVENS had written that the 
Founders' intent in adopting the Commerce Clause nearly two cen-
turies ago is of little relevance to the world in which we live 
today, I would not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion 
purports to rely on their contemporary intent. Ante at 3. I 
therefore write--briefly in view of the scope of the subject--to 
place the Commerce Clause in proper historical perspective, and 
further to suggest that even today federalism is not, as JUSTICE 
STEVENS appears to believe, utterly subservient to that Clause. 
II 
The Constitution's central purpose was, as the name im-
plies, to constitute a government. The most important provi-
sions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relating 
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to the establishment of that government. The system of checks 
and balances, for example, is far more central to the larger per-
spective than any single power conferred on any branch. Indeed, 
the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from which the entire 
Convention began its work, focuses on the framework of government 
without even mentioning the power to regulate commerce. 2 
Apart from the framework of government itself, the Fram-
ers stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble to the Con-
stitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, in-
sure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty .... " 
2whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, it is 
clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutional Conven-
tion in Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Mad-
ison's report of the proceedings begins, "Monday May 14th 1787 
was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention 
for revising the federal system of Government." 1 M. Farrand, 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 
1937} (footnote omitted}. After dealing with several preliminary 
matters, see id., at 1-17, the "main business," id., at 18 (J. 
Madison}, opened on May 29 with Edmund Randolph's speech propos-
ing the Virginia Plan. Almost all of the Plan's resolutions 
dealt with the appropriate structure for the new government. 
Only the sixth resolution dealt with legislative powers at all. 
And far from stressing any power to regulate interstate commerce, 
it simply declared, in relevant part, 
"that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to 
enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to 
which the separate States are incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by 
the exercise of individual Legislation " 1 
Farrand, supra, at 21. 
While this language was, no doubt, broad enough to include the 
power to regulate interstate commerce, there was certainly no 
emphasis on that particular power. 
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These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the 
States in the Articles of Confederation: "their common defence, 
the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general 
welfare." Art. III. Although the "general Welfare" recognized 
by the Constitution could embrace the free flow of trade among 
States (despite the fact that the same language in the Articles 
of Confederation did not) , it is clear that security "against 
foreign invasion [and] against dissentions between members of the 
Union" was of at least equal importance. See Speech by Edmund 
Randolph (May 29, 1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The Records 
of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Mad-
ison) • 3 
The power to achieve these purposes was not delegated 
solely to Congress. If, however, one looks at the powers that 
were so delegated, the posit ion of the Commerce Clause hardly 
suggests that it was "central" among the concerns of the patriots 
who formed our union. The enumeration of powers in Article I, 
section 8 begins with the "Power To lay and collect Taxes. " 4 
3No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to 
defend the country was essential, and must be given to the cen-
tral government. See The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Even under the Articles of Confed-
eration, it was considered necessary to give Congress "the sole 
and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war." 
Art. IX. All of the evidence indicates that this most basic pur-
pose of government was far more important to the Founders than 
the regualation of interstate commerce. 
4A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of 
Confederation was the central government's inability to collect 
taxes directly. See 1 Far rand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of 
Alexander Hamilton). Remedying this defect was thus one of the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
chambers draft: EEOC v. Wyoming, No. 81-554 page 5. 
This is followed by the power "to pay the Debts" of the United 
States. Then, consistent with the Preamble, comes the power to 
"provide for the common Defence and general Welfare." See note 
3, supra. The perceived need for a national legislature with the 
power to tax, and to maintain an army and navy for the common 
defense, loomed far larger in the Founders' thinking than the 
need to eliminate trade barriers. Among the remaining enumerated 
powers, the power to regulate interstate commerce is only one 
among roughly a score. It is given no place of particular promi-
nence. So much for what the Constitution's language and struc-
ture teaches about the Framers' intent. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a national 
government with delegated powers and state governments that re-
tained a significant measure of sovereign authority. This is 
clear from the Constitution itself, from the debates surrounding 
its adoption and ratification, from the early history of our con-
stitutional development, and from the decisions of this Court. 
It is impossible to believe that the Constitution would have been 
adopted, much less ratified, if it had been understood that the 
Commerce Clause embodied the national government's "central mis-
most important purposes of the Constitutional Convention. See R. 
Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954): The Federalist 
No. 30 (A. Hamilton) . 
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sion," a mission to be accomplished even at the expense of regu-
lating the personnel practices of state and local governments. 
A 
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on na-
tiona! powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly 
recognizes the retained power of the States: "The powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people." This limitation was, of course, implicit in the 
Constitution as originally ratified. Even those who opposed the 
adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute the propriety of 
such a limitation. Rather, they argued that it was unnecessary, 
for the Constitution delegated certain powers to the central gov-
ernment, and those not delegated were necessarily retained by the 
States or the people. 5 Furthermore, the inherent federal nature 
of the system is clear from the structure of the national govern-
ment itself. Members of Congress and presidential electors are 
chosen by States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by 
5Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The 
Federalist No. 84, pp. 578-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also 
United States v. Darby, 312 u.s. 100, 124 (1941) {Tenth Amendment 
"declaratory of the relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before 
the amendment"); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 
(1931) {"The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the under-
standing of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, 
that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the 
States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as 
originally ratified ...• ") • 
.. -· 
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States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause gives particular recognition to the States' "public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings." Article IV, section 4 re-
quires a republican form of government in each State. The ini-
tial ratification of the Constitution was accomplished on a 
state-by-state basis, and subsequent amendments require approval 
by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the 
Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a federal 
system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Constitution," ex-
plained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are numer-
ous and indefinite. The former will be exercised prin-
cipally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negociation, and foreign commerce ...• The powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the 
objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, con-
cern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of 
the State." The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 {J. Cooke 
ed. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that Madison's contemporaries shared this 
view. See, e.g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver Elsworth to 
the Governor of Connecticut {Sept. 26, 1787), reprinted in 3 
Farrand, supra, at 99 {description of proposed Constitution) {The 
"powers [vested in Congress] extend only to matters respecting 
the common interests of the union, and are specially defined, so 
that the particular states retain their sovereignty in all other 
matters."). 
. . 
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During the earliest years of our constitutional develop-
ment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union to 
assert its rights as a State against the federal government. In 
1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolu-
tions,6 which were passed by the Kentucky legislature to protest 
the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, Act of June 18, 1798, c. 
54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, c. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of 
July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 
Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison drafted similar Virginia 
Resolutions, which were adopted by the Virginia General Assembly. 
See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 528-529 (2d 
ed. 1863). In both cases it was clear that the powers reserved 
to the States were treated as a substantive limitation on Con-
gress's authority. It was asserted that these powers enabled a 
State to interpose its will against ~ action by the Federal 
Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's views 
6 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
. ' 
"[t]hat the several states composing the United States 
of America are not united on the principle of unlimited 
submission to their general government; but that, by 
compact, under the style and title of a Constitution 
for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they 
constituted a general government for special purposes, 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, 
reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of 
right to their own self-government; and that whensoever 
the general government assumes undelegated powers, its 
acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force." Ken-
tucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, 
Debates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
. . .• 
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were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification doctrine--
the extreme view that eventually led to the War Between the 
States. 7 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 
1859) (original draft of South Carolina Exposition of 1828). 
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited 
the delegated powers of the Federal Government was hardly con-
fined to the South. The New England States, for example, vehe-
mently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, c. 5, 2 Stat. 
4 51, and they turned to their rights as States in defense. In 
1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the support of the legis-
lature, refused to comply with the Act of Jan. 9, 1809, c. 5, 2 
Stat. 506, which Congress passed to enforce the embargo. 8 In 
7 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not 
suggest that either the doctrine of interposition or that of nul-
lification was constitutionally sound. In any event, they were 
laid to rest in one of history's bloodiest fratricides, ending at 
Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great figures in our his-
tory are, however, directly pertinent to the question whether 
there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would em-
power the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sov-
ereign powers reserved to the States. 
8The Governor explained to a special session of the state 
legislature that 
"[w]henever our national legislature is led to overleap 
the prescribed bounds of their [sic] constitutional 
powers, on the state legislatures;-Tn great emergen-
cies, devolve the arduous task--it is their right--it 
becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting 
shield between the right and liberty of the people, and 
the assumed power of the general government." Message 
of Governor Trumbull (Feb. 25, 1809), reprinted in H. 
Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, 1789-1861, 
at pp. 39-40 (1907). 
The Assembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the 
Governor's position and concluding that the embargo legislation 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Massachusetts the story was similar: The legislature denounced 
the enforcement Act as "unjust, oppressive, and unconstitutional, 
and not legally binding on the citizens of this state." Resolu-
tion of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted 
in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, 1789-1861, at 
p. 27 (1907). When Congress enacted the Embargo Act of Dec. 17, 
1813, c. 1, 3 Stat. 88, the Massachusetts legislature declared it 
"a manifest .•. abuse of power" that infringed the "sovereignty 
reserved to the States"9 and justified the legislature in 
"interpos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppres-
sion," Resolution of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 4, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 72. Even Daniel Webster, 
famous for his defense of the national government's powers, rec-
ognized that principles of federalism limit Congress's power. 1 0 
was "incompatible with the constitution of the United States, and 
encroach[ed] upon the immunites of [the] State." Resolution of 
the Connecticut General Assembly (Special Session Feb. 1809), 
reprinted in Ames, supra, at ___ • In view of its duty to support 
the Constitution, the legislature declined "to assist, or concur 
in giving effect to the aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, 
to enforce the Embargo." Ibid. 
9The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was 
reserved, in part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal 
power. Resolution of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 4, 
1814), reprinted in Ames, supra n. 8, at 72. 
10Dur ing a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a 
bill for the enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these 
measures were enacted it would be "the solemn duty of the State 
Governments" to interpose their authority to prevent enforcement. 
In his view, this was "among the objects for which the State Gov-
ernments exist." Speech on the Conscription Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), 
reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster 55, 
68 (1903) 0 
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B 
Few perceptions of history are clearer than the fact 
that state sovereignty has always been a basic assumption of 
American political theory. Although its contours have changed 
over two centuries, state sovereignty remains a fundamental com-
ponent of our system that this Court has recognized time and time 
again. Even to refer to the highlights would go far beyond the 
scope of this dissent. I therefore mention only a few of the 
decisions from last Term alone in which the Court expressly noted 
that States retain significant sovereign powers.ll In Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 (1982}, we 
considered the state action exemption from the antitrust laws. 
Since "'under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save 
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their author-
ity, '" id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341, 351 
11see also Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, __ 
u.s. , (1982} ("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autono-
mous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the 
Constitution.'"} (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974}}: Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, u.s. , n. 10 
(1982} (States are "'coequal sovereign'Sln a federal system'"} 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 u.s. 286, 
292 (1980}}: Engle v. Isaac, __ u.s. __ , __ (1982} (discussing 
"the States' sovereign power to punish offenders"}: Underwriters 
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health 
Ins. Guaranty Assn., 455 u.s. 691, 704 (1982} (recognizing "the 
structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing 
equal sovereign powers"}: Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 u.s. 432, 
444-447 (1982} (relying on State's "sovereign" police powers}: 
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 108 
(1981} (state courts are those "of a different, though paramount 
sovereignty"} (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 
(1932}} • 
... 
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(1943)), we had previously recognized an antitrust exemption for 
States acting "in the exercise of [their] sovereign powers," id., 
at 48. We held that this exemption does not extend to cities, 
but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the sovereign nature of 
States. See id., at 48-54. In United Transportation Union v. 
Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), we unanimously upheld 
the application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned rail-
road. We reached this conclusion, however, only by finding that 
operation of the railroad was not one of the State's "constitu-
tionally preserved sovereign function[s] ." Id., at 683. And in 
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, u.s. 
(1982), we considered whether parts of the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act "constituted an invasion of state sovereignty 
in violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., at Although the 
Court upheld the statute, it was clear that state sovereignty was 
an essential element to be considered in reaching that conclu-
sion. See id., at ___ _ 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance 
of the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. 
The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the earliest 
phases of constitutional development, understood the States' re-
served powers to be a limitation on Congress's power--including 
its power under the Commerce Clause. And the Court has recog-
nized and accepted this fact for almost two hundred years. 12 
12of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce 
Clause. It is essential to the functioning of our National Gov-
Footnote continued on next page. 
" I 
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IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion recognizes no limi-
tat ion on Congress's ability to override state sovereignty in 
exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His opinion 
does not mention either federalism or state sovereignty. Instead 
it declares that "[t] he only basis for questioning the federal 
statute at issue here is the pure judicial fiat found in this 
Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 
4 (emphasis added}. Under this view it is not easy to think of 
any state function that could not be preempted. 
ernment. It is, however, only one provision of a Constitution 
that embodies strong principles of federalism . 
... 
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13Th is case illustrates how far the Federal Government, with 
the Court's approval, has departed from the principles upon which 
our federal union was formed. The authority relied upon today is 
a provision of the Constitution giving Congress the power to 
"regulate Commerce ... among the several States .... " The per-
ceived "Commerce," incredible as it would have seemed even a few 
years ago, is the effect on trade among the States of Wyoming's 
requirement that its game wardens retire at age 65 rather than 
70. 
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I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, -b1:2t-r-
write separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STE-
-p-
VENS's revisionist view of the history of our country~ JUS TICE 
STEVENS commences his concurring opinion with the startling ob-
servation that the Commerce Clause "was the Framers' response to 
the central problem that gave rise to the Constitution itself." 
Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). At a subsequent point in his opin-
ion, he observes that "this Court has construed the Commerce 
Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers ... to confer a power 
on the national government adequate to discharge its central mis-
sion." Ante, at 3 (emphasis added) .1 JUSTICE STEVENS further 
states that "National League of Cities not only was incorrectly 
decided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the 
Constitution itself .... " Ante, at 5 (emphasis added). 
J'ttS'f'rCE--SXli:lJii!NS-aAd I l'fttl!le ha"te read different history -c;r-
~- - Althoagh No one would deny that removing barriers to the 
free flow of trade was one of the purposes of the Constitution. 9 
l~' --
suggest that there were a number of other purposes of equal or 
1\ 
1The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is 
an extrajudicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. 
Ante, at 1-2. Justice Rutledge declared that the "proximate 
cause of our national existence" was not to assure the great 
"democratic freedoms"; rather it was "to secure freedom of trade" 
within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal 
Faith 25 (1947). 
. .. 
' •.· 
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doubt there were differences of opinion of the 
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Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers were "the 
problem," or that their eliminati~~~ "central missio 
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and to suggest that even today federalism is not 
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so utterly subservient to that Clause as JUSTICE STEVENS appears 
to believe. 
II 
The central purpose of the Constitution was, as the 
name implies, to constitute a government. The central provi-
sions, therefore, are those relating to the establishment of the 
government. The system of checks and balances, for example, is 
far more central to the larger perspective than any single power 
conferred on Congress. But apart from the framework of govern-
ment itself, the Framers stated their motivating purposes in the 
Preamble to the Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, en-
sure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty .... " 
The power to achieve these purposes was not delegated 
solely to the at the powers that were so 
delegated, position of the Commerce Clause hardly 
suggests that it was "central" among the concerns of the patriots 
who formed our union. Article I, section 8 begins with the power 
~ 
to tax and to pay debts. 2 Then, consistent with the Preamble, ~ 
" 
2A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of 
Confederation was the central government's inability to collect 
taxes directly. Remedying this defect was thus one of the prin-
cipal purposes of the Constitutional Convention. See R. Paul, 
Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954). The importance of the 
taxing power in the minds of the Founding Fathers is obvious from 
the Convention and the ratification debates. See, e.g., The Fed-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Welfare." 3 
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1'\ 
language and structure of the Constitution itself teaches about 
the intent of the Framers. 
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A. 
The retained power of the States is recognized explic-
itly in the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple." This limitation was implicit in the Constitution as origi-
nally ratified. Even those who opposed the adoption of a Bill of 
Rights did not dispute the propriety of such a limitation. Rath-
er, they argued that it was unnecessary, for the Constitution 
delegated certain powers to the central government, and those not 
delegated were necessarily retained by the States or the people.~  
Furthermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of government itself. Members of Congress and 
presidential electors are chosen by States. Representation in 
the Senate is apportioned by States, regardless of population. 
~USTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion recognizes no 1 imi t to 
Congress's power to override state sovereignty in exercising its 
powers under the Commerce Clause. The opinion does not mention 
either federalism or state sovereignty. It instead declares that 
"[t] he only basis for questioning the federal statute at issue 
here is the pure judicial fiat found in this Court's opinion in 
National League of Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 4. Under this 
view it is not easy to think of any function of state or local 
overnment that could not be preempted--incltldin~ a Stat~'s crim ~ 
• 4 --
tf ~lexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The 
Federalist No. 84, pp. 578-581 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also 
United States v. Darby, 312 u.s. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment 
"declaratory of the relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before 
the amendment"); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 
(1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the under-
standing of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, 
that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the 
States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as 
originally ratified •... "). 
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The Full Faith and Credit Clause gives particular recognition to 
the "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" of the 
States. Article IV, section 4 requires a republican form of gov-
ernment in each State. The initial ratification of the Constitu-
tion was accomplished on a state-by-state basis, and subsequent 
amendments require approval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that 
the Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Constitu-
tion," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are numer-
ous and indefinite. The former will be exercised prin-
cipally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negociation, and foreign commerce •... The powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the 
objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, con-
cern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of 
the State. " The Federal is t No. 4 5 , p. 313 ( J . Cooke 
ed. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that this view was shared by a±~of Madi-
son's contemporaries. See, e.g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oli-
ver Elsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 2 6, 178 7) , 
reprinted in 3 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 
of 1787, p. 99 (1911) (description of proposed Constitution) (The 
"powers [vested in Congress] extend only to matters respecting 
the common interests of the union, and are specially defined, so 
that the particular states retain their sovereignty in all other 
matters."). 
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During the earliest years of our constitutional devel-
opment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the union to 
assert its rights as a State against the federal government. In 
1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolu-
tions, which were passed by the Kentucky legislature to protest 
the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, [citation].~~ the same 
time, Madison drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were 
adopted by the Virginia General Assembly. [citation] In both 
cases it was clear that the reserved powers of the States were 
treated as a substantive limitation on Congress's authority. 
ater, Jefferson's and Ma 
by John C. Calhoun in the South Carolina Expo · 10n of 1828, 
tation] , which set forth the 
s. J?In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several States composing the United States 
of America are not united on the principle of unlimited 
submission to their general government; but that, by 
compact, under the style and title of a Constitution 
for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they 
constituted a general government for special purposes, 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, 
reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of 
right to their own self-government; and that whensoever 
the general government assumes undelegated powers, its 
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The view that the reserved powers of the States placed 
limits on the powers of the federal government was hardly con-
fined to the South. The New England States, for example, were 
vehement in their opposition to the Embargo Act of 1807, [cita-
tion], and they turned to their rights as States in defense. In 
1809, the governor of Connecticut, with the support of the legis-
lature, refused to assist the Secretary of War in enforcing the 
~ ~~ct..:ril'fn Massachusetts the story was similar. When Congress 
/' passed an Act to enforce the embargo in 1809, [citation] , the 
Massachusetts legislature denounced it as "unjust, oppressive, 
and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of 
this state." [citation] When Congress enacted another embargo 
in 1813, [citation], the Massachusetts legislature declared it "a 
manifest ..• abuse of power" that infringed 





the legislature in 
G/ -1-The governor explained 
legislature that 
to a special session of the state 
"[w]henever our national legislature is led to overleap 
the prescribed bounds of their [sic] constitutional 
powers, on the state legislatures~n great emergen-
cies, devolve the arduous task--it is their right--it 
becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting 
shield between the right and liberty of the people, and 
the assumed power of the general government." [ci ta-
tion] 
The legislature promptly passed resolutions supporting the gover-
nor's position, and concluding that the Embargo Act was "incom-
patible with the constitution of the United States, and 
encroach [ed] upon the immuni tes of [the] state." [ citation] In 
view of its duty to support the Constitution, the legislature 
declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the aforesaid 
unconstitutional acts." [citation] 
F t t ( ) 
7
QI" Wl'll f 11 . oo no e s r appear on o ow1ng pages. 
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"interpos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppres-
sion," [citation]. Even Daniel Webster, who is famous for his 
defense of the powers of the federal government, recognized that 
principles of federalism limit Congress's power. 8(~~~ 
sovereignty of the States in their respective 
however, is not simply a matter 
support is so overwhelming state sovereignty has 
~.;-
becom~~lOn of American political theory wA leh this 
Court has recognized time and time Even to refer to the 
highlights would go far beyond the scope of this ~ dissent, 
~ ,-.J..n-t /-
~ I menti6 n only a few of the decisions from last Term alone in 
whicl the Court expressly noted that States have significant sov-
ereign powers. 10 In Community Communications Co. v. City of 
t§ /?.llhe legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was 
reserved, in part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal 
power. [citation]. 
9During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a 
bill for the enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these 
measures were enacted it would be "the solemn duty of the State 
Governments" to interpose their authority to prevent enforcement. 
In his view, this was "among the objects for which the State Gov-
ernments exist." Speech on the Conscription Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), 
reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster 55, 
68 (1903). 
10see also Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, __ 
u.s. , [for cite-checking: 50 U.S.L.W., at 4601] (1982) 
("Puerto R1C0, like a State, is an autonomous political entity, 
'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.'") (quot-
ing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 u.s. 663, 673 
(1974)); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinea, u.s. , [4556] n. 10 (1982) (States 
are "'coequal sovereigns in a federal system'") (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 u.s. 286, 292 (1980)); 
Engle v. Isaac, __ U.S. __ , __ [4382] (1982) (discussing "the 
States' sovereign power to punish offenders"); Underwriters Na-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 (1982), we considered the state action ex-
emption from the antitrust laws. Since "'under the Constitution, 
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitution-
ally subtract from their authority,'" id., at 49 (quoting Parker 
v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341, 350-351 (1943)), there is an antitrust 
exemption for States acting "in the exercise of [their] sovereign 
powers," id., at 48. We held that this exemption does not extend 
to cities, but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the sovereign 
nature of States. See id., at 48-54. In United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), we unanimously 
upheld the application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned 
railroad. We reached this conclusion, however, only by finding 
that operation of the railroad was not one of the State's "con-
stitutionally preserved sovereign function[s] ," id., at 683. And 
in Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, u.s. 
(1982), we considered whether parts of the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act "constituted an invasion of state sovereignty 
in violation of the Tenth Amendment," id., at [102 S.Ct., at 
2133]. Although the Court upheld the statute, it was clear that 
state sovereignty was an essential element to be considered in 
tional Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health 
Ins. Guaranty Assn., 455 u.s. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the 
structure of our nation as a union of States, each possessing 
equal sovereign powers"): Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 u.s. 432, 
444-447 (1982) (relying on State's "sovereign" police powers): 
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 u.s. 100, 108 
(1982) (state courts are those "of a different, though paramount 
sovereign") (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 u.s. 521, 525 
(1932)). 
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reaching that conclusion. Id.,at ___ _ [2137-2143]. 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the impor-
tance of the principles of federalism in our constitutional sys-
tern. The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, cons ide red Con-
gress's power--including its power under the Commerce Clause--to 
------be limited by the powers raserved to the States. This is a fact 
that has been -recognized and accepted by this Court for almost 
two hundred years. ~ 
IV 
I raise 
Commerce Clause, nor to suggest that ,ex~reme 
a guments (such as Interposition or 
basic of federalism. This was the true intention of 
the Founding Fathers. 
'. . 
February 9, 1983 
EEOC4 GINA-POW 
Rider A - page 2 
It is true, of coursy e, that this Court over the 
intervening years ~ properly-~onstrued the Commerce 
Clause, and extended its reach, to accommodate 
unanticipated and indeed unimaginable changes that have 
occurred primarily in transportation and communication. 
If Justice Stevens had written that the ~unders intent in 
~ - ~0 
adopting the Commerce Clause nearly twe centuries~ is 
~ ~afl~rld in which we live today, I would 
A 
not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion proports 
to rely on their contemporary intent. Ante at 3. 
February 9, 1983 
EEOCS GINA-POW 
RIDER A, page 4 
Add the following to the end of n. 3: 
Apart from the purpose of forming a government that 
included both state and federal components, the perceived 
need for a government with power to tax, and to maintain 
an army and navy for the common defense, loomed far larger 
Ht..c.4.-~e.:.1 (!... 
in the ~s of the £ ounders than the need to eliminate 
" 
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EEOC6 GINA-POW 
RIDER A, page 7 
It was asserted that these powers enabled a ~tate to 
-~ 
interpose its will against any action by the federal 
government. Thirty years later, Jefferson's and Madison's 
views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in the South 
Carolina Exposition of 1828 that set forth the 
~ 
nullification doctrine - the extreme view that~led to the 
~r ¥etween the~tates.Y~ 
~, Tin referring to this early and interesting history, I do 
not suggest that either the doctrine of interposition or 
that of nullification was constitutionally sound. 
~~~ 1 were laid to rest in one of the 
2. 
bloodiest fratricidef in history that ended at Appomattox 
in 1865. The views of these great figures in our history 
are, however, directly pertinent to the question whether 
there was ever any inten1lon that the Commerce Clause~~~ 
p6'We£S .of tbe S~. 
February 9, 1983 
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RIDER A, page 9 
B 
Lf/ Few perceptions of history are clearer than the fact 
that state sovereignty was a basic assumption of American 
political theory. Although its contours have not remained 
the same as conditions have changed, state sovereignty 
remains a fundamental component of our system that this 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF 'JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, but 
write separately to record a personal dissent from JUSTICE STE-
VENS's revisionist view of the history of our country. 
I 
JUSTICE STEVENS commences his concurring opinion with 
the startling observation that the Commerce Clause "was the Fram-
ers' response to the central problem that gave rise to the Con-
stitution itself." Ante, at 1 {emphasis added). At a subsequent 
point in his opinion, he observes that "this Court has construed 
the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers ... to 
confer a power on the national government adequate to discharge 
its central mission." Ante, at 3 {emphasis added) . 1 JUSTICE 
STEVENS further states that "National League of Cities not only 
was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the cen-
tral purpose of the Constitution itself .... " Ante, at 5 {empha-
sis added). 
No one would deny that removing barriers to the free 
flow of trade was one of the purposes of the Constitution. I 
suggest, however, that there were a number of other purposes of 
1The authority on which JUSTICE STEVENS primarily relies is 
an extrajudicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. 
Ante, at 1-2. Justice Rutledge declared that the "proximate 
cause of our national existence" was not to assure the great 
"democratic freedoms"; rather it was "to secure freedom of trade" 
within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal 
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equal or greater importance in the contemplation of the statesmen 
who assembled in Philadelphia, and the delegates who debated the 
issue of ratification at the conventions in the several States. 
No doubt there were differences of opinion as to the primacy of 
the various purposes. But one can be reasonably sure that few of 
the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers were "the cen-
tral problem," or that their elimination was the "central mis-
sion" of the Constitutional Convention. Creating a federal sys-
tem was far more central than any eighteenth century perception 
of interstate commerce. It is true, of course, that this Court 
over the intervening years properly has construed the Commerce 
Clause, and extended its reach, to accommodate unanticipated and 
indeed unimaginable changes that have occurred primarily in 
transportation and communication. If JUSTICE STEVENS had written 
that the Founders' intent in adopting the Commerce Clause nearly 
two centuries ago is of little relevance to the world in which we 
live today, I would not have disagreed. But his concurring opin-
ion purports to rely on their contemporary intent. Ante at 3. I 
therefore write--briefly in view of the scope of the subject--to 
place the Commerce Clause in the proper perspective of history, 
and further to suggest that even today federalism is not so ut-
terly subservient to that Clause as JUSTICE STEVENS appears to 
believe. 
II 
The central purpose of the Constitution was, as the 
name implies, to constitute a government. The central provi-
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sions, therefore, are those relating to the establishment of the 
government. The system of checks and balances, for example, is 
far more central to the larger perspective than any single power 
conferred on Congress. But apart from the framework of govern-
ment itself, the Framers stated their motivating purposes in the 
Preamble to the Constitution: 
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, en-
sure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty •••• " 
The power to achieve these purposes was not delegated 
solely to the Congress. If, however, one looks at the powers 
that were so delegated, the position of the Commerce Clause hard-
ly suggests that it was "central" among the concerns of the pa-
triots who formed our union. Article I, section 8 begins with 
the power to tax and to pay debts. 2 Then, consistent with the 
Preamble, comes the power to "provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare. " 3 Among the following enumerated powers, the 
2A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of 
Confederation was the central government's inability to collect 
taxes directly. Remedying this defect was thus one of the prin-
cipal purposes of the Constitutional Convention. See R. Paul, 
Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954). The importance of the 
taxing power in the minds of the Founding Fathers is obvious from 
the Convention and the ratification debates. See, e.g., The Fed-
eralist No. 30 (A. Hamilton). 
3Both sides of the constitutional debate recognized that the 
power to defend the country was essential, and must be given to 
the central government. See The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 
(J. Cooke ed. 19 61) (J. Madison) . Even under the Articles of 
Confederation, it was considered necessary to give Congress "the 
sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Commerce Clause is only one among nearly a score. It is given no 
place of prominence. So much for what the language and structure 
of the Constitution itself teaches about the intent of the Fram-
ers. 
III 
One would never know from the concurring opinion that 
the Constitution formed a federal system, composed of the central 
government and States that retained a significant measure of sov-
ere ign authority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, 
from the debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from 
the early history of our constitutional development, and from the 
decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the 
Constitution would have been adopted, much less ratified, if it 
had been understood that the "central mission" of the national 
government was embodied in the Commerce Clause, a mission to be 
accomplished even at the expense of regulating the personnel 
practices of state and local governments. 
A 
The retained power of the States is recognized explic-
i tly in the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the 
war." Art. IX. Apart from the purpose of forming a government 
that included both state and federal components, the perceived 
need for a government with power to tax, and to maintain an army 
and navy for the common defense, loomed far larger in the think-
ing of the Founders than the need to eliminate barriers to the 
fledgling commerce among the states . 
. ,. 
,._,.,, y' .. 
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United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple ... This limitation was implicit in the Constitution as origi-
nally ratified. Even those who opposed the adoption of a Bill of 
Rights did not dispute the propriety of such a limitation. Rath-
er, they argued that it was unnecessary, for the Constitution 
delegated certain powers to the central government, and those not 
delegated were necessarily retained by the States or the people. 4 
Furthermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear 
from the structure of government itself. Members of Congress and 
presidential electors are chosen by States. Representation in 
the Senate is apportioned by States, regardless of population. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause gives particular recognition to 
the 11 public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings.. of the 
States. Article IV, section 4 requires a republican form of gov-
ernment in each State. The initial ratification of the Constitu-
tion was accomplished on a state-by-state basis, and subsequent 
amendments require approval by three fourths of the States. 
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that 
4Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The 
Federalist No. 84, pp. 578-581 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also 
United States v. Darby, 312 u.s. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment 
11 declaratory of the relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before 
the amendment 11 ) ~ United States v. Sprague, 282 u.s. 716, 733 
(1931) ( 11 The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the under-
standing of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, 
that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the 
States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as 
originally ratified .... 11 ). 
~. 
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the Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a 
federal system. As James Madison, "the Father of the Constitu-
tion," explained to the people of New York: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are numer-
ous and indefinite. The former will be exercised prin-
cipally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negociation, and foreign commerce .... The powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the 
objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, con-
cern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of 
the State." The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke 
ed. 1961). 
There can be no doubt that this view was shared by Madison's con-
temporaries. See, e.g., Letter of Roger Sherman & Oliver 
Elsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 17 8 7) , r e-
printed in 3 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, p. 99 (1911) (description of proposed Constitution) (The 
"powers [vested in Congress] extend only to matters respecting 
the common interests of the union, and are specially defined, so 
that the particular states retain their sovereignty in all other 
matters."). 
During the earliest years of our constitutional devel-
opment, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, 
they formed the basis for virtually every State in the union to 
assert its rights as a State against the federal government. In 
1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolu-
tions, which were passed by the Kentucky legislature to protest 
the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, [citation] . 5 At the same 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
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t irne, Madison drafted s irnilar Virginia Resolutions, which were 
adopted by the Virginia General Assembly. [citation] In both 
cases it was clear that the reserved powers of the States were 
treated as a substantive limitation on Congress's authority. It 
was asserted that these powers enabled a State to interpose its 
will against any action by the Federal Government. Thirty years 
later, Jefferson's and Madison's views were expanded by John C. 
Calhoun in the South Carolina Exposition of 1828, [citation] , 
~f-set forth the nullification doctrine--the extreme view that 
eventually led to the War Between the States. 6 
The view that the reserved powers of the States placed 
limits on the powers of the Federal Government was hardly con-
fined to the South. The New England States, for example, were 
5 In the first resolution, Jefferson explained 
"[t]hat the several States composing the United States 
of America are not united on the principle of unlimited 
submission to their general government; but that, by 
compact, under the style and title of a Constitution 
for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they 
constituted a general government for special purposes, 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, 
reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of 
right to their own self-government; and that whensoever 
the general government assumes undelegated powers, its 
acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force." [ci-
tation] 
6 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not 
suggest that either the doctrine of interposition or that of nul-
lification was constitutionally sound. In any event, they were 
laid to rest in one of history's bloodiest fratricides, ending at 
Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great figures in our his-
tory are, however, directly pertinent to the question whether 
there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would ern-
power the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sov-
ereign powers reserved to the States. 
,. I 
'· 
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vehement in their opposition to the Embargo Act of 1807, [cita-
tion], and they turned to their rights as States in defense. In 
1809, the governor of Connecticut, with the support of the legis-
lature, refused to assist the Secretary of War in enforcing the 
Act. 7 In Massachusetts the story was similar. When Congress 
passed an Act to enforce the embargo in 1809, [citation] , the 
Massachusetts legislature denounced it as "unjust, oppressive, 
and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of 
this state." [citation] When Congress enacted another embargo 
in 1813, [citation], the Massachusetts legislature declared it "a 
manifest ... abuse of power" that infringed the "sovereignty re-
served to the States" 8 and justified the legislature in 
"interpos[ing] its power" to protect its citizens from "oppres-
7The governor explained to a special session of the state 
legislature that 
"[w)henever our national legislature is led to overleap 
the prescribed bounds of their [sic] constitutional 
powers, on the state legislatures, in great emergen-
cies, devolve the arduous task--it is their right--it 
becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting 
shield between the right and liberty of the people, and 
the assumed power of the general government." [cita-
tion] 
The legislature promptly passed resolutions supporting the gover-
nor's position, and concluding that the Embargo Act was "incom-
patible with the constitution of the United States, and 
encroach [ed] upon the immunites of [the] state." [citation] In 
view of its duty to support the Constitution, the legislature 
declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the aforesaid 
unconstitutional acts." [citation] 
8The legislature explained that the State's sovereignty was 
reserved, in part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal 
power. [citation]. 
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sion," [citation] . Even Daniel Webster, \Htoz i:s famous for his 
defense of the powers of the federal government, recognized that 
principles of federalism limit Congress's power. 9 
B 
Few perceptions of history are clearer than the fact 
that state sovereignty was a basic assumption of American politi-
cal theory. Although its contours have not remained the same as 
conditions have changed, state sovereignty remains a fundamental 
component of our system that this Court has recognized time and 
time again. Even to refer to the highlights would go far beyond 
the scope of this dissent. I therefore mention only a few of the 
decisions from last Term alone in which the Court expressly noted 
that States have significant sovereign powers.10 In Community 
9During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a 
bill for the enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these 
measures were enacted it would be "the solemn duty of the State 
Governments" to interpose their authority to prevent enforcement. 
In his view, this was "among the objects for which the State Gov-
ernments exist." Speech on the Conscription Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), 
reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster 55, 
68 (1903). 
10see also Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, __ 
u.s. , [for cite-checking: 50 U.S.L.W., at 4601] (1982) 
("Puerto Rico, like a State, is an autonomous political entity, 
'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.'") (quot-
ing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 
(1974)); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinea, u.s. , [4556] n. 10 (1982) (States 
are "'coequal sovereigns in a federal system'") (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 u.s. 286, 292 (1980)); 
Engle v. Isaac, U.S. , [4382] (1982) (discussing "the 
States' sovereignpower to pun1 sh offenders") ; Underwriters Na-
tional Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health 
Ins. Guaranty Assn., 455 u.s. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing "the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
" ' 
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Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), we 
considered the state action exemption from the antitrust laws. 
Since "'under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save 
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their author-
ity,'" id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-351 
(1943)), there is an antitrust exemption for States acting "in 
the exercise of [their] sovereign powers," id. , at 48. We held 
that this exemption does not extend to cities, but in so doing we 
repeatedly stressed the sovereign nature of States. See id., at 
48-54. In United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
u.s. 678 (1982), we unanimously upheld the application of the 
Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. We reached this 
conclusion, however, only by finding that operation of the rail-
road was not one of the State's "constitutionally preserved sov-
ereign function[s] ," id., at 683. And in Federal Energy Regula-
tory Comm'n v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___ (1982), we considered 
whether parts of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act "con-
stituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the 
Tenth Amendment," id., at ___ [102 S.Ct., at 2133]. Although the 
Court upheld the statute, it was clear that state sovereignty was 
an essential element to be considered in reaching that conclu-
structure of our nation as a union of States, each possessing 
equal sovereign powers")~ Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 u.s. 432, 
444-447 (1982) (relying on State's "sovere1gn" police powers)~ 
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 u.s. 100, 108 
(1982) (state courts are those "of a different, though paramount 
sovereign") (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 
(1932)). 
, .. 
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sion. Id., at __ -__ [2137-2143]. 
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the impor-
tance of the principles of federalism in our constitutional sys-
tern. The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, cons ide red Con-
gress's power--including its power under the Commerce Clause--to 
be limited by the powers reserved to the States. This is a fact 
that has been recognized and accepted by this Court for almost 
two hundred years.ll 
IV 
JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion recognizes no lim-
it to Congress's power to override state sovereignty in exercis-
ing its powers under the Commerce Clause. The opinion does not 
mention either federalism or state sovereignty. ~de­
clares that "[t]he only basis for questioning the federal statute 
at issue here is the pure judicial fiat found in this Court's 
opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery." Ante, at 4. 
Under this view it is not easy to think of any function of state 
or local government that could not be preempted. 
11of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce 
Clause. It is essential to the functioning of our National Gov-
ernment. It is, however, only one provision of a Constitution 
that embodies strong principles of federalism. 
'"", , 
mfs 01/30/83 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
·---------
dissenting opinion, 
only to stress my disagreement with some of the asser-
and implications found in JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring 
To read JUSTICE STEVENS's opinion, one would think that 
Commerce Clause was the centerpiece around which the Consti-
was built, and that principles of federalism have no 
in constitutional analysis. Both of these propositions 
in my view, wrong. 
I 
No one today could seriously challenge the importance of 
the Commerce Clause, but it is--and always has 
revisions in the Cons · The central pur-
pose of the Constitution was, as the name implies, to constitute 
a government. The central provisions, therefore, are those re-
lating to the establishment of the government. ~ider 
~ Constitution's system of checks 
· ~ 




and balances, for example, ~ 
~~k 
perspective than the c~ 
Even if /' looked only at Article I, 
~-
sect ion 8, w'hlch 
enumerates certain powers granted to Congress, I would not place 
\1 ~"' the Commerce Clause above the rest. It strikes me as no acci-
dent, for example, that section 8 begins by granting Congress the 
( 
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"Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." 
If one power were to be viewed as central, the taxing power seems 
to be the obvious candidate. 1 Congress's powers to "declare 
War," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a 
Navy," all of which are found in section 8, were also at least as 
important as the commerce powers in the minds of the Founding 
Fathers. 2 Their desire to "provide for the common defence," af-
ter all, was one of the explicit concerns mentioned in the Pream-
ble. 
II 
Principles of federalism are also an important aspect of 
our constitutional theory, and this fact has been recognized from 
the nation's earliest years. Chief Justice Marshall's contribu-
tions to the growth of the power of the federal government are 
well known. Less well recognized is the fact that virtually ev-
ery state in the country asserted its rights as a state against 
the federal government during the same period. In several cases 
these assertions were directed at acts of Congress. 3 As the Con-
1The delegates at the Constitutional Convention certainly paid 
more attention to Congress's power to tax than to its power to 
regulate interstate commerce. [citation] And at the state rati-
fying conventions, the extent of the taxing power was the more 
frequent subject of debate. [citation] ~/-_. _ · _ .J. 
P1..c.~~-~~ 
2 [Put something here about the need to ki"efend against common 
enemies. No one disputed that this was a~ pew~r for the central 
government.] -
3The states were also jealous to defend their rights agai st 
what were viewed as encroachments by the federal judic z·ary. The 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~ 
~~~ 
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stitution developed, it is clear that principles of federalism 
played an important role in restricting Congress's power. 
In 1798, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolu-
tions, which were passed by the Kentucky legislature to protest 
the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, [citation]. In the first 
resolution he explained 
At 
"[t]hat the several States composing the United States 
of America are not united on the principle of unlimited 
submission to their general government; but that, by 
compact, under the style and title of a Constitution 
for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they 
constituted a general government for special purposes, 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, 
reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of 
right to their own self-government; and that whensoever 
the general government assumes undelegated powers, its 
acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force." [ci-
tation] 
the same time, James Madison, "the Father of the 
Constitution," drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were 
adopted by the Virginia General Assembly. [citation] In both 
cases it was clear that the reserved powers of the states were 
treated as a substantive limitation on Congress's authority. 
This view of federalism was hardly limited to the South. 
Within a decade, the New England states were vehement in their 
opposition to the Embargo Act of 1807, [citation], and they 
classic example, of course, is the Eleventh Amendment, a reaction 
to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). Other examples from 
this early period may be found in Pennsylvania's reactions to 
Huidekoper' s Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. 1 ( 18 0 5) , and United 
States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115 (1809), and in Georgia's reaction to 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
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turned to their rights as states in defense. In 1809, for exam-
ple, the Secretary of War sought assistance from the governor of 
Connecticut in enforcing the Embargo Act. The governor flatly 
refused, and summoned a special session of the state legislature. 
He explained to the legislature that 
"[w]henever our national legislature is led to overleap 
the prescribed bounds of their [sic] constitutional 
powers, on the state legislatures;-in great emergen-
cies, devolve the arduous task--it is their right--it 
becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting 
shield between the right and liberty of the people, and 
the assumed power of the general government." [ ci ta-
tion] 
The legislature promptly passed resolutions supporting the gover-
nor's position, and concluding that the Embargo Act was "incom-
patible with the constitution of the United States, and 
encroach [ed] upon the immunites of [the] state." [citation] In 
view of its duty to support the Constitution, the legislature 
declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the aforesaid 
unconstitutional acts." [citation] 
In Massachusetts the story was similar. When Congress 
passed an Act to enforce the embargo in 1809, [citation], the 
Massachusetts legislature denounced it as "unjust, oppressive, 
and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of 
this state." [citation] When Congress enacted another embargo 
in 1813, [citation], the Massachusetts legislature again reacted 
strongly. After receiving complaints from forty towns in the 
state, it declared: 
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"A power to regulate Commerce is abused when employed 
to destroy it; and a manifest and voluntary abuse of 
power sanctions the right of resistance, as much as a 
direct and palpable usurpation. The sovereignty re-
served to the States, was reserved to protect the Citi-
zens from acts of violence by the United States, as 
well as for purposes of domestic regulation. We spurn 
the idea that the free, sovereign and independent State 
of Massachusetts is reduced to a mere municipal corpo-
ration, without power to protect its people, and to 
defend them from oppression, from whatever quarter it 
comes. Whenever the national compact is violated, and 
the citizens of this state are oppressed by cruel and 
unauthorized law, this legislature is bound to inter-
pose its power, and wrest from the oppressor his vic-
tim." [citation] 
There can be little doubt that early New Englanders4 considered 
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause to be limited by 
principles of federalism. 
The most extreme assertion of states' rights in this 
period can be found in the South Carolina Exposition of 1828, 
which sets out John c. Calhoun's nullification doctrine. [cita-
tion] In essence, Calhoun argued that each state had the power 
to determine whether an act of the national government complied 
with the Constitution; and if not, whether the act should be en-
forced within the limits of the state. The doctrine was first 
asserted by South Carolina four years later in reaction to the 
4During this period even Daniel Webster, who is famous for his 
defense of the powers of the federal government, recognized that 
principles of federalism limit Congress's power. During a debate 
in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the enlistment 
of minors, he declared that if these measures were enacted it 
would be the duty of the states to interpose their authority to 
prevent enforcement. In his view, this was one of the purposes 
for which state governments existed. 1 H. Hockett, The Constitu-
tional History of the United States 337 (1939). 
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Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832, [citation] . 5 A state convention 
passed an ordinance nullifying the Acts with the declaration that 
they were "unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, 
and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null, 
void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers, or 
citizens." [citation] 
In sum, there are numerous examples from our early his-
tory that demonstrate the importance of the principles of feder-
alism. The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, cons ide red Con-
gress's power--including its power under the Commerce Clause--to 
be limited by the powers reserved to the States. 
III 
I raise these points not to suggest that Interposition 
or Nullification are, or ever were, viable doctrines. Rather I 
consider it important to stress the federal nature of the Consti-
tution, and to emphasize that all of Congress's powers--including 
its powers under the Commerce Clause--must be exercised consis-
tently with basic principles of federalism. 
5Almost all of the southern states passed resolutions during 
this period condemning protective tariffs as unconstitutional. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, and write 
separately only to stress my disagreement with some of the asser-
tions and implications found in JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring 
opinion. To read JUSTICE STEVENS's opinion, one would think that 
the Commerce Clause was the centerpiece around which the Consti-
tution was built, and that principles of federalism have no 
weight in constitutional analysis. Both of these propositions 
are, in my view, wrong. 
I 
No one today could seriously challenge the importance of 
the Commerce Clause, but it is--and always has been--only one of 
many important provisions in the Constitution. The central pur-
pose of the Constitution was, as the name implies, to constitute 
a government. The central provisions, therefore, are those re-
lating to the establishment of the government. I thus consider 
the Constitution's system of checks and balances, for example, to 
be far more important in the larger perspective than the Commerce 
Clause. 
Even if I looked only at Article I, sect ion 8, which 
enumerates certain powers granted to Congress, I would not place 
the Commerce Clause above the rest. It strikes me as no acci-
dent, for example, that section 8 begins by granting Congress the 
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"Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." 
If one power were to be viewed as central, the taxing power seems 
to be the obvious candidate. 1 Congress's powers to "declare 
War," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a 
Navy," all of which are found in section 8, were also at least as 
important as the commerce powers in the minds of the Founding 
Fathers. 2 Their desire to "provide for the common defence," af-
ter all, was one of the explicit concerns mentioned in the Pream-
ble. 
II 
Principles of federalism are also an important aspect of 
our constitutional theory, and this fact has been recognized from 
the nation's earliest years. Chief Justice Marshall's contribu-
tions to the growth of the power of the federal government are 
well known. Less well recognized is the fact that virtually ev-
ery state in the country asserted its rights as a state against 
the federal government during the same period. In several cases 
these assertions were directed at acts of Congress. 3 As the Con-
1The delegates at the Constitutional Convention certainly paid 
more attention to Congress's power to tax than to its power to 
regulate interstate commerce. [citation] And at the state rati-
fying conventions, the extent of the taxing power was the more 
frequent subject of debate. [ citation] 
2 [Put something here about the need to defend against common 
enemies. No one disputed that this was a power for the central 
government.] 
3The states were also jealous to defend their rights against 
what were viewed as encroachments by the federal judiciary. The 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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stitution developed, it is clear that principles of federalism 
played an important role in restricting Congress's power. 
In 1798, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolu-
tions, which were passed by the Kentucky legislature to protest 
the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, [citation] . In the first 
resolution he explained 
At 
"[t]hat the several States composing the United States 
of America are not united on the principle of unlimited 
submission to their general government; but that, by 
compact, under the style and title of a Constitution 
for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they 
constituted a general government for special purposes, 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, 
reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of 
right to their own self-government; and that whensoever 
the general government assumes undelegated powers, its 
acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force." [ci-
tation] 
the same time, James Madison, "the Father of the 
Constitution," drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were 
adopted by the Virginia General Assembly. [citation] In both 
cases it was clear that the reserved powers of the states were 
treated as a substantive limitation on Congress's authority. 
This view of federalism was hardly limited to the South. 
Within a decade, the New England states were vehement in their 
opposition to the Embargo Act of 1807, [citation], and they 
classic example, of course, is the Eleventh Amendment, a reaction 
to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 u.s. 419 (1793). Other examples from 
this early period may be found in Pennsylvania's reactions to 
Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. 1 (1805), and United 
States v. Peters, 9 u.s. 115 (1809), and in Georgia's react1on to 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 u.s. 515 (1832) • 
. ' 
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turned to their rights as states in defense. In 1809, for exam-
ple, the Secretary of War sought assistance from the governor of 
Connecticut in enforcing the Embargo Act. The governor flatly 
refused, and summoned a special session of the state legislature. 
He explained to the legislature that 
"[w]henever our national legislature is led to overleap 
the prescribed bounds of their [sic] constitutional 
powers, on the state legislatures;--In great emergen-
cies, devolve the arduous task--it is their right--it 
becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting 
shield between the right and liberty of the people, and 
the assumed power of the general government." [cita-
tion] 
The legislature promptly passed resolutions supporting the gover-
nor's position, and concluding that the Embargo Act was "incom-
patible with the constitution of the United States, and 
encroach[ed] upon the immunites of [the] state." [citation] In 
view of its duty to support the Constitution, the legislature 
declined "to assist, or concur in giving effect to the aforesaid 
unconstitutional acts." [citation] 
In Massachusetts the story was similar. When Congress 
passed an Act to enforce the embargo in 180 9, [ citation] , the 
Massachusetts legislature denounced it as "unjust, oppressive, 
and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of 
this state." [citation] When Congress enacted another embargo 
in 1813, [citation], the Massachusetts legislature again reacted 
strongly. After receiving complaints from forty towns in the 
state, it declared: 
. . 
' . . 
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"A power to regulate Commerce is abused when employed 
to destroy it; and a manifest and voluntary abuse of 
power sanctions the right of resistance, as much as a 
direct and palpable usurpation. The sovereignty re-
served to the States, was reserved to protect the Citi-
zens from acts of violence by the United States, as 
well as for purposes of domestic regulation. We spurn 
the idea that the free, sovereign and independent State 
of Massachusetts is reduced to a mere municipal corpo-
ration, without power to protect its people, and to 
defend them from oppression, from whatever quarter it 
comes. Whenever the national compact is violated, and 
the citizens of this state are oppressed by cruel and 
unauthorized law, this legislature is bound to inter-
pose its power, and wrest from the oppressor his vic-
tim." [citation] 
There can be little doubt that early New Englanders4 considered 
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause to be limited by 
principles of federalism. 
The most extreme assertion of states' rights in this 
period can be found in the South Carolina Exposition of 1828, 
which sets out John C. Calhoun's nullification doctrine. [cita-
tion] In essence, Calhoun argued that each state had the power 
to determine whether an act of the national government complied 
with the Constitution; and if not, whether the act should be en-
forced within the limits of the state. The doctrine was first 
asserted by South Carolina four years later in reaction to the 
4During this period even Daniel Webster, who is famous for his 
defense of the powers of the federal government, recognized that 
principles of federalism limit Congress's power. During a debate 
in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the enlistment 
of minors, he declared that if these measures were enacted it 
would be the duty of the states to interpose their authority to 
prevent enforcement. In his view, this was one of the purposes 
for which state governments existed. 1 H. Hockett, The Constitu-
tional History of the United States 337 (1939). 
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Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832, [citation]. 5 A state convention 
passed an ordinance nullifying the Acts with the declaration that 
they were "unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, 
and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null, 
void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers, or 
citizens." [citation] 
In sum, there are numerous examples from our early his-
tory that demonstrate the importance of the principles of feder-
alism. The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the 
earliest phases of constitutional development, cons ide red Con-
gress's power--including its power under the Commerce Clause--to 
be limited by the powers reserved to the States. 
III 
I raise these points not to suggest that Interposition 
or Nullification are, or ever were, viable doctrines. Rather I 
consider it important to stress the federal nature of the Consti-
tution, and to emphasize that all of Congress's powers--including 
its powers under the Commerce Clause--must be exercised consis-
tently with basic principles of federalism. 
5Almost all of the southern states passed resolutions during 
this period condemning protective tariffs as unconstitutional. 
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
I join the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion, 
and write separately to record a personal dissent from 
Justice Stevens' revisionist view of the history of our 
country. He commences his separate concurring opinion 
with the startling observation that the Commerce Clause 
"was the Framers' response to the central problem that 
gave rise to the Constitution itself". Ante, at 1. 
(emphasis added). Again, at a subsequent point in his 
opinion Justice Stevens observed that "this Court has 
construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the 
Framers . . . to confer a power on the national government 
adequate to discharge its central miss ion". Ante, at 3 
(emphasis added) •1 Justice Stevens further states that 
1The authority primarily relied on by 
Justice Stevens are quotations from Justice Rutledge who 
did indeed write in 1947 that the "proximate cause of our 
national existence" was not to assure the great 
"democratic freedoms"; rather it was "to secure freedom of 
trade" within the former colonies. W. Rutledge, A 
Declaration of Legal Faith, at 25-26, (1947), ante, at 
1,2 . 
... ~ . 
2. 
"National League of Cities not only was incorrectly 
decided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose 
of the Constitution itself . . . " Ante, at 5. (emphasis 
added) 
I 
Justice Stevens and I must have read different 
history books. No one would suggest that removing 
barriers to the free flow of trade was not one of the 
purposes of the Constitution. I do suggest that there 
were a number of other purposes of equal or greater 
importance in the contemplation of the statesmen who 
assembled in Philadelphia and as evidenced by the debates 
in the several states on the issue of ratification. No 
doubt there were differences of opinion as to the primacy 
of the various purposes. But one can be reasonably sure 
that few among the Founding Fathers thought that trade 
barriers were "the central problem", or that their 
elimination was the "central mission" of the 
Constitutional Convention. 
If Justice Stevens had written that the intent 
of the Founders, in adopting the Commerce Clause nearly 
two centuries ago,is irrelevant to the world in which we 
.l 
live today, I would not have disagreed. But 




Commerce Clause properly has been construed, and its reach 
gradually extended, by this Court to accommodate 
unanticipated changes that have occurred over the decades 
primarily in transportation and communication. I would 
not have thought until today, however, that anyone would 
suppose that the time and circumstances of a game warden's 
retirement in Wyoming were of the slightest consequences 
to commerce and trade. Surely, such a suggestion, 
seriously made at the time that this was within the 
central purpose of the Constitution, would have foreclosed 
its ratification. 
I refer to the dissenting opinion of the Chief 
Justice for a response to the Court's opinion on the basis 
of constitutional doctrine. I write only -- and briefly 
in view of the scope of the subject -- to place the 
Commerce Clause properly in the perspective of history, 
and to suggest that even today federalism is not as 
utterly subservient to that Clause as Justice Stevens 
appears to believe. 
• 1 
4. 
The central purpose of the Constitution was, as 
the name implies, to constitute a government. The central 
provisions, therefore, are those relating to the 
establishment of the government. The system of checks and 
balances, for example, was far more central to the larger 
perspective than any single power conferred on Congress. 
But apart from the framework of government itself, the 
motivating purposes of the Framers were stated in the 






to form a more perfect Union, establish 
ensure domestic Tranquility, provide 
common defence, promote the general 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty .. 
Achievement of these purposes was not delegated 
solely to the Congress. But if one looks at the powers 
that were so delegated, the position of the Commerce 
Clause hardly suggests that it was "central" among the 
concerns of the patriots who formed our union. Section 8 
beg ins with the power to tax and to pay debts. Then, 
consistent with the preamble is the power to "provide for 
the common defense and general welfare". Among the 
following enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause is only 




and structure of the Constitution itself teachers about 
the intent of the Framers. 
III 
One would never know from 
colleague's 
formed a 
concurring opinion that 
federal system, composed 
my friend's and 
the Constitution 
of the central 
government and states that retained a significant measure 
of sovereign authority. This is clear from the the 
Constitution itself, the debates at the Convent ion and 
particularly from the discussions that attended the 
ratification debates in the colonies. It is impossible to 
believe that the Constitution would have been adopted, 
much less ratified, if it had been understood that the 
"central mission" of the national government was embodied 
in the Commerce Clause, a mission to be accomplished even 
at the expense of regulating the personnel practices of 
state and local government. 
·. 
